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Abstract
Stream ciphers are fast cryptographic primitives to provide confidentiality of electronically
transmitted data. They can be very suitable in environments with restricted resources,
such as mobile devices or embedded systems. Practical examples are cell phones, RFID
transponders, smart cards or devices in sensor networks. Besides efficiency, security is the
most important property of a stream cipher. In this thesis, we address cryptanalysis of
modern lightweight stream ciphers. We derive and improve cryptanalytic methods for dif-
ferent building blocks and present dedicated attacks on specific proposals, including some
eSTREAM candidates. As a result, we elaborate on the design criteria for the develop-
ment of secure and efficient stream ciphers. The best-known building block is the linear
feedback shift register (LFSR), which can be combined with a nonlinear Boolean output
function. A powerful type of attacks against LFSR-based stream ciphers are the recent
algebraic attacks, these exploit the specific structure by deriving low degree equations for
recovering the secret key. We efficiently determine the immunity of existing and newly
constructed Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks. The concept of algebraic im-
munity is then generalized by investigating the augmented function of the stream cipher.
As an application of this framework, we improve the cryptanalysis of a well-known stream
cipher with irregularly clocked LFSR’s. Algebraic attacks can be avoided by substituting
the LFSR with a suitable nonlinear driving device, such as a feedback shift register with
carry (FCSR) or the recently proposed class of T-functions. We investigate both replace-
ment schemes in view of their security, and devise different practical attacks (including
linear attacks) on a number of specific proposals based on T-functions. Another efficient
method to amplify the nonlinear behavior is to use a round-based filter function, where
each round consists of simple nonlinear operations. We use differential methods to break
a reduced-round version of eSTREAM candidate Salsa20. Similar methods can be used
to break a related compression function with a reduced number of rounds. Finally, we
investigate the algebraic structure of the initialization function of stream ciphers and pro-
vide a framework for key recovery attacks. As an application, a key recovery attack on
simplified versions of eSTREAM candidates Trivium and Grain-128 is given.
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Zusammenfassung
Stromchiffren sind schnelle kryptografische Verfahren, um die Vertraulichkeit von elek-
tronisch u¨bermittelten Daten zu gewa¨hrleisten. Sie ko¨nnen in Umgebungen mit einge-
schra¨nkten Ressourcen eingesetzt werden, etwa in mobilen Gera¨ten oder in eingebetteten
Systemen. Praktische Beispiele sind Mobiltelefone, RFID Transponder, Smartcards oder
Gera¨te in Sensornetzwerken. Nebst der Effizienz ist die Sicherheit die wichtigste Eigen-
schaft einer Stromchiffre. In dieser Doktorarbeit behandeln wir die Kryptanalyse von
modernen und leichtgewichtigen Stromchiffren. Wir entwickeln und verbessern krypt-
analytische Methoden fu¨r verschiedene Bausteine, und pra¨sentieren Angriffe auf spe-
zifische Verfahren, einschliesslich einigen eSTREAM Kandidaten. Daraus ergeben sich
diverse Kriterien fu¨r das Design und die Entwicklung von sicheren und effizienten Strom-
chiffren. Der am besten bekannte Baustein von Stromchiffren ist das lineare Schiebe-
register (LFSR), welches mit einer nichtlinearen Boolschen Filterfunktion kombiniert wer-
den kann. Ein ma¨chtiger Angriff gegen LFSR-basierte Stromchiffren sind die algebraischen
Angriffe, welche die spezifische Struktur ausnutzen um tiefgradige Gleichungen zu er-
halten und den geheimen Schlu¨ssel zu rekonstruieren. Fu¨r bestehende und zuku¨nftig
konstruierte Boolsche Funktionen ko¨nnen wir effizient die Immunita¨t gegen Schnelle Al-
gebraische Angriffe bestimmen. Das Konzept der algebraischen Immunita¨t kann auf die
Erweiterte Funktion der Stromchiffre verallgemeinert werden. Die Methode wird dann
erfolgreich auf eine bekannte Stromchiffre mit irregula¨r getakteten LFSR’s angewendet.
Im Allgemeinen ko¨nnen algebraische Angriffe verhindert werden, indem das LFSR durch
einen geeigneten nichtlinearen Baustein ersetzt wird, etwa ein Schieberegister mit Spei-
cher (FCSR) oder eine der ku¨rzlich vorgeschlagenen T-funktionen. Wir untersuchen beide
Bausteine im Hinblick auf die Sicherheit, und entwickeln diverse (insbesondere lineare)
Angriffe gegen Stromchiffren, die auf T-funktionen basieren. Es gibt auch andere effiziente
Konstruktionen, um das nichtlineare Verhalten einer Stromchiffre zu versta¨rken, etwa eine
rundenbasierte Filterfunktion, wobei jede Runde aus einfachen nichtlinearen Operationen
besteht. Wir verwenden differenzielle Methoden, um den eSTREAM Kandidaten Salsa20
fu¨r eine reduzierte Anzahl Runden zu brechen. A¨hnliche Methoden ko¨nnen dann verwen-
det werden, um eine verwandte Kompressionsfunktion (ebenfalls mit einer reduzierten
Anzahl Runden) zu brechen. Schliesslich untersuchen wir die algebraische Struktur der
Initialisierungsfunktion von Stromchiffren, und stellen eine allgemeine Methode fu¨r die
Rekonstruktion vom Schlu¨ssel bereit. Als Anwendung pra¨sentieren wir einen Angriff auf
vereinfachte Versionen der eSTREAM Kandidaten Trivium und Grain-128.
Schlu¨sselwo¨rter: Kryptanalyse, Stromchiffren, Algebraische Angriffe, T-Funktionen,
eSTREAM
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Motivation
Today’s digital communication technologies require adequate security. Stream ciphers
provide confidentiality of electronically transmitted data. Compared to other primitives,
stream ciphers are competitive in software applications with exceptionally high speed,
and in hardware applications with exceptionally small footprint. With the appearance of
mobile devices and embedded systems (such as cell phones, RFID transponders, smart
cards or devices in sensor networks), the latter becomes more significant and matches
up with the concept of lightweight cryptography. However, the attacks found on well-
known stream ciphers make it necessary to accomplish large efforts in the invention of
new replacement schemes, and in return, to cryptanalyze the new schemes. Furthermore,
it would be attractive to combine functionalities of primitives, e.g. authentication or
integrity methods may be associated to stream ciphers. In this context, the ECRYPT
project named eSTREAM has been initiated in 2004 to design and analyze new proposals
of stream ciphers “suitable for widespread adoption” [104]. This project is a successor of
the NESSIE project initiated in 2000, where no stream cipher was elected for the final
portfolio. In contrast, the block cipher Rijndael was selected in 2001 to be the advanced
encryption standard (AES). The AES is very popular and well studied. A modern stream
cipher should be “superior to the AES in at least one significant aspect” [104], where we
assume that the AES is used in some appropriate mode, e.g. counter mode.
Thesis Outline
In this thesis, we focus on the cryptanalysis of synchronous stream ciphers. The outline
of this thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2, we present our preliminaries, including the
formalism for stream ciphers and some important attacks and concepts. Our analysis
begins in Chapter 3 with the well-known filter generators, which consist of a linear update
and a nonlinear Boolean output function. To evaluate resistance against fast algebraic
attacks, we present efficient algorithms and theoretical bounds. In Chapter 4, we are able
to generalize the concept of algebraic immunity of stream ciphers by investigating the
1
2 1. Introduction
augmented function. As an application of this framework, we improve the cryptanalysis
of a well-known stream cipher with irregularly clocked LFSR’s, see Chapter 5. Algebraic
attacks are more difficult for nonlinear driving devices such as shift registers with carry
(FCSR’s). In Chapter 6, we investigate different representations for an FCSR-based stream
cipher. Another recently proposed building block for stream ciphers are the so-called T-
functions. In Chapter 7, we present a collection of practical attacks on stream ciphers
based on T-functions. Instead of a nonlinear building block, one could use a round-based
filter function, where each round consists of simple nonlinear operations. In Chapter 8,
we use differential methods to break reduced-round versions of two stream ciphers and a
related compression function. In Chapter 9, we investigate the algebraic structure of the
initialization function of stream ciphers and provide a general framework for key recovery
attacks. We finally draw our conclusions in Chapter 10. In the Appendix, we present
a very simple and efficient attack on a specific stream cipher. We have cryptanalytic
results for the following eSTREAM candidates: F-FCSR, Grain-128,MAG, Salsa20, Trivium,
TSC-4. We have additional results for ASG, ChaCha, Rumba, TF-0, TF-0M, TSC-1, TSC-2,
and for filter generators with different filter functions.
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4 1. Introduction
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Cryptology is the science of information protection against unauthorized parties [98,119].
It can be split up into cryptography (design of cryptographic systems) and cryptanalysis
(security analysis of cryptographic systems). The most important aspects of information
protection are confidentiality (information is secret from unauthorized parties), authentic-
ity (information originates from authorized party) and integrity (information is protected
against malicious modification). Modern cryptographic problems also include electronic
payment, electronic votes etc. Cryptographic algorithms can be classified into secret-key
(or symmetric) algorithms and public-key algorithms. Finally, secret-key algorithms can
be block ciphers or stream ciphers. We describe symmetric cryptosystems in general (pro-
viding confidentiality), and give an overview of designs and attacks on stream ciphers.
This requires to introduce some notational conventions.
2.1 Notational Preliminaries
We denote by F the finite field GF(2) and by Fn the vector space of dimension n over F.
An element of Fn (i.e. a word of n bits) is denoted x := (x0, . . . , xn−1) in vectorial notation,
or x := x0|| . . . ||xn−1 in big-endian bitwise notation, where || denotes concatenation. It
can also be identified as an integer x =
∑n−1
i=0 xi2
i, where x0 is the least significant bit
(lsb), and xn−1 is the most significant bit (msb). The support of x is defined to be the set
supp(x) := {i|xi = 1} and the Hamming weight of x is wt(x) := |supp(x)|. For x, y ∈ Fn,
let x ⊆ y be an abbreviation for supp(x) ⊆ supp(y). Arithmetic operations like +, −, ·
are performed modulo 2n. Boolean operations are performed on all n bits in parallel and
are denoted by ∧ (AND), ∨ (OR), and ⊕ (XOR). In addition, ≪ k (resp. ≫ k) denotes
a left (resp. right) shift by k positions (with zero-padding), and ≪ k (resp. ≫ k)
denotes a cyclic left (resp. right) shift by k positions (i.e. a rotation). It will be clear
from the context if x = (x0, . . . , xm−1) denotes an element of F
m×n, i.e. a vector of m
words of n bits each. In this case, a single bit j of word i is denoted [xi]j. A Boolean
function f is a mapping from the set Fn to F. One possibility to characterize f is its truth
table T (f) ∈ F2n . It is defined by T (f) := (f(0), . . . , f(2n − 1)). The Boolean function
is balanced if wt(T (f)) = 2n−1. An alternative description of a Boolean function is its
5
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Encryption Decryption
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Figure 2.1: Symmetric encryption.
algebraic normal form. Let F[x0, . . . , xn−1] be the ring of multivariate polynomials over
F in the n unknowns x0, . . . , xn−1. For a multi-index α ∈ Fn, we define the monomials by
xα := xα00 · . . . · xαn−1n−1 . Then, any Boolean function f : Fn → F has a unique expression
f(x) =
⊕
α
fα x
α, fα ∈ F . (2.1)
Consequently, we define its coefficients vector C(f) ∈ F2n by C(f) := (f0, . . . , f2n−1)
and its degree by deg(f) := max{|α| : fα = 1}. We will also consider vectorial Boolean
functions (or S-boxes) from Fn to Fm.
2.2 Definition of a Cryptosystem
According to the communication model introduced by Shannon [113], there is a sender and
a receiver with a public communication channel. The goal of the sender is to send some
information (the plaintext) in a confidential way to the receiver. This can be achieved
with a cryptosystem and an additional secure channel of low bandwidth. In symmetric
cryptography, the secure channel can not be eavesdropped by an adversary, and it is used
to transmit a secret key. Given the plaintext, the secret key and the cryptosystem, the
sender can construct the ciphertext and send it to the receiver over the public commu-
nication channel. The receiver can then reconstruct the plaintext, given the ciphertext,
the secret key and the cryptosystem, see Fig. 2.2. Formally, a cryptosystem is defined as
follows:
Definition 1. A cryptosystem consists of a plaintext space P, a ciphertext space C and
a key space K. There is an encryption algorithm Enc : K × P → C and a decryption
algorithm Dec : K × C → P. For each K ∈ K and p ∈ P, it is Dec(K,Enc(K, p)) = p.
A cryptosystem is necessary to protect the information from eavesdropping of a third
entity, which will be called the adversary. In an adversary model, the means and goals
of an adversary are defined. According to Kerckhoff’s Principle, an adversary knows
the specification of the cryptosystem and has access to the ciphertext c. The goal of
an adversary is to recover (part of) the plaintext, or to recover the secret key. Another
reasonable scenario is the known-plaintext attack, where the adversary knows one or
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more pairs of ciphertext with corresponding plaintext, and her goal is to decrypt other
ciphertexts or to recover the key. In some situations, it may be reasonable to assume that
the adversary has access to the physical device which contains an implementation of the
cryptosystem. All kinds of physical emanations from the device (like power consumption,
radiation, execution times etc.) can then potentially be used in a side-channel attack to
recover the key. Given some adversary model, any attack is evaluated in terms of the
required amount of data, time (number of basic operations) and memory. Consider the
known-plaintext scenario, where the adversary knows a pair (p, c) and tries to recover
the key K. An obvious attack is to try all possible keys K of the finite set K, until the
equation Enc(K, p) = c is verified. This is a basic brute-force attack, which is independent
of the details of the underlying cryptosystem. Consequently, the size of the key space
determines the maximum security of a cryptosystem, which should be related to the
computational power of a strong adversary. If there exists no better attack than brute-
force, the cryptosystem is computational secure. Otherwise, the cryptosystem is said to be
broken (which does not mean that the attack is practical). For many cryptosystems, the
problem of recovering the key can be seen as solving a huge system of nonlinear Boolean
equations. Shannon claimed that breaking a good cipher should require ”as much work
as solving a system of simultaneous equations in a large number of unknowns of a complex
type” (where the unknowns are the key bits). In general, such a problem is known to be
NP-hard.
2.3 Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are an important class of symmetric encryption algorithms [111]. They
encrypt individual symbols (usually binary digits) of a plaintext one at a time, using an
encryption transformation which varies with time, see Fig. 2.2 and Fig. 2.3. Here is a
formal definition:
Definition 2. A synchronous stream cipher consists of an internal state x ∈ X , an up-
date function L : X → X and an output function f : X → Z, where Z is the keystream
alphabet. An output z ∈ Z at time t is produced according to zt = f(xt), where xt = Lt(x)
and x is the initial state. The initial state x is produced by an initialization function
from the secret key K and an initialization vector IV denoted by V . The stream of out-
puts z0, z1, . . . is called the keystream. Each output symbol is then combined with the
corresponding plaintext symbol to produce a ciphertext symbol.
In a synchronous stream cipher, the keystream is independent of the plaintext and cipher-
text. There is no error propagation, but both the sender and receiver must be synchro-
nized. If synchronization is lost due to ciphertext digits being inserted or deleted during
transmission, then decryption fails and can only be restored through re-synchronization.
In the re-synchronization process, a public initialization vector (IV) is exchanged and
loaded into the keyed internal state, without exchanging a new key. This way, the gen-
erator will produce a unique keystream (independent from other keystreams produced
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Initiali-
zation
AutomatonKey
IV
Plaintext
Initial
State Keystream Ciphertext
Figure 2.2: Stream cipher from a high level.
State
Update
Filter
New State
Keystream
Figure 2.3: Automaton of a stream cipher.
by the same key) every time it is invoked, such that keystream blocks are never re-used.
Additional methods for authentication and integrity are needful in many applications.
Compared to other cryptosystems, synchronous stream ciphers are advantageous in
software applications with very high throughput requirements, or in hardware applica-
tions with restricted resources (such as limited storage, gate count, or power consump-
tion). They are also appropriate when buffering is limited or when characters must be
individually processed as they are received. Because they have no error propagation,
synchronous stream ciphers may also be advantageous in situations where transmission
errors are highly probable.
For a binary additive stream cipher it is Z = {0, 1}, and the plaintext, ciphertext and
keystream are binary streams of equal size. The encryption is then defined by c = p⊕ z,
and decryption simply becomes p = c⊕z. If the keystream z is a uniformly random stream
which is used only once, then the binary additive stream cipher is called a one-time pad.
According to Shannon [113], the one-time pad is unconditionally secure, which means
no secret information can be obtained from the ciphertext even for an adversary with
unlimited resources. However, this scheme is not efficient because it requires random keys
of the same size as the plaintext. With a stream cipher according to Def. 2, one can use a
small key to initialize an automaton and generate a pseudo-random keystream of length of
the plaintext. In the standard adversary model of a stream cipher, it is assumed that the
adversary knows some part of the keystream (corresponding to a known-plaintext attack)
for chosen IV’s, and her goal is to distinguish the keystream from a uniformly random
stream, or to predict the keystream, or to recover the internal state (if the update function
and the initialization function are invertible, then the key can be derived from the internal
state).
Another class of stream ciphers are self-synchronizing stream ciphers, where the
keystream is generated as a function of the key and a fixed number of previous ciphertext
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digits. Self-synchronization is possible if ciphertext digits are deleted or inserted, because
the decryption function depends only on a fixed number of preceding ciphertext digits.
One of the rare examples is eSTREAM Phase 3 candidate Moustique. We do not fur-
ther investigate this class. Finally, we remark that some stream ciphers have additional
mechanisms for message authentication (but no eSTREAM candidate since Phase 3).
2.4 Other Cryptosystems
In this section, we briefly present two other important classes of cryptosystems. A block
cipher is a symmetric cryptosystem with P = C = Fn for a block size n. For each key
K, the encryption function Enc(K, p) is a permutation. In the most general case, the key
space corresponds to the set of permutations of size 2n!, where a single key is represented
by a table of size 2n. It is reasonable to use only a subset of the permutations, which can
be generated efficiently with a small key. To encrypt messages longer than the block size,
a mode of operation is used. The output feedback (OFB) mode makes a block cipher into
a synchronous stream cipher. Most block ciphers are constructed by repeatedly applying
a simple round function, which consists of substitutions and permutations (i.e. realizing
the concept of confusion and diffusion). Security of block ciphers is well studied, but
block ciphers are typically less efficient compared to dedicated stream ciphers.
In symmetric cryptography, key management is a main concern. Each pair of par-
ticipants must share a secret key, which gives a huge number of N(N − 1)/2 keys for
N participants. One solution is to use a trusted key distribution center, which shares
a single key with each participant. Another solution is to use public-key cryptosystem.
In a public-key cryptosystem, each participant has a secret key (for decryption) and a
public key (for encryption). The public key can be distributed to all participants, using
an authenticated (but not confidential) channel. It should be computationally difficult to
compute the secret key given the public key, or to decrypt without the secret key (where
the secret key is a trapdoor of a potential one-way function). Public-key algorithms are
based on computationally hard problems, such as factorization. These algorithms are
much less efficient than symmetric algorithms. Hence, public-key cryptosystems are often
used to exchange a secret session key only, and are then replaced by efficient symmetric
cryptosystems to secure the communication channel.
2.5 Cryptographic Hash Functions
A cryptographic hash function is a fixed (and unkeyed) transformation that takes an
input of arbitrary size, and returns a string of fixed size n, which is called the hash value.
The hash value is a concise representation of the (potentially large) input from which it
was computed (i.e. a digital fingerprint). Hash functions are used in many cryptographic
protocols, e.g. for message integrity checks and digital signatures. A hash function should
behave as much as possible like a random function while still being deterministic and
efficiently computable. It should have the following three security properties:
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1. Preimage resistance: given Hash(x), the complexity to find an input x is not
smaller than 2n.
2. Second preimage resistance: given an input x, the complexity to find a second
input y such that Hash(x) = Hash(y) is not smaller than 2n.
3. Collision resistance: The complexity to find any x and y such that Hash(x) =
Hash(y) is not smaller than 2n/2 using a serial birthday attack (see [122,20] for more
advanced birthday attacks).
Most unkeyed hash functions are designed as iterative processes which hash arbitrary
length inputs by processing successive fixed-size blocks of the input using a compression
function f . This is known as the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, see e.g. [51]. A hash
input x of arbitrary finite length is divided into fixed-length blocks xi of r bits. This pre-
processing typically involves appending extra bits (padding). Each block xi then serves
as input to the compression function f , which computes a new intermediate result hi (the
chaining variable) of bitlength n as a function of the previous intermediate result hi−1
and the next input block xi. The initial chaining variable h0 is a prespecified value or
an IV, and the final chaining variable is the hash value (or an optional output transfor-
mation could be used). With this construction, collision resistance of the hash function
can be reduced to the collision resistance of the compression function. Commonly used
(iterative) hash functions are MD5 and SHA-1. In 2005, security flaws were identified in
both algorithms, see e.g. [123]. The U.S. Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
is initiating an effort to develop one or more additional hash algorithms through a public
competition. In Chapter 8, we present a collision attack on a reduced-round compression
function.
2.6 Designs of Stream Ciphers
We describe some well-known designs for stream ciphers, based on feedback shift registers
and T-functions.
2.6.1 Feedback Shift Registers
Feedback shift registers, in particular linear feedback shift registers, are the basic compo-
nents of many stream ciphers because they are well-suited for hardware implementations,
and produce sequences having large periods and good statistical properties, see e.g. [111].
Definition 3. A binary linear feedback shift register (LFSR) of size n is a finite state
automaton with internal state of n bits. In each clock cycle, the update function L shifts
the state by one position, where the input bit is a linear function of the previous bits.
More precisely, let x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) be the initial state. Then, the output sequence
X = (x0, x1, . . .) is determined by the recursion xt = (c1xt−1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ cnxt−n) for t ≥ n,
where all ci are fixed elements in {0, 1}.
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x3 x2 x1 x0
Figure 2.4: Example of a linear feedback shift register of size n = 4 and with feedback
polynomial C(D) = 1 +D3 +D4.
The connection polynomial of the LFSR is defined by C(D) := 1⊕ c1D⊕ . . .⊕ cnDn. Let
S(D) be the formal power series S(D) := x0⊕x1D⊕x2D2⊕ . . ., then the LFSR recursion
is equivalent to C(D)S(D) = P (D) for a polynomial P (D) which is related to the initial
state. If C(D) is a primitive polynomial, then each of the 2n − 1 nonzero initial states
of the corresponding LFSR produces an output sequence with maximum possible period
2n−1. Hence, an LFSR with primitive connection polynomial is called a maximum-length
LFSR. The output sequence of a maximum-length LFSR has good statistical properties,
see [98].
Example 1. Consider an LFSR of size n = 4 and with primitive connection polynomial
C(D) = 1 ⊕ D3 ⊕ D4, see Fig. 2.4. With the initial state x = (1, 1, 0, 0), the output
sequence becomes X = (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, . . .) and is periodic with period
15. 
Because of the linear structure, an LFSRshould not be used by itself: the LFSR could be
initialized with any n bits of the output to generate the remaining bits of the output (or to
recover the initial state by solving a linear system). There are three general methodologies
for destroying the linearity properties of an LFSR:
1. Filter generators: Use a nonlinear filter function on the contents of a single LFSR.
2. Combination generators: Use a nonlinear combining function (potentially with
memory) on the outputs of several LFSR’s.
3. Clock-controlled generators: Use the output of one (or more) LFSR’s to control
the clock of one (or more).
Nonlinear filters for designs of Type 1 will be analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4. Well-known
examples of Type 2 are the Geffe Generator and the Summation Generator, a real-world
application is E0 (which is used in the Bluetooth technology). Well-known examples of
Type 3 are the Alternating Step Generator (see Chapter 5), the Shrinking Generator, and
the Self-Shrinking Generator, a real-world application is A5 (which is used in the GSM
technology for mobile communication). These three classical types of designs are not
considered as antiquated: the structure is very simple, and serves as a basis for modern
constructions, although many of the proposals are broken [26, 92].
More recent constructions use nonlinear feedback shift registers (NFSR’s), where a non-
linear Boolean function serves as feedback function. Examples are the eSTREAM Phase
2 and 3 candidates Grain (filter generator with NFSR, LFSR and filter), ACHTERBAHN
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fi
Figure 2.5: A T-function from two 6-bit words to one 6-bit word. For example, bit 4 of
the output is determined by bits 1 to 4 of the two input words.
(combination generator with NFSR’s) and MICKEY (clock-controlled generator with NFSR
and LFSR). It should be noticed that the analysis of NFSR’s is much more involved for
both, the designer and the adversary. Jump registers can be used for efficient clock-
controlled generators. A new type of feedback register was introduced by Klapper and
Goresky [83] and is called a feedback shift register with carry (FCSR), which is equipped
with auxiliary memory for storing the (integer) carry. An FCSR is similar to an LFSR,
except that the contents of the tapped stages of the shift register are added as integers
to the current content of the memory to form a sum. The least significant bit of the sum
is then fed back into the first stage of the shift register, while the remaining higher order
bits are retained as the new value of the memory. FCSR’s can be conveniently analyzed
using the algebra over the 2-adic numbers. An example of such a design is the eSTREAM
Phase 3 candidate F-FCSR, which will be analyzed in Chapter 6.
2.6.2 T-functions
We have seen that LFSR’s are simple primitives which are well understood, but the clean
mathematical structure can also help an adversary to find an attack. In contrast to this
tame approach, one could also use crazy compositions of operations, hoping that neither
the designer nor the adversary will be able to analyze the mathematical behavior of the
scheme. This wild approach is often preferred in real-world designs. Recently, triangular
functions (T-functions) have been introduced by Klimov and Shamir, see [85,86,87,84]. In
a T-function, information does not propagate from left to right. T-functions are semi-wild:
they can look like crazy combinations of nonlinear Boolean and arithmetic operations, but
have many analyzable mathematical properties. Here is a definition:
Definition 4. A (multiword) T-function is a mapping from k n-bit words to l n-bit words,
in which each bit i of any of the outputs (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) can depend only on bits 0, . . . , i
of the inputs.
All the Boolean operations and most of the arithmetic operations (such as addition and
multiplication, but not right shift and circular shift) in modern processors are T-functions,
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and can be executed in one clock cycle. Compositions of T-functions are also T-functions,
which allows to design many T-functions with very efficient software implementation. A
T-function with k = l words could be used iteratively as an update function in a stream
cipher. From an efficiency point of view, a composition of a small number of basic T-
functions would be desirable. From the security point of view, the composition should be
a mixture of Boolean and arithmetic operations, including some nonlinear subexpressions
such as squaring. Klimov and Shamir developed tools to analyze invertibility and the
cycle structure of T-functions. Invertibility is important in a stream cipher, because
if we repeatedly apply an update function to the internal state, we want to prevent
an incremental loss of entropy. The cycle structure of an invertible T-function is also
important, since we do not want the sequence of generated states to be trapped in a short
cycle. A T-function has the single-cycle property, if its repeated application to any initial
state goes through all the 2kn possible states. For a single-cycle T-function used as update
function, no weak initial states are possible. It can be seen as replacement schemes of
maximum-length LFSR’s. However, the period of the least significant bits (or bit-slices) of
T-functions is small by construction: The period for bit(-slice) i is at most 2ki for a state
of k words. Consequently, one should only use the most significant bits in an additional
filter function, or mix lower and higher bits with cyclic shifts.
Example 2. The mapping x 7→ x+(x2∨5) mod 2n is an invertible T-function with a single
cycle. For n = 4 and the initial state x = (1, 1, 0, 0), the sequence of the most-significant
bits becomes X = (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, . . .) and is periodic with period
16. 
Most processors have either 32 or 64 bit words, and thus univariate mappings with k = 1
are not sufficient. Klimov and Shamir constructed invertible T-functions on multiword
states whose iteration is guaranteed to yield a single cycle. One of their proposals was
used in eSTREAM Phase 1 candidate Mir-1. Another class of single-cycle T-functions on
multiword states named TSC was proposed by Hong et al. in [76], one of their construction
was optimized for hardware implementations. In Chapter 7, we present powerful attacks
on different proposals, and some cryptanalysis of eSTREAM Phase 2 candidate TSC-4.
2.6.3 Alternative Designs
There are also alternative and unique designs of stream ciphers such as RC4, which is used
in the security applications WEP and SSL. The eSTREAM Phase 3 candidates Trivium
and Salsa20 can also be mentioned here, although their design is strongly influenced by
block ciphers. We present some cryptanalysis on these two eSTREAM candidates in
Chapters 3, 8 and 9.
2.7 Attacks on Stream Ciphers
We describe some well-known attacks on stream ciphers, mainly on LFSR-based designs.
Many of these attacks result in necessary conditions for the design of secure stream ciphers.
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2.7.1 LFSR-synthesis
The linear complexity C of any binary sequence is defined by the length of the shortest
LFSR that generates the sequence. Given at least 2C bits of a binary sequence with linear
complexity C, the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [93] determines an LFSR of length C in
O(C2) time. In the case of a filter generator with an LFSR of size n, the linear complexity
of the keystream is at most Dl :=
∑l
i=0
(
n
i
)
, where l := deg(f) is the algebraic degree of
the Boolean filter function f . With 2Dl bits of keystream, the remaining keystream can
be synthesized in O(D2l ). As a consequence, linear complexity of a stream cipher should
be large.
2.7.2 Algebraic Attacks
Any stream cipher can be expressed as a system of multivariate algebraic equations,
depending on the secret key and on the known keystream. The observed keystream
can be substituted in this system, and the system can be solved to recover the secret
key. These two steps (find equations and solve the system) are the principle of algebraic
attacks [45, 95]. If the system corresponds to simultaneous equations in a large number
of unknowns and of a complex (nonlinear) type, then solving the system is difficult. An
overdefined nonlinear system could be linearized (where each monomial is replaced by a
new variable) and solved by Gaussian elimination. The efficiency of the method depends
on the algebraic degree of the equations.
Example 3. Consider the system of equations x0x1 = 0, x0 ⊕ x0x1 = 1, x1 ⊕ x0x1 = 0.
With the new variables y0 = x0, y1 = x1, y2 = x0x1, one obtains the linearized system
y2 = 0, y0⊕ y2 = 1, y1⊕ y2 = 0. Gaussian elimination yields y0 = 1, y1 = 0, y2 = 0, which
corresponds to the solution x0 = 1, x1 = 0. 
One could also use more sophisticated methods derived from Buchenberger’s algorithm to
compute a Gro¨bner basis of a polynomial ideal. The most efficient algorithm is Fauge`re’s
F5 [56], an alternative method is XL [44]. More recently, SAT-solver have been used [12]
(such as MiniSAT). However, the computational cost of these approaches is difficult to
evaluate and strongly depends on the structure of the system, see [9].
In the case of filter generators, the basic equations are zt = f(Lt(x)) with x =
(x0, . . . , xn−1) and for t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Notice that L(x) and also L
t(x) is linear in x
for any t. Consequently, the degree of f(Lt(x)) corresponds to l := deg(f) ≤ n for any t.
The number of monomials of degree i is
(
n
i
)
, so the overall number of monomials of degree
between 0 and l is Dl :=
∑l
i=0
(
n
i
)
(which is about
(
n
l
)
for l < n/2). If we use linearization,
the number of variables is at most Dl, and time complexity to solve this system is about
O(D3l ) (where the exponent 3 is taken for matrix inversion). This is worse compared to
LFSR-synthesis. The crucial idea of algebraic attacks on filter generators is to reduce the
degree of the equations. Let us first recall the definition of an annihilator : a function g
is called an annihilator of f , if fg = 0. Here is a simple example:
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Example 4. The function g = x0 ⊕ x1 of degree 1 is an annihilator of f = x0x1 of degree
2, hence fg = 0. 
Let g be an annihilator for f or f⊕1 of low degree d. In the case fg = 0, one can multiply
zt = f(Lt(x)) by g(Lt(x)) and obtains g(Lt(x)) · zt = 0. For zt = 1, this is an equation of
degree d. Similarly, for (f ⊕ 1)g = 0, one obtains g(Lt(x)) · (zt ⊕ 1) = 0 of degree d. The
complexity of algebraic attacks can be summarized by:
1. Relation search step. Finding annihilators g of f or f ⊕ 1 with low degree d
(if these exist at all). The complexity of this step is roughly in O(D3k), for Dk :=∑d
i=0
(
k
i
)
and where k ≤ n is the fixed number of input variables to the filter function.
2. Solving step. With R linearly independent annihilators of degree d for f or f ⊕ 1,
a single output bit zt can be used to set up (in average) R/2 equations in x at time
t. The number of monomials in these equations is at most D :=
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
, hence
by linearization, data complexity of conventional algebraic attacks becomes about
2D/R, and time complexity O(D3).
In general, the algebraic immunity AI of a Boolean function f is defined by the minimum
degree d of an annihilator for f or f ⊕ 1. In [45] it has been shown that for any function
f with k-bit input vector, functions g 6= 0 and h exist, with fg = h such that e and
d are at most ⌈k/2⌉. This implies that AI(f) ≤ ⌈k/2⌉. For a function with maximum
algebraic immunity, time complexity of algebraic attacks is only about the square root
of simple linearization; data complexity is about the square root of simple linearization
and of LFSR-synthesis. As a consequence, AI of a stream cipher should be large. There
are sophisticated algorithms to determine AI of an arbitrary Boolean function [3, 53].
Recently, some theoretical work on constructions of Boolean functions with maximum AI
was presented [48, 50, 29, 35]. Algebraic Attacks can also be applied to other LFSR-based
designs. However, these attacks are more difficult if the update function L is nonlinear
(e.g. for some T-functions constructions), as the degree of equations is increasing with t.
In this work, an improvement of algebraic attacks is presented in Chapter 4.
2.7.3 Fast Algebraic Attacks
Fast algebraic attacks were introduced by Courtois in [41]. They were confirmed and
improved later by Armknecht in [2] and Hawkes and Rose in [72]. A prior aim of fast
algebraic attacks is to find a relation fg = h with e := deg g small and d := deg h
larger. The equation zt = f(Lt(x)) of filter generators is multiplied by g such that
g(Lt(x)) ·zt = h(Lt(x)). In classical algebraic attacks, the degree d would necessarily lead
to considering a number of unknowns of the order of D :=
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
. In fast algebraic
attacks, one considers that the sequence of the functions h(Lt(x)) can be obtained as an
LFSR with linear complexity D. One could use then the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm
to eliminate all monomials of degree superior to e in the equations, such that eventually
one only needs to solve a system in E :=
∑e
i=0
(
n
i
)
unknowns. More precisely, one can
precompute a linear combination
⊕D
i=0 ci ·h(Lt+i(x)) = 0 with fixed coefficients ci ∈ {0, 1}
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for all t. This gives
⊕D
i=0 ci · g(Lt+i(x)) · zt+i = 0 of lower degree e. The complexity of
fast algebraic attacks can be summarized in these four steps:
1. Relation search step. One searches for functions g and h of low degrees such
that fg = h. For g and h of degrees e and d respectively, with associated values
Dk :=
∑d
i=0
(
k
i
)
and Ek :=
∑e
i=0
(
k
i
)
, such g and h can be found when they exist by
solving a linear system with Dk+Ek equations, and with complexity O((Dk+Ek)3).
Usually one considers e < d.
2. Precomputation step. In this step, one searches for particular linear relations
which permit to eliminate monomials with degree greater than e in the equa-
tions. This step needs a sequence of 2D bits of stream and has a complexity of
O(D log2(D)) using a direct method presented in [72].
3. Substitution step. At this step, one eliminates the monomials of degrees greater
than e. This step has a natural complexity in O(E2D) but using discrete Fourier
transform, it is claimed in [72] that a complexity O(ED log(D)) can be obtained.
4. Solving step. One solves the system with E linear equations in O(E3). Each
equation requires D bits of keystream, hence data complexity is about CD = D +
E. This is not much larger than in algebraic attacks (with the same asymptotic
complexity).
Notice that, for arbitrary non-zero functions f , g, h, the relation fg = h implies fh = h,
thus we have d ≥ AI(f) and we can restrict to values e with e ≤ AI(f). Fast algebraic
attacks are always more efficient than conventional algebraic attacks if d = AI(f) and
e < d. In case that e turns out to be large for this d, it is of interest to determine
the minimum e where d is slightly larger than AI(f). In Chapter 3, we give efficient
algorithms for the relation search step. A powerful variant of algebraic attacks on the filter
generator was presented recently in [108]. In this work, a precomputation of complexity
O(Dl log2(Dl)) is used to find linear equations in the initial state variables (similar to the
precomputation of FAA’s). The initial state can be recovered after observing about Dl
keystream bits with a complexity of O(Dl).
2.7.4 Correlation and Linear Attacks
In correlation and linear attacks one considers an overdefined system of linear input-
output relations of some correlation (i.e. some noisy equations). In contrast, algebraic
attacks deal with exact equations.
Correlation Attacks. The main scenario of correlation attacks are combination generators,
assuming that the keystream bit zt is correlated to one individual LFSR output sequence
xt due to the combining function, hence Pr(xt = z
t) = p 6= 0.5. Here is an example of
bit-correlation:
Example 5. Consider a combination generator with 3 LFSR’s and with combination func-
tion f(x) = x0x1⊕x0x2⊕x1x2. Then, the correlation of the output sequence of any LFSR
to the keystream is p = 0.75. 
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With a divide-and-conquer strategy, one can determine the initial state of the target
LFSR first, given N bits of keystream. In the original correlation attack proposed by
Siegenthaler [115], one checks all possible initial states of the target LFSR, and chooses the
initial state with the minimum number of deviations to the observed keystream (assuming
p > 0.5). The attack by Siegenthaler can be prevented by using a correlation-immune
combining function. In this case, the keystream is statistically independent of the output
of each constituent LFSR; any correlation attack should then consider several LFSR’s
together.
Fast Correlation Attacks. In [96], fast correlation attacks have been developed. These
attacks are significantly faster than exhaustive search over all initial states of the target
LFSR. Let us first review the statistical model: it is assumed that a linear combination of
some LFSR outputs is correlated to the keystream. This linear combination corresponds
to the output of a unique LFSR of size L. The output of this LFSR is a codeword of size N
of the linear code of dimension L defined by the feedback polynomial. The keystream can
be seen as the result of the transmission of this codeword through the binary symmetric
channel with error probability 1 − p, or Pr(xt = zt) = p 6= 0.5. The attack aims at
recovering L bits of the codeword from the knowledge of N bits of the keystream. With
information theoretic arguments, the minimum number of required keystream bits to
recover the initial state is N = L/(1 − h(p)), where h is the binary entropy function,
but no efficient decoding algorithm is known for achieving this bound. The idea of the
attack in [96] is to use parity-check equations (of degree ≤ N) for the linear code, which
can be derived from the feedback polynomial. Every bit xt satisfies several parity-check
equations, and by substituting the corresponding keystream digits zt in these equations,
we obtain relations for each bit zt which may or may not hold. The probability bias of these
equations is determined by p and by the weight w of the parity-check equations. To test
whether xt = z
t, one counts the number of all equations which hold for zt. Under favorable
conditions, one can find some bits zt which have a high probability of being correct, which
means that only slight modifications of the estimate are necessary to determine all bits of
the LFSR. This main idea can be combined with a partial exhaustive search, and the attack
can be extended to the situation where w is large: the precomputation step then consists
in generating parity-check equations of low weight (i.e. finding polynomial multiples of
the feedback polynomial of low weight) but large degree N , see e.g. [34,37]. Another idea
is to use iterative decoding methods for the keystream bits zt: assign to each bit zt a new
probability for xt = z
t conditioned on the number of relations satisfied. This procedure
can be iterated, and after a few rounds, those bits zt with small conditional probability
are complemented, until we end up with the original LFSR sequence. The attacks were
improved by a series of variant attacks [80].
Linear Attacks. The bit-correlations of correlation attacks can be viewed as a special case
of linear cryptanalysis [94], which tries to take advantage of high probability occurrences
of linear relations involving keystream bits and initial state bits. In general, the starting
point is a system of linear relations in some of the initial state bits x which hold with
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probabilities different from 1/2 for the observed keystream. The most likely solution for
x is the one that satisfies the most relations (assuming that all relations have p > 0.5),
see [15] for a recent application on eSTREAM candidate Grain-v0. Another approach is to
use low-weight parity checks for the linear relations and apply iterative methods [64]. In
Chapter 7, we present linear attacks on T-functions. An important measure for correlation
and linear attacks is the nonlinearity of a Boolean function. In Chapter 4, we present an
efficient method to find relations with small nonlinearity.
2.7.5 Differential Attacks
Differential cryptanalysis [24] is a general method of cryptanalysis that is applicable
primarily to block ciphers, but also to stream ciphers and cryptographic hash functions.
One investigates how a difference in the input of the cipher affects the difference in the
output (requiring chosen plaintext). The difference is traced through the network of
transformations F , discovering where the cipher exhibits non-random behavior. The
goal is to find a suitable differential, i.e. a fixed input-difference ∆x and a fixed output-
difference ∆z such that ∆z = F (x)⊕F (x⊕∆x) with high probability for a random input
x. The differential can be exploited to distinguish the output with statistical methods
(or to recover the key using more sophisticated variants). The statistical properties of
the differential mainly depend on the nonlinear part of the cipher. Note that a fixed
differential of first order reduces the algebraic degree of the output function by one. One
method of differential attack on a stream cipher is to find a high-probability differential
for the output function [23]. The known keystream allows computation of the output-
difference, and the inputs of the initialization function (i.e. the key and the IV) should
be chosen such that two states with the desired input-difference are produced. There are
many specialized types of differential attacks. Collisions in hash functions correspond to
differentials with zero output-difference.
2.7.6 Tradeoff Attacks
Tradeoff attacks are generic attacks, where a tradeoff in time, memory and data can be
achieved to attack the stream cipher. During the precomputation phase, which requires P
steps, the adversary explores the general structure of the stream cipher and summarizes
her findings in large tables, requiring memory of size M . During the realtime phase,
which requires T steps, the adversary is given D frames (i.e. data which corresponds to
D different keystreams produced by unknown keys and IV’s), and her goal is to use the
tables to find the key of one frame as fast as possible. In [10], Babbage concludes that the
internal state of the stream cipher should be at least twice as large as the key. Biryukov
and Shamir presented some improved TMD tradeoffs in [25]. In [77, 52] they conclude
that a TMD tradeoff attack can be mounted with P,D, T,M smaller than exhaustive key
search, if the IV size is smaller than half the key size. Furthermore, an attack can be
mounted with D, T,M smaller than exhaustive key search, but without restrictions on P ,
if the IV size is smaller than the key size.
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2.8 Statistical Tests
In this section, we briefly describe optimal distinguishers and statistical key recovery
attacks, and we describe the χ2 test.
2.8.1 Optimal Distinguishers
Binary hypothesis testing is a formal way for distinguishing between two distributions.
This is a frequently encountered problem in cryptanalysis. We use the well-known ap-
proach by Neyman-Pearson, and some advanced methods described in [11]. Let XN :=
(X0, X1, . . . , XN−1) denote N i.i.d. random variables where each Xi ∈ X and X has
cardinality m. We assume that the distribution of the random variables is either D0 (the
null hypothesis) or D1 (the alternative hypothesis). Both distributions are assumed to be
known. Let xN := (x0, x1, . . . , xN−1) be a realization of the N random variables. Given
xN , the goal is to decide if the random variables have distribution D0 or D1. A (possibly
computationally unbounded) algorithm D which takes as input a sequence of N realiza-
tions xN distributed according to D0 or D1, and outputs 0 or 1 according to its decision,
is called a distinguisher. It can be fully determined by an acceptance region A ⊂ X such
that D(xN) = 1 iff xN ∈ A. Note that D(XN) is a derived random variable. The ability
to distinguish a distribution from another is usually measured in terms of the advantage
of the distinguisher and is defined by
AdvD :=
∣∣Pr(D(XN) = 0|D0)− Pr(D(XN) = 0|D1)∣∣ . (2.2)
Hence, the distinguisher can make two types of errors: it can either output 0 when
the distribution is D1 (which is a false alarm if H0 is the interesting event) or 1 when
the distribution is D0 (which is a non-detection); we will denote these respective error
probabilities by pα := Pr(D(XN) = 0|D1) and pβ := Pr(D(XN) = 1|D0), and the overall
error probability is defined as pe :=
1
2
(pα+pβ). It is linked to the advantage by the simple
relation AdvD = 1− 2pe. The Neyman-Pearson Lemma derives an optimal test D, i.e. a
test which minimizes the error pe for given N . It is based on the likelihood ratio LR with
acceptance region
A = {x : LR(xN) ≥ 1} with LR(xN ) = Pr(X
N = xN |D0)
Pr(XN = xN |D1) . (2.3)
Let us now assume that the distributions D0 and D1 are close to each other, i.e. Pr(X =
x|D0) = µx and Pr(X = x|D1) = µx + εx with probability bias |εx| ≪ µx for all x ∈ X .
Baigne`res et al. introduced the distance ∆(D0, D1) between two close distributions. This
measure is directly linked to the number of samples needed to distinguish both probability
distributions with a good success probability. It is defined by
∆(D0, D1) :=
∑
x∈X
ε2x
µx
. (2.4)
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The data complexity of an optimal distinguisher becomes N = d/∆(D0, D1), where the
real number d controls the overall probability of error. If Φ denotes the distribution
function of the standard normal distribution, it is approximately pe ≈ Φ(−
√
d/2). In the
case where D1 is the uniform distribution, we use the notation ∆(D0) instead of ∆(D0, D1)
and have ∆(D0) = |X |
∑
x ε
2
x. This measure is called the squared Euclidean imbalance. In
the case X = {0, 1} we have ε := ε0 = −ε1 and one can see that ∆(D0) = 4ε2 and N is
proportional to ε−2. It is a well accepted fact that the complexity of linear cryptanalysis
is linked to the inverse of the square of the bias.
2.8.2 Key Recovery
According to [11], the framework of optimal distinguishers can be adapted to key recovery.
Assume that one observes 2n realizations x of size N each, where 2n− 1 realizations have
uniform distribution D1, and only one realization has non-uniform distribution D0. The
goal is then to identify the realization with distribution D0. Such a situation could appear
when the adversary wants to distinguish the correct subkey of n bits (assuming that only
the correct subkey gives a distribution D0). We consider the simple key ranking method
where the rank of a subkey corresponds to the grade LR(xN). The correct subkey has a
high expected rank if
N =
4n log 2
∆(D0)
. (2.5)
Then, the expected rank (starting by 1) becomes 1+ (2n− 1)Φ(−√n∆(D0)/2). This is a
guess-and-determine attack: a subkey is guessed, and the correct one can be determined.
The remaining bits of the key can then be found with a partial search (verify the observed
keystream).
2.8.3 The Chi-Squared Test
The χ2 test is used to distinguish an unknown distribution D0 from the uniform distri-
bution D1, see e.g. [82]. Again, let X
N := (X0, X1, . . . , XN−1) denote N i.i.d. random
variables where each Xi ∈ X and X has cardinality m. We assume that the distribution
of the random variables is either D0 (the null hypothesis) or the uniform distribution D1
(the alternative hypothesis). Let xN = (x0, x1, . . . , xN−1) be a realization, and Nx the
number of observations x in xN . Then, the χ2 statistic is a random variable defined by
χ2 :=
∑
x
(Nx −N/m)2
N/m
. (2.6)
For large N , the χ2 statistic is compared with the threshold of the χ2α,m−1 distribution
having m − 1 degrees of freedom and significance level α. Consequently, a χ2 test can
be defined by a threshold T , such that the alternative hypothesis is accepted if χ2 < T .
If the random variables in XN have uniform distribution D1, then the expectation of χ
2
becomes E(χ2) = m − 1. Now assume that the random variables in XN have a non-
uniform distribution D0 with Pr(X = x|D0) = 1/m + εx, such that |εx| ≪ 1/m for all
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x ∈ X . With the definitions ε2 := ∑x ε2x and c := Nε2, the expectation of χ2 becomes
about E(χ2) = (c+1)m−1. The difference between the expectations becomes significant,
if c = O(1). Consequently, about N = 1/ε2 samples are required to distinguish a source
with distribution D1 from a source with uniform distribution D0. Note that ε
2 differs
from ∆(D0) only by a factor of |X |. It is well-known that a χ2 cryptanalysis needs about
1/∆(D0) queries to succeed, which is not worse (up to a constant term) than an optimal
distinguisher. In fact, the χ2 statistical test is asymptotically equivalent to a likelihood
ratio test. Consequently, if one distribution is unknown, the best practical alternative to
an optimal distinguisher seems to be a χ2 attack.
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Chapter 3
Algebraic Immunity against Fast Algebraic
Attacks
In this chapter we propose several efficient algorithms for assessing the resistance of
Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks when implemented in LFSR-based stream
ciphers. An efficient generic algorithm is demonstrated to be particularly efficient for sym-
metric Boolean functions. As an application, it is shown that large classes of symmetric
functions are very vulnerable to fast algebraic attacks despite their proven resistance
against conventional algebraic attacks.
3.1 Introduction
Resistance against fast algebraic attacks is not fully covered by algebraic immunity, as
has been demonstrated, e.g. by a fast algebraic attack on the eSTREAM Phase 2 candi-
date SFINKS [42]. We will later give examples of functions which have optimal algebraic
immunity but are very vulnerable against fast algebraic attacks. It seems therefore rele-
vant to be able to efficiently determine the immunity of existing and newly constructed
Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks. For determining immunity against fast
algebraic attacks, we give a new algorithm that compares favorably with the known algo-
rithms [95, 53].
The algorithm is applied to several classes of Boolean functions with optimal algebraic
immunity, including symmetric Boolean functions like the majority functions. Symmetric
functions are attractive as the hardware complexity grows only linearly with the number
of input variables. However, it is shown in this chapter that the specific structure of these
functions can be exploited in a much refined algorithm. It is concluded that large classes
of symmetric functions are very vulnerable to fast algebraic attacks despite their optimal
algebraic immunity. A symmetric function would not be implemented by itself but rather
in combination with other nonlinear components in stream ciphers. It seems nevertheless
essential to know the basic cryptographic properties of each component used.
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3.2 Efficient Computation of Immunity
Given a Boolean function f(x) =
⊕
α fαx
α with n input variables, the goal is to decide
whether g(x) =
⊕
β gβx
β of degree e and h(x) =
⊕
γ fγx
γ of degree d exist, such that
fg = h. The known function f is represented preferably by the truth table T (f), which
allows to efficiently access the required elements, and the unknown functions g and h
are represented by the coefficient vectors C(g) and C(h), which leads to the simple side
conditions gβ = 0 for |β| > e and hγ = 0 for |γ| > d. In order to decide if g and h
exist, one has to set up a number of linear equations in gβ and hγ . Such equations are
obtained e.g. by evaluation of f(x) ·⊕β gβxβ = ⊕γ hγxγ for some values of x. There
are D + E variables with D :=
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
and E :=
∑e
i=0
(
n
i
)
, so one requires at least the
same number of equations. The resulting system of equations can be solved by Gaussian
elimination with time complexity O((D + E)3) = O(D3). If any D + E equations are
linearly independent, then no nontrivial g and h of corresponding degree exist. Otherwise,
one may try to verify a nontrivial solution.
Certainly, there are more sophisticated algorithms, namely we are able to express a
single coefficient hγ as a linear combination of coefficients gβ. If these relations hold for any
value of γ, one may choose γ with |γ| > d such that hγ = 0, in order to obtain relations
in gβ only. Consequently, equations for coefficients of g can be completely separated
from equations for coefficients of h. As there are only E variables gβ, one requires at
least E equations, and the system of equations can be solved in O(E3). Depending on
the parameters n, d, e and on the structure of f , there are different strategies how to
efficiently set up equations.
3.2.1 Setting up Equations
In this section, we consider the product fg = h where f , g and h are arbitrary Boolean
functions in n variables. Recall that α ⊆ β is an abbreviation for supp(α) ⊆ supp(β).
In addition β − α denotes integer subtraction (which is equivalent to bitwise subtraction
if α ⊆ β). There is a well-known relation between elements of the truth table T (f) and
the coefficients vector C(f) of a Boolean function f , which requires introduction of the
following matrix:
Definition 5. The Hadamard matrix HN is an N × N matrix in F, where the element
of row i and column j (counting from 0) is defined by
(
i
j
)
mod 2.
Notice that HN is a lower-triangular and self-inverse matrix. The following relation is
given without proof:
Proposition 1. For any Boolean function f with n input variables, one has T (f) =
H2n · C(f) and C(f) = H2n · T (f).
Prop. 1 can be replaced by an expression that is computed more efficiently.
Lemma 1. Consider a Boolean function f(x) =
⊕
α fαx
α. Then it is f(k) =
⊕
α⊆k fα
and fk =
⊕
α⊆k f(α).
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Proof. Prop. 1 can be expressed as f(k) =
⊕
α
(
k
α
)
fα and fk =
⊕
α
(
k
α
)
f(α), where
binomial coefficients are in modulo 2. Lucas’ Theorem says that
(
α
β
)
=
∏(αi
βi
)
mod 2,
where αi and βi are the binary expression of α and β, respectively. Consequently, if(
α
β
)
= 1 mod 2, then βi = 1⇒ αi = 1 for all i, which is equivalent to β ⊆ α. 
With the following theorem, we are able to express a single coefficient hγ as a linear
combination of coefficients gβ, where the linear combination is computed either with
elements of the truth table T (f), or with elements of the coefficient vector C(f).
Theorem 1. Let f(x) =
⊕
α fαx
α and g(x) =
⊕
β gβx
β. Set h(x) =
⊕
γ hγx
γ :=
f(x) · g(x). Then, for Aγ,β ∈ F, we have for each γ
hγ =
⊕
β⊆γ
Aγ,β · gβ (3.1)
Aγ,β :=
⊕
β⊆α⊆γ
f(α) =
⊕
γ−β⊆α⊆γ
fα . (3.2)
Proof. From Prop. 1 we have f(k) =
⊕
α⊆k fα and fk =
⊕
α⊆k f(α). We obtain the
relation hγ =
⊕
α⊆γ h(α) =
⊕
α⊆γ f(α)g(α). With g(α) =
⊕
β⊆α gβ, this becomes
hγ =
⊕
α⊆γ
(⊕
β⊆α
gβf(α)
)
=
⊕
(α,β):β⊆α⊆γ
f(α)gβ =
⊕
β⊆γ
( ⊕
β⊆α⊆γ
f(α)
)
gβ .
For the second expression, first observe that by definition we have xα := xα00 · · ·xαn−1n−1 =∏
i∈supp(α) xi. As we can replace x
e
i by xi for any e ≥ 1, it holds xαxβ =
∏
i∈supp(α)∪supp(β) xi.
Then hγx
γ =
⊕
S fαx
αgβx
β with S = {(α, β) : supp(α) ∪ supp(β) = supp(γ)} and hence
hγ =
⊕
β⊆γ (
⊕
S′ fα) gβ with S ′ = {α : supp(α) ∪ supp(β) = supp(γ)} = {α : supp(γ) \
supp(β) ⊆ supp(α) ⊆ supp(γ)}, which is S ′ = {α : supp(γ−β) ⊆ supp(α) ⊆ supp(γ)} as
no carries occur in the subtraction for β ⊆ γ. We finally have S ′ = {α : γ−β ⊆ α ⊆ γ}.
Example 6. Let us set up an equation for γ = (101)2. Eq. 3.1 brings out
h(101) = A(101),(000) · g(000)
⊕ A(101),(100) · g(100)
⊕ A(101),(001) · g(001)
⊕ A(101),(101) · g(101) .
If we use the Eq. 3.2 in order to determine the coefficients Ai,j, we find
A(101),(000) = f(101) = f(000)⊕ f(100)⊕ f(001)⊕ f(101)
A(101),(100) = f(001) ⊕ f(101) = f(100)⊕ f(101)
A(101),(001) = f(100) ⊕ f(101) = f(001)⊕ f(101)
A(101),(101) = f(000) ⊕ f(100) ⊕ f(001) ⊕ f(101) = f(101) . 
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Remark 1. Let us introduce the vector Bγ,β ∈ F2n , where the i’th element of Bγ,β is
defined by
(
γ
i
)(
i
β
)
. Then, according to Lucas’ Theorem, the coefficient Aγ,β can also be
written as a scalar product Aγ,β = Bγ,β · T (f) = Bγ,γ−β · C(f).
3.2.2 Determining the Existence of Solutions
Based on Th. 1, we propose Alg. 1 to determine if g and h exist, given f and the corre-
sponding degrees e and d.
Algorithm 1 Determine the existence of g and h for any f
Input: A Boolean function f with n input variables and two integers 0 ≤ e ≤ AI(f)
and AI(f) ≤ d ≤ n.
Output: Determine if g of degree at most e and h of degree at most d exist such that
fg = h.
1: Initialize an E ×E matrix G, and let each entry be zero.
2: Compute an ordered set I ← {β : |β| ≤ e}.
3: for i from 1 to E do
4: Choose a random γ with |γ| = d+ 1.
5: Determine the set B ← {β : β ⊆ γ, |β| ≤ e}.
6: for all β in B do
7: Let the entry of G in row i and column β (in respect to I) be Aγ,β
8: end for
9: end for
10: Solve the linear system of equations, and output no g and h of corresponding
degree if there is only a trivial solution.
Let us discuss functionality and complexity of Alg. 1. According to Eq. 3.1, for each
choice of γ one can set up an equation that depends on a linear combination of hγ and
{gβ : β ⊆ γ}. We make use of the side conditions hγ = 0 for |γ| > d, and gβ = 0 for
|β| > e. This can be used to simplify the equations: with a choice of γ such that |γ| > d,
one obtains an equation that depends only on a linear combination of {gβ : β ∈ B}
with B := {β : β ⊆ γ, |β| ≤ e}. In order to compute the linear combination, one has
to compute the coefficients Aγ,β for each β ∈ B. Notice that with Eq. 3.2, Aγ,β has
2|γ|−|β| addends f(α), where {β : β ⊆ γ, |β| = b} has cardinality (|γ|
b
)
. Consequently, a
single equation is set up in
∑e
b=0
(
|γ|
b
)
2|γ|−b steps, assuming that f(α) can be accessed in
negligible time. As there are E variables gβ, one requires at least E equations in order to
make a statement about the (non-) existence of nontrivial g (the equations are linearly
independent with high probability). The coefficients Aγ,β of the equations are stored in an
E × E matrix G, initialization takes O(E2) time and memory. This requires an ordered
set I ← {β : |β| ≤ e}, indicating the order of gβ in G; it can be precomputed in O(E)
time. The complexity to set up a single equation increases with |γ| (where we required
|γ| > d), so one may choose |γ| as small as possible. Let |γ| = d + 1 for each equation,
which allows to set up a number of
(
n
d+1
)
equations. In the case of e ≪ d and d ≈ n/2
(which is the typical scope of fast algebraic attacks), one has E <
(
n
d+1
)
, so it is sufficient
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to set up equations with |γ| = d + 1 only. The overall time complexity to set up E
equations becomes
C ′T = E
e∑
b=0
(
d+ 1
b
)
2d+1−b . (3.3)
Time complexity of the final step of Alg. 1 is O(E3), hence overall time complexity of
Alg. 1 is CT = C
′
T + O(E3). For the specified range of parameters, one has C ′T <
E(e + 1)
(
d+1
e
)
2d+1. Furthermore, D ≈ 2n−1 ≈ 22d−1, or √D ≈ 2d and hence C ′T ∈
O(e(d+1
e
)√
DE).
Proposition 2. The arithmetic complexity of Alg. 1 to determine the existence of g and
h for any f corresponds to CT ∈ O(e
(
d+1
e
)√
DE+E3), provided that e≪ d and d ≈ n/2.
Compared to the complexity O(D3) of Alg. 2 in [95], Alg. 1 is very efficient for g of low
degree, see Fig. 3.1 and the following example.
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Figure 3.1: Time complexity of Alg. 1 for n = 30 (left) and n = 50 (right) with d = n/2.
The solid line indicates the complexity D3 of the trivial algorithm.
Example 7. Consider the majority function f with n = 5 inputs. As AI(f) = 3, it may
be interesting to find g and h with e = 1 and d = 3. The function g has E = 6 coefficients
gβ with |β| ≤ e, and we will setup equations for all γ with |γ| > d:
β ∈{(00000), (00001), (00010), (00100), (01000), (10000)}
γ ∈{(11110), (11101), (11011), (10111), (01111), (11111)} .
To construct the matrix G, one has to compute the coefficients Aγ,β for all combinations
of γ and β (if β ⊆ γ), see also Ex. 6. One obtains (in respect to the above order of β):
G =


1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1


.
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The kernel space has dimension 4, a possible basis of the kernel are the vectors
{(0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1)} .
This corresponds to the monomials x0⊕x1, x0⊕x2, x0⊕x3, x0⊕x4 respectively. Any linear
combination of these monomials is a solution for g. For example, with g(x) = x0 ⊕ x1,
and f(x) = x0x1x2 ⊕ x0x1x3 ⊕ x0x1x4 ⊕ x0x2x3 ⊕ x0x2x4 ⊕ x0x3x4 ⊕ x1x2x3 ⊕ x1x2x4 ⊕
x1x3x4⊕x2x3x4⊕x0x1x2x3⊕x0x1x2x4⊕x0x1x3x4⊕x0x2x3x4⊕x1x2x3x4 one has indeed
f(x) · g(x) = (x0 ⊕ x1) · (x2x3 ⊕ x2x4 ⊕ x3x4), which is of degree 3. 
This interesting example will be investigated in more detail in Sect. 3.3 for symmetric
functions.
3.2.3 Experimental Results
In [48], a class of (non-symmetric) Boolean functions f with maximum algebraic immunity
is presented; these functions will be referred here as DGM functions. Application of Alg. 1
on their examples for n = 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 reveals that h and g exist with d = AI(f) = ⌈n/2⌉
and e = 1. We point out that this is the most efficient situation for a fast algebraic attack.
Explicit functions g with corresponding degree are also obtained by Alg. 1, see Tab. 3.1
(where we show one single example of g, and dim denotes the dimension of the solution
space for g of degree e). A formal expansion of f(x) · g(x) was performed to verify the
results. A reaction on this attack is presented in [49].
Table 3.1: Degrees of the functions h and g for DGM functions f with n input variables.
n deg f deg h deg g g dim
5 4 3 1 1⊕ x3 4
6 4 3 1 1⊕ x5 4
7 5 4 1 1⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 1
8 5 4 1 1⊕ x4 ⊕ x5 1
9 8 5 1 x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 1
10 8 6 1 x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7 1
3.3 Immunity of Symmetric Functions
In this section, we present a general analysis of the resulting system of equations for
symmetric functions and propose a generic and a specific algorithm in order to determine
the existence of g and h of low degrees.
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3.3.1 Setting up Equations
Consider the case that f(x) is a symmetric Boolean function. This means that f(x) =
f(x0, . . . , xn−1) is invariant under changing the order of the variables xi. Therefore, we
have f(y) = f(y′) if |y| = |y′| and we can identify f with its (abbreviated) truth table
T s(f) := (f s(0), . . . , f s(n)) ∈ Fn+1 where f s(i) := f(y) for a y with |y| = i. Let σi(x) :=⊕
|α|=i x
α denote the elementary symmetric polynomial of degree i. Then, each symmetric
function f can be expressed by f(x) =
⊕
i f
s
i σi(x) with f
s
i ∈ F. Similarly to the non-
symmetric case, f can be identified with its (abbreviated) coefficient vector Cs(f) :=
(f s0 , . . . , f
s
n) ∈ Fn+1. Again, a relationship between Cs(f) and T s(f) does exist:
Proposition 3. For any symmetric Boolean function f with n input variables, one has
T s(f) = Hn+1 · Cs(f) and Cs(f) = Hn+1 · T s(f).
One can derive a much simpler relation for the coefficients hγ in the case of symmetric
functions f . Notice that in general, g and h are not symmetric.
Corollary 1. Let f(x) =
⊕n
i=0 f
s
i σi(x) be a symmetric function and g(x) =
⊕
β gβx
β.
Set h(x) =
⊕
γ hγx
γ := f(x) · g(x). Then, for Asi,j ∈ F, we have for each γ
hγ =
⊕
β⊆γ
As|γ|,|β| · gβ (3.4)
Asi,j =
⊕
k
(
i− j
i− k
)
f s(k) =
⊕
k
(
j
i− k
)
f sk . (3.5)
Proof. Notice that Th. 1 holds for any function f , including symmetric functions. As
f(α) = f(α′) for |α| = |α′|, we can rewrite the expressions from Th. 1 to
hγ =
⊕
β⊆γ
( ⊕
β⊆α⊆γ
f(α)
)
gβ =
⊕
β⊆γ

⊕
k
⊕
β⊆α⊆γ,|α|=k
f s(k)

 gβ ,
hγ =
⊕
β⊆γ
( ⊕
γ−β⊆α⊆γ
fα
)
gβ =
⊕
β⊆γ

⊕
k
⊕
γ−β⊆α⊆γ,|α|=k
f sk

 gβ .
Thus, to prove the claim it is enough to show that |{α : β ⊆ α ⊆ γ, |α| = k}| = (|γ|−|β|
|γ|−k
)
and |{α : γ − β ⊆ α ⊆ γ, |α| = k}| = ( |β|
|γ|−k
)
. For the first claim, observe that for any α
with β ⊆ α ⊆ γ it holds that
αi =


0, γi = 0
1, γi = 1, βi = 1
∗, γi = 1, βi = 0
where ′∗′ denotes that the value can be 0 or 1. This shows that |γ| − |β| entries of α
can be freely chosen if α can have an arbitrary weight. Because of β ⊆ α, it holds that
30 3. Algebraic Immunity against Fast Algebraic Attacks
|α| ≥ |β|. To ensure that |α| = k, exactly k − |β| of the freely selectable entries must be
equal to 1. Thus, the number of combinations is
(
|γ|−|β|
k−|β|
)
=
(
|γ|−|β|
|γ|−k
)
which shows the first
claim. The proof for the second claim is similar. To fulfill γ − β ⊆ α ⊆ γ, it must holds
for the entries of α that
αi =


0, γi = 0
∗, γi = 1, βi = 1
1, γi = 1, βi = 0
.
Because of β ⊆ γ by assumption, exactly |β| entries of α are not fixed. To ensure that
|α| = k, exactly k−(|γ|−|β|) of the freely selectable entries must be equal to 1. Therefore,
the number of combinations is
(
|β|
k−(|γ|−|β|)
)
=
(
|β|
|γ|−k
)
which shows the second claim. 
Example 8. Let us set up an equation for γ = (101)2. It is |γ| = 2, and Eq. 3.4 brings out
h(101) = A
s
2,0 · (g(000))
⊕ As2,1 · (g(100) ⊕ g(001))
⊕ As2,2 · (g(101)) .
If we use Eq. 3.5 in order to determine the coefficients Asi,j, we find
As2,0 = f
s
2 = f
s(0)⊕ f s(2)
As2,1 = f
s
1 ⊕ f s2 = f s(1)⊕ f s(2)
As2,2 = f
s
0 ⊕ f s2 = f s(2) . 
Remark 2. Let us introduce the vector Bsi,j ∈ Fn+1, where the k’th element of Bsi,j is
defined by
(
i−j
i−k
)
. Then, the coefficient Asi,j can also be written as a scalar product A
s
i,j =
Bsi,j · T s(f) = Bsi,i−j · Cs(f).
3.3.2 Determining the Existence of Solutions
Given a symmetric function f , the existence of g and h with corresponding degrees can be
determined by an adapted version of Alg. 1 (which will be referred as Alg. 1S): in step 7,
the coefficient Aγ,β is replaced by A
s
|γ|,|β|. The discussion of this slightly modified algorithm
is similar to Sect. 3.2.2. However, computation of Asi,j requires only n+1 evaluations of the
function f , which can be neglected in terms of complexity. Consequently, time complexity
to set up equations is only aboutO(E2), and overall complexity of Alg. 1S becomes O(E3).
Next, we will derive a method of very low (polynomial) complexity to determine the
existence of g and h of low degree for a symmetric function f , but with the price that the
method uses only sufficient conditions (i.e. some solutions may be lost). More precisely,
we constrict ourselves to homogeneous functions g of degree e (i.e. g contains monomials
of degree e only, gβ = 0 for all β with |β| 6= e), and Eq. 3.4 becomes
hγ = A
s
|γ|,e
⊕
|β|=e;β⊆γ
gβ . (3.6)
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Remember that hγ = 0 for |γ| > d, so the homogeneous function g is determined by the
corresponding system of equations for all γ with |γ| = d + 1, . . . , n. In this system, the
coefficient As|γ|,e is constant for
(
n
|γ|
)
equations. If As|γ|,e = 0, then all these equations are
linearly dependent (i.e. of type 0 = 0). On the other hand, if As|γ|,e = 1, then a number of(
n
|γ|
)
additional equations is possibly linearly independent. Consequently, if the sum of all
possibly linearly independent equations for |γ| = d+ 1, . . . , n is smaller than the number
of variables
(
n
e
)
, Eq. 3.6 gives an underdefined system of linear equations which must have
a nontrivial (and homogeneous) solution g. This sufficient criterion is formalized by
n∑
i=d+1
Asi,e ·
(
n
i
)
<
(
n
e
)
. (3.7)
Given some degree e, the goal is to find the minimum value of d such that Eq. 3.7 holds.
This can be done incrementally, starting from d = n. We formalized Alg. 2 of polynomial
complexity O(n3). This algorithm turned out to be very powerful (but not necessarily
optimal) in practice, see Sect. 3.3.4 for some experimental results.
Algorithm 2 Determine the degrees of g and h for symmetric f
Input: A symmetric Boolean function f with n input variables.
Output: Degrees of specific homogeneous functions g and h such that fg = h.
1: for e from 0 to ⌈n/2⌉ do
2: Let d← n, number of equations ← 0, number of variables ← (n
e
)
.
3: while number of equations < number of variables and d+ 1 > 0 do
4: Compute A← Asd,e.
5: Add A · (n
d
)
to the number of equations.
6: d← d− 1.
7: end while
8: Output deg g = e and deg h = d+ 1.
9: end for
For a specified class of symmetric Boolean functions f , it is desirable to prove some
general statements concerning the degrees of g and h for any number of input variables
n. In the next section, we apply technique based on Alg. 2 in order to prove a theorem
for the class of majority functions.
3.3.3 Fast Algebraic Attacks on the Majority Function
We denote by f the symmetric Boolean majority function with n ≥ 2 input variables,
defined by f s(i) := 0 if i ≤ ⌊n/2⌋ and f s(i) := 1 otherwise. For example, T s(f) := (0, 0, 1)
for n = 2, and T s(f) := (0, 0, 1, 1) for n = 3. The algebraic degree of this function is
2⌊log2 n⌋. In [29] and [50], it could be proven independently that f has maximum algebraic
immunity.1 First, we show that the coefficients As|γ|,e from Corollary 1 have a simple form
in the case of the majority function.
1It has been proved in [107] that the majority function is the only symmetric function with maximum
AI in odd number of variables.
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Lemma 2. Let f be the majority function in n inputs and d = ⌊n/2⌋+1. Then for d′ < d
one has Asd′,e = 0, and for d
′ ≥ d, one has
Asd′,e =
(
d′ − e− 1
d− e− 1
)
. (3.8)
Proof. Recall that f(k) = 0 for k < d. Hence, due to Corollary 1 it is
Asd′,e
Cor. 1
=
n⊕
k=0
(
d′ − e
k − e
)
· f(k) =
n⊕
k=d
(
d′ − e
k − e
)
=
d′⊕
k=d
(
d′ − e
k − e
)
.
The last equation is true because of
(
a
b
)
= 0 mod 2 for a < b. This shows that Asd′,e = 0
for d′ < d. Now, let d′ ≥ d ≥ 1. Then, Asd′,e can be simplified to
Asd′,e =
d′⊕
k=d
(
d′ − e
k − e
)
=
d′⊕
k=d
(
d′ − e− 1
k − e
)
⊕
d′⊕
k=d
(
d′ − e− 1
k − e− 1
)
=
d′−1⊕
k=d
(
(d′ − 1)− e
k − e
)
⊕
d′⊕
k=d
(
(d′ − 1)− e
(k − 1)− e
)
= Asd′−1,e ⊕
d′−1⊕
k=d−1
(
(d′ − 1)− e
k − e
)
= 2 · Asd′−1,e ⊕
(
d′ − e− 1
d− e− 1
)
=
(
d′ − e− 1
d− e− 1
)
. 
The main goal of this section is to prove the following theorem, which discloses the
properties of f (and related functions) with respect to fast algebraic attacks.
Theorem 2. Consider the majority function f with any n ≥ 2 input variables, defined
by f s(i) := 0 if i ≤ ⌊n/2⌋ and f s(i) := 1 otherwise. Then there exist Boolean functions g
and h such that fg ≡ h, where deg h = ⌊n/2⌋+1 and deg g = d−2j, and where j ∈ N0 is
maximum so that deg g > 0. If n is even, the vector space of solutions g has a dimension
≥ (n
e
)− ( n
e−2
)
, and in the case of n odd a dimension ≥ (n
e
)− ( n
e−1
)
.
Proof. Consider fg = h, where f is the majority function, deg g = e and deg h = d.
Our strategy is to set e and d to values which guarantee that Eq. 3.7 is satisfied, so we
have to analyze the number of non-zero coefficients Asd′,e =
(
d′−e−1
d−e−1
)
mod 2 from Lemma 2
for these values, and determine the size of the left side in Eq. 3.7. Now, let e := d − 2j
where j is chosen maximum such that e ≥ 1. Observe that d− e− 1 = 2j − 1 =∑j−1i=0 2i.
For a =
∑
ai2
i, by Lucas’ Theorem, it holds that
(
a
d−e−1
)
=
∏j−1
i=0
(
ai
1
) ·∏ni=j (ai0 ) mod 2.
Note that
(
a
b
)
= 0 mod 2 iff at least one term
(
0
1
)
= 0 exists in the product. This shows
that
(
a
d−e−1
)
mod 2 = 1 if and only if ai = 1 for i = 0, . . . , j − 1, or, equivalently,
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a =
(
j−1∑
i=0
2i
)
+
(
n∑
i=j
ai · 2i
)
=
(
2j − 1)+
(
n∑
i=j
ai · 2i
)
=
(
2j − 1)+ 2j ·
(
n∑
i=j
ai · 2i−j
)
.
Hence, Asd+i,e =
(
d−e−1+i
d−e−1
)
mod 2 =
(
(2j−1)+i
2j−1
)
mod 2 = 1 if and only if i is a multiple of
2j = d − e. In other words, if d = ⌊n/2⌋ + 1 and if e = ⌊n/2⌋ + 1 − 2j, only equations
in Eq. 3.6 with d′ = d + k · (d − e) and k ≥ 1 impose conditions on the coefficients gβ,
whereas the others are necessarily equal to zero. For k = 1, we have A2d−e,e = 1. We will
prove now that d+ k · (d− e) > n for k = 2. The consequence is that only the coefficients
Ad′,e for d
′ = 2d− e are equal to 1. By the definition of j, it holds that
⌊n/2⌋+ 1− 2j+1 ≤ 0⇔ 2j+1 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋+ 1⇔ 2(d− e) ≥ d⇔ d− e ≥ e .
Notice that 2d − e = 2⌊n/2⌋ + 2 − e, which is n + 2 − e for n even, and n + 1 − e for
n odd (and which is at least d + 1). With 2d − e ≥ n + 1 − e and d − e ≥ e, we find
d + 2 · (d − e) = (2d − e) + (d − e) ≥ (n + 1 − e) + e > n. Altogether, the number of
non-trivial equations in Eq. 3.6 is
(
n
2d−e
)
which is equal to
(
n
e−2
)
for n even and
(
n
e−1
)
for n
odd. In both cases, this value is less than
(
n
e
)
, the number of coefficients gβ. Consequently,
the system of equations of Eq. 3.6 is underdefined and non-trivial solutions for g exist.
Further on, one sees that the dimension of the solution space is at least
(
n
e
)− ( n
e−2
)
for n
even and at least
(
n
e
)− ( n
e−1
)
for n odd. 
Algebraic and fast algebraic attacks are invariant with regard to binary affine transforma-
tions in the input variables. Consequently, Th. 2 is valid for all Boolean functions which
are derived from the majority function by means of affine transformations. We notice
that such a class of functions was proposed in a recent paper, discussing design principles
of stream ciphers [27, 28]. For values n = 2, 3, 4, 6 only, Th. 2 is not meaningful. A very
interesting subcase is n = 2j+1 and n = 2j + 1 for j ≥ 2, for which Boolean functions g
with deg g = 1 exist.
Table 3.2: Degrees of the functions g and h (from fg = h) for dimension n, according to
Th. 2.
n 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
deg g 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 1
deg h 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9
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3.3.4 Experimental Results
Application of Alg. 1S reveals that Th. 2 is optimal for the majority function where
d = ⌊n/2⌋ + 1 (verification for n = 5, 6, . . . , 16). An explicit homogeneous function g
can be constructed according to g(x) =
∏e−1
i=0 (x2i + x2i+1). We verified that Alg. 2 can
discover the solutions of Th. 2.
In [29], a large pool of symmetric Boolean functions with maximum algebraic immunity
is presented (defined for n even). One of these functions is the majority function, whereas
the other functions are nonlinear transformations of the majority function. Application of
Alg. 2 brings out that Th. 2 is valid for all functions f (verification for n = 6, 8, . . . , 16).
For some functions f , Alg. 2 finds better solutions than predicted by Th. 2 (e.g. for
T s(f) := (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1) where d = 3 and e = 1), which means that Th. 2 is not optimal
for all symmetric functions. All solutions found by Alg. 2 can be constructed according
to the above equation. Furthermore, Alg. 1S finds a few solutions which are (possibly)
better than predicted by Alg. 2 (e.g. for T s(f) := (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) where d = 3 and e = 2),
which means that Alg. 2 is not optimal for all symmetric functions.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, several efficient algorithms are derived to compute the algebraic immunity
of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks. Here, we focus on fast algebraic attacks
related to filtered registers, although the algorithms may be used in different contexts.
We described very fast algorithms for symmetric functions and proved that symmetric
functions do not seem to be very secure in the context of a filtered register. For non-
symmetric functions, our algorithm is very efficient when the degree of g is small.
Chapter 4
Algebraic Immunity of Augmented Functions
In this chapter, the algebraic immunity of S-boxes and augmented functions of stream
ciphers is investigated. Augmented functions are shown to have some algebraic properties
that are not covered by previous measures of immunity.
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, it turned out in some cases that large AI did not help to prevent
fast algebraic attacks (FAA’s). It is an open question if immunity against FAA’s is a
sufficient criterion for any kind of algebraic attacks on stream ciphers. In the case of
block ciphers, the algebraic immunity of S-boxes is a measure for the complexity of a very
general type of algebraic attacks, considering implicit or conditional equations [46, 4].
Present methods for computation of AI of S-boxes are not very efficient, only about
n = 20 variables are computationally feasible (except for power mappings, see [103, 43]).
In this chapter, we integrate the general approach for S-boxes in the context of stream
ciphers and generalize the concept of algebraic immunity of stream ciphers, see Open Prob-
lem 7 in [33]. More precisely, we investigate conditional equations for augmented functions
of stream ciphers and observe some algebraic properties (to be used in an attack), which
are not covered by the previous definitions of AI. As a consequence, immunity against
FAA’s is not sufficient to prevent any kind of algebraic attack: Depending on the Boolean
functions used in a stream cipher, we demonstrate that algebraic properties of the aug-
mented function allow for attacks which need much less known output than established
algebraic attacks. This induces some new design criteria for stream ciphers. Time com-
plexity of our attacks is derived by intrinsic properties of the augmented function. Our
framework can be applied to a large variety of situations. We present two applications
(which both have been implemented). First, we describe efficient attacks on some filter
generators. For example, we can efficiently recover the state of a filter generator based
on certain Boolean functions when an amount of output data is available which is only
linear in the length of the driving LFSR. This should be compared to the data complex-
ity of conventional algebraic attacks, which is about
(
n
e
)
, where n is the length of the
LFSR and e equals the algebraic immunity of the filter function. Our investigation of the
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augmented function allows to contribute to open problems posed in [57], and explains
why algebraic attacks using Gro¨bner bases against filter generators are in certain cases
successful even for a known output segment only slightly larger than the LFSR length.
In a second direction, a large scale experiment carried out with the eSTREAM Phase
3 candidate Trivium suggests some immunity of this cipher against algebraic attacks on
augmented functions. This experiment becomes feasible as for Trivium with its 288-bit
state one can find preimages of 144-bit outputs in polynomial time. Finally, we investigate
conditional correlations based on this framework.
Augmented functions of LFSR-based stream ciphers have previously been studied, e.g.
in [1, 61, 91], where it had been noticed that the augmented function can be weaker than
a single output function, with regard to (conditional) correlation attacks as well as to
inversion attacks. However, for the first time, we analyze the AI of sometimes quite large
augmented functions. Surprisingly, augmented functions did not receive much attention
in this context yet.
4.2 Algebraic Properties of S-boxes
Let F denote the finite field GF(2), and consider the vectorial Boolean function (or S-
box) S : Fn → Fm with S(x) = z, where x := (x0, . . . , xn−1) and z := (z0, . . . , zm−1). In
the case of m = 1, the S-box reduces to a Boolean function, and in general, the S-box
consists of m Boolean functions Si(x). These functions give rise to the explicit equations
Si(x) = zi. Here, we assume that z is known and x is unknown.
4.2.1 Implicit Equations
The S-box can hide implicit equations, namely F (x, z) = 0 for each x ∈ Fn and with z =
S(x). The algebraic normal form of such an equation is denoted F (x, z) =
⊕
cα,βx
αzβ =
0, with coefficients cα,β ∈ F and multi-indices α, β ∈ Fn (which can likewise be identified
by their integers). In the context of algebraic attacks, it is of interest to focus on implicit
equations with special structure, e.g. on sparse equations or equations of small degree.
Let the degree in x be d := max{|α|, cα,β = 1} ≤ n with the weight |α| of α, and consider
an unrestricted degree for the known z, hence max{|β|, cα,β = 1} ≤ m. The maximum
number of monomials (or coefficients) in an equation of degree d corresponds to 2mD,
where D :=
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
. In order to determine the existence of an implicit equation of
degree d, consider a matrix M in F of size 2n × 2mD. Each row corresponds to an input
x, and each column corresponds to an evaluated monomial (with some fixed order). If
the number of columns in M is larger than the number of rows, then linearly dependent
columns (i.e. monomials) exist, see [40, 46]. The rank of M determines the number of
linearly independent (but potentially not algebraically independent) solutions, and the
solutions correspond to the kernel of MT . Any non-zero implicit equation (which holds
for each input x) may then depend on x and z, or on z only. If it depends on x and z,
then the equation may degenerate for some values of z. For example, x0z0 ⊕ x1z0 = 0
degenerates for z0 = 0.
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Table 4.1: Theoretical block size m0 for different parameters n and d.
d
n 16 18 20 32 64 128
1 12 14 16 27 58 121
2 9 11 13 23 53 115
3 7 9 10 20 49 110
4.2.2 Conditional Equations
As the output is assumed to be known, one could investigate equations which are condi-
tioned by the output z, hence Fz(x) = 0 for each preimage x ∈ S−1(z) and of degree d
in x. The number of preimages is denoted Uz := |S−1(z)|, where Uz = 2n−m for balanced
S and m ≤ n. Notice that conditional equations for different outputs z need not be
connected in a common implicit equation, and one can find an optimum equation (i.e. an
equation of minimum degree) for each output z. Degenerated equations are not existing
in this situation, and the corresponding matrix Mz has a reduced size of Uz ×D. Similar
to the case of implicit equations, one obtains:
Proposition 4. Consider an S-box S : Fn → Fm and let S(x) = z. Then, the number of
(independent) conditional equations of degree at most d for some z is Rz = D−rank(Mz).
A sufficient criterion for the existence of a non-zero conditional equation is 0 < Uz < D.
The condition Rz > 0 requires some minimum value of d, which can depend on z. As
already proposed in [4], this motivates the following definition of algebraic immunity for
S-boxes:
Definition 6. Consider an S-box S : Fn → Fm. Given some fixed output z, let d be
the minimum degree of a non-zero conditional equation Fz(x) = 0 which holds for all
x ∈ S−1(z). Then the algebraic immunity AI of S is defined by the minimum of d over
all z ∈ Fm.
The AI can be bounded, using the sufficient condition of Prop. 4. Let d0 be the minimum
degree such that D > 2n−m. If the S-box is surjective, then there exists at least one z
with a non-zero conditional equation of degree at most d0, hence AI ≤ d0. In addition,
the block size m of the output could be considered as a parameter (by investigating
truncated S-boxes Sm, corresponding to partial conditioned equations for S). Let m0 :=
⌊n − log2D + 1⌋ for some degree d. Then, the minimum block size m to find non-zero
conditional equations of degree at most d is bounded by m0. See Tab. 4.1 for some
numerical values of m0. A single output z is called weak, if non-zero conditional equations
of degree d exist for Uz ≫ D (or if the output is strongly imbalanced). This roughly
corresponds to the condition d≪ d0, or m≪ m0.
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4.2.3 Algorithmic Methods
As already mentioned in [33], memory requirements to determine the rank of M are
impractical for about n > 20. In the case of conditional equations, the matrix Mz can
be much smaller, but the bottleneck is to compute an exhaustive list of preimages, which
requires a time complexity of 2n. However, one could use a probabilistic variant of this
basic method: Instead of determining the rank of Mz which contains all Uz inputs x, one
may solve for a smaller matrix M ′z with V < Uz random inputs. Then, one can determine
the non-existence of a solution: If no solution exists forM ′z, then no solution exists forMz
either. On the other hand, if one or more solutions exist for M ′z, then they hold true for
the subsystem of V inputs, but possibly not for all Uz inputs. Let the probability p be the
fraction of preimages that satisfy the equation corresponding to such a solution. With the
heuristical argument (1− p)V < 1, we expect that p > 1− 1/V . However, this argument
holds only for V > D, because otherwise, there are always at least D−V solutions (which
could be balanced). Consequently, if V is a small multiple of D, the probability can be
quite close to one. For this reason, all solutions of the smaller system can be useful in
later attacks. As Mz corresponds to a homogeneous system, any linear combination of
these solutions is a solution of the subsystem. However, a linear combination may have
a different probability with respect to all Uz inputs. Determining only a few random
preimages can be very efficient: In a naive approach, time complexity to find a random
preimage of an output z is about 2n/Uz (which is 2
m for balanced S), and complexity
to find D preimages is about 2nD/Uz. This is an improvement compared to the exact
method if Uz ≫ D, i.e. equations can be found efficiently for weak outputs. Memory
requirements of the probabilistic algorithm are about CM = D
2, and time complexity is
about CT = D2
m +D3.
4.3 Algebraic Attacks based on the Augmented Function
In this section, we focus on algebraic cryptanalysis of S-boxes in the context of stream
ciphers. Given a stream cipher, one may construct an S-box as follows:
Definition 7. Consider a stream cipher with internal state x of n bits, an update function
L, and an output function f which outputs one bit of keystream in a single iteration. Then,
the augmented function Sm is defined by
Sm : F
n → Fm
x 7→ (f(x), f(L(x)), . . . , f(Lm−1(x)) . (4.1)
The update L can be linear (e.g. for filter generators), or nonlinear (e.g. for Trivium). The
input x correspond to the internal state at some time t, and the output z corresponds
to an m-bit block of the known keystream. Notice that m is a very natural parameter
here. The goal is to recover the initial state x by algebraic attacks, using (potentially
probabilistic) conditional equations Fz(x) = 0 of degree d for outputs z of the augmented
function Sm. This way, one can set up equations for state variables of different time steps
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t. In the case of a linear update function L, each equation can be transformed into an
equation of degree d in the initial state variables x. In the case of a nonlinear update
function L, the degree of the equations is increasing with time. However, the nonlinear
part of the update is sometimes very simple, such that equations for different time steps
can be efficiently combined. Finally, the system of equations in the initial state variables
x is solved.
If the augmented function has some weak outputs, then conditional equations can be
found with the probabilistic algorithm of Sect. 4.2.3, which requires about D preimages
of a single m-bit output. One may ask if there is a dedicated way to compute random
preimages of m-bit outputs in the context of augmented functions. Any stream cipher
as in Def. 7 can be described by a system of equations. Nonlinear systems of equations
with roughly the same number of equations as unknowns are in general NP-hard to solve.
However, due to the special (simple) structure of some stream ciphers, it may be easy
to partially invert the nonlinear system. For example, given a single bit of output of a
filter generator, it is easy to find a state which gives out this bit. Efficient computation
of random preimages for m-bit outputs is called sampling. The sampling resistance is
defined as 2−m where m is the maximum value for which we can efficiently produce all
preimages of m-bit outputs (without trial and error). Some constructions have very low
sampling resistance, see [25, 10].
The parameters of our framework are the degree d of equations, and the block-size m
of the output. An optimal tradeoff between these parameters depends on the algebraic
properties of the augmented function. The attack is expected to be efficient, if:
1. There are many low-degree conditional equations for Sm.
2. Efficient sampling is possible for this block size m.
This measure is well adapted to the situation of augmented functions, and can be applied
to sometimes quite large augmented functions, see Sect. 4.5 and 4.6. This way, we intend
to prove some immunity of a stream cipher, or present attacks with reduced complexity.
4.4 Generic Scenarios for Filter Generators
Our framework is investigated in-depth in the context of LFSR-based stream ciphers (and
notably for filter generators), which are the main target of conventional and fast algebraic
attacks. We describe some elementary conditional equations induced by annihilators.
Then, we investigate different methods for sampling, which are necessary to efficiently set
up conditional equations. We suggest a basic scenario and estimate data complexity of
an attack, the scenario is refined and improved.
4.4.1 Equations Induced by Annihilators
Let us first discuss the existence of conditional equations of degree d = AI, where AI
is the ordinary algebraic immunity of f here. With m = 1, the number of conditional
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equations for z = 0 (resp. z = 1) corresponds to the number of annihilators of f ⊕ 1
(resp. f) of degree d. If one increases m, then all equations originating from annihilators
are involved: For example, if there is 1 annihilator of degree d for both f and f ⊕ 1, then
the number of equations is expected to be at least m for any m-bit output z. Notice that
equations of fast algebraic attacks are not involved if m is small compared to n.
4.4.2 Sampling
Given an augmented function Sm of a filter generator, the goal of sampling is to efficiently
determine preimages x for fixed output z = Sm(x) of m bits. Due to the special structure
of the augmented function, there are some efficient methods for sampling:
Filter Inversion. One could choose a fixed value for the k input bits of the filter, such that
the observed output bit is correct (using a table of the filter function). This can be done
for about n/k successive output bits, until the state is unique. This way, preimages of an
output z of n/k bits can be found in polynomial time, and by partial search, preimages
of larger outputs can be computed. Time complexity to find a preimage of m > n/k bits
is about 2m−n/k, i.e. the method is efficient if there are only few inputs k.
Linear Sampling. In each time step, a number of l linear conditions are imposed on
the input variables of f , such that the filter becomes linear. The linearized filter gives
one additional linear equation for each keystream bit. Notice that all variables can be
expressed by a linear function of the n variables of the initial state. Consequently, for an
output z ofm bits, one obtains (l+1)m (inhomogeneous) linear equations for n unknowns,
i.e. we expect that preimages can be found in polynomial time if m ≤ n/(l + 1). To find
many different preimages, one should have several independent conditions (which can be
combined in a different way for each clock cycle).
In practice, sampling should be implemented carefully in order to avoid contradictions
(e.g. with appropriate conditions depending on the keystream), see [25].
4.4.3 Basic Scenario
We describe a basic scenario for algebraic attacks on filter generators based on the aug-
mented function: With CD bits of keystream, one has C
′
D = CD −m + 1 (overlapping)
windows of m bits. Assume that there are R :=
∑
z Rz equations of degree d for m-bit
outputs z. For each window, we have about r := R/2m equations, which gives a total of
N = rC ′D equations.
1 Each equation has at most D monomials in the initial state vari-
ables, so we need about the same number of equations to solve the system by linearization.
Consequently, data complexity is CD = D/r +m− 1 bits. The initial state can then be
recovered in CT = D
3. This should be compared with the complexity of conventional
1From a heuristical point of view, the parameter r is only meaningful if the conditional equations are
approximately uniformly distributed over all outputs z.
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algebraic attacks CD = 2E/RA and CT = E
3, where e := AI, E :=∑ei=0 (ni), and RA the
number of annihilators of degree e. Notice that the augmented function may give low-
degree equations, which are not visible for single-bit outputs; this increases information
density and may reduce data complexity. Our approach has reduced time complexity if
d < e, provided that sampling (and solving the matrix) is efficient.
4.4.4 Refined Basic Scenario
The basic scenario for filter generators should be refined in two aspects, concerning the
existence of dependent and probabilistic equations: First, with overlapping windows of
m bits, it may well happen that the same equation is counted several times, namely if
the equation already exists for a substring of m′ < m bits (e.g. in the case of equations
produced by annihilators). In addition, equations may be linearly dependent by chance.
If this is not considered in the computation of R, one may have to enlarge data com-
plexity a little bit. Second, one can expect to obtain probabilistic solutions. However,
depending on the number of computed preimages, the probability p may be large and
the corresponding equations can still be used in our framework, as they increase R and
reduce data complexity, but potentially with some more cost in time. As we need about
D (correct and linearly independent) equations to recover the initial state, the probability
p should be at least 1 − 1/D (together with our estimation for p, this justifies that the
number of preimages should be at least D). In the case of a contradiction, one could
complement a few equations in a partial search and solve again, until the keystream can
be verified. Depending on the actual situation, one may find an optimal tradeoff in the
number of computed preimages. Notice that our probabilistic attack deduced from an al-
gebraic attack with equations of degree 1 is a powerful variant of a conditional correlation
attack, see [91]. A probabilistic attack with nonlinear equations is a kind of higher order
correlation attack, see [39].
4.4.5 Substitution of Equations
It is possible to further reduce data complexity in some cases. Consider the scenario where
one has N = rC ′D linear equations. On the other hand, given an annihilator of degree
e := AI, one can set up a system of degree e as in conventional algebraic attacks. The
N linear equations can be substituted into this system in order to eliminate N variables.
This results in a system of D′ :=
∑e
i=0
(
n−N
i
)
monomials, requiring a data complexity
of CD = D
′ and time complexity CT = D
′3. Notice that data can be reused in this
case, which gives the implicit equation in CD. Obviously, a necessary condition for the
success of this method is rE > 1. A similar improvement of data complexity is possible
for nonlinear equations of degree d. One can multiply the equations by all monomials of
degree e− d in order to obtain additional equations of degree e, along the lines of XL [44]
and Gro¨bner bases algorithms.
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Table 4.2: Different setups for our experiments with filter generators.
Setup n k feedback taps filter taps
1 18 5 [2, 3, 5, 15, 17, 18] [1, 2, 7, 11, 18]
2 18 5 [1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] [1, 3, 7, 17, 18]
3 18 5 [3, 5, 7, 15, 17, 18] [1, 5, 8, 16, 18]
4 18 5 [4, 5, 6, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18] [1, 6, 7, 15, 18]
5 18 5 [2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 15, 17, 18] [1, 3, 6, 10, 18]
6 20 5 [7, 10, 13, 17, 18, 20] [1, 3, 9, 16, 20]
7 20 5 [1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 20] [1, 5, 15, 18, 20]
8 20 5 [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 19, 20] [1, 4, 9, 16, 20]
9 20 5 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20] [1, 2, 15, 17, 20]
10 20 5 [1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 11, 15, 20] [1, 5, 13, 18, 20]
11 40 5 [3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, [1, 3, 10, 27, 40]
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36, 40]
4.5 First Application: Some Specific Filter Generators
Many conventional algebraic attacks on filter generators require about
(
n
e
)
output bits
where e equals the algebraic immunity of the filter function. On the other hand, in [57],
algebraic attacks based on Gro¨bner bases are presented, which in a few cases require only
n+ ε data. It is an open issue to understand such a behavior from the Boolean function
and the tapping sequence. We present attacks on the corresponding augmented functions,
requiring very low data complexity. This means, we can identify the source of the above
behavior, and in addition, we can use our method also for other functions.
4.5.1 Experimental Setup for Filter Generators
In Tab. 4.2, we collect the setups of our experiments with filter generators, where n is the
size of the LFSR, and k the number of inputs to the filter function. The feedback taps
are chosen such that the LFSR has maximum period (i.e., the corresponding polynomial
is primitive), and filter taps are chosen according to a full positive difference set (i.e.,
all the positive pairwise differences are distinct). Tap positions are counted from the left
(starting by 1), and the LFSR is shifted to the right.
4.5.2 Existence of Equations
In this subsection, we give extensive experimental results for different filter generators.
Our setup is chosen as follows: The filter functions are instances of the CanFil family
(see [57]) or the Majority functions. These instances all have five inputs and algebraic
immunity 2 or 3. Feedback taps correspond to a random primitive feedback polynomial,
and filter taps are chosen randomly in the class of full positive difference sets, see Tab. 4.2
in Appendix 4.5.1 for an enumerated specification of our setups. Given a specified filter
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Table 4.3: Counting the number of linear equations R for the augmented function of
different filter generators, with n = 20 bit input and m bit output.
Filter m R for setups 6− 10
CanFil1 14 0 0 0 0 0
15 3139 4211 3071 4601 3844
CanFil2 14 0 0 0 0 0
15 2136 2901 2717 2702 2456
CanFil5 6 0 0 0 2 0
7 0 0 0 8 0
8 0 0 0 24 0
9 0 0 0 64 0
10 6 0 0 163 0
11 113 0 2 476 0
12 960 16 215 1678 29
Majority5 9 0 0 0 2 0
10 1 10 1 18 1
11 22 437 40 148 56
generator and parameters d andm, we compute the number Rz of independent conditional
equations Fz(x) = 0 of degree d for each output z ∈ Fm. The overall number of equations
R :=
∑
z Rz for n = 20 is recorded in Tab. 4.3. Thereby, preimages are computed by
exhaustive search in order to exclude probabilistic solutions.
In the case of CanFil1 and CanFil2, linear equations exist only for m ≥ m0 − 1,
independent of the setup. On the other hand, for CanFil5 and Majority5, there exist many
setups where a large number of linear equations already exists for m ≈ n/2, see Ex. 9.
We conclude that the number of equations weakly depends on the setup, but is mainly
a property of the filter function. The situation is very similar for other values of n, see
Tab. 4.4 for n = 18. This suggests that our results can be scaled to larger values of n.
Let us also investigate existence of equations of higher degree: CanFil1 and CanFil2 have
AI = 2 and there is 1 annihilator for both f and f ⊕ 1, which means that at least m
quadratic equations can be expected for anm-bit output. For each setup and m < m0−1,
we observed only few additional equations, whereas the number of additional equations is
exploding for larger values ofm. This was observed for many different setups and different
values of n.
Example 9. Consider CanFil5 with n = 20 and setup 9. For the output z = 000000 of
m = 6 bits, there are exactly 214 preimages, hence the matrixMz has 2
14 rows and D = 21
columns for d = 1. Evaluation of Mz yields a rank of 20, i.e. a nontrivial solution exists.
The explicit solution is Fz(x) = x1⊕x3⊕x4⊕x5⊕x9⊕x10⊕x11⊕x12⊕x13⊕x14⊕x16 = 0.
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Table 4.4: Counting the number of linear equations R for the augmented function of
different filter generators, with n = 18 bit input and m bit output.
Filter m R for setups 1-5
CanFil1 12 0 0 0 0 0
13 625 288 908 335 493
CanFil2 12 0 0 0 0 0
13 144 346 514 207 418
CanFil3 12 0 0 4 0 0
13 1272 1759 2173 2097 983
CanFil4 7 0 0 0 0 0
8 19 4 0 0 0
9 102 17 1 0 12
10 533 69 9 20 167
CanFil5 6 1 0 0 0 0
7 4 0 0 0 0
8 15 0 0 0 1
9 55 1 0 0 39
10 411 61 3 0 360
11 2142 1017 166 10 1958
CanFil6 8 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 10 64 0 0
10 0 97 256 0 0
11 0 517 1024 0 0
12 0 2841 3533 1068 0
13 152 19531 17626 12627 9828
CanFil7 11 0 2 0 0 6
12 68 191 36 26 178
Majority5 8 1 0 0 0 0
9 8 3 42 27 14
10 97 94 401 282 158
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4.5.3 Probabilistic Equations
In the previous subsection, the size n of the state was small enough to compute a complete
set of preimages for some m-bit output z. However, in any practical situation where n
is larger, the number of available preimages is only a small multiple of D, which may
introduce probabilistic solutions. Here is an example with n = 20, where the probability
can be computed exactly:
Example 10. Consider again CanFil5 with n = 20 and setup 9. For the output z = 000000
of m = 6 bits, there are 214 preimages and one exact conditional equation of degree
d = 1. We picked 80 random preimages and determined all (correct or probabilistic) linear
conditional equations. This experiment was repeated 20 times with different preimages.
In each run, we obtained between 2 and 4 independent equations with probabilities p =
0.98, . . . , 1. For example, the (probabilistic) conditional equation Fz(x) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕
x6 ⊕ x9 ⊕ x15 ⊕ x16 ⊕ x17 = 0 holds with probability p = 1− 2−9. 
In the above example, there are only few probabilistic solutions and they have impres-
sively large probability, which makes the equations very useful in an attack. Notice that
experimental probability is in good agreement with our estimation p > 1−1/80 = 0.9875.
The situation is very similar for other parameters. With the above setup and m = 10, not
only z = 000 . . . 0 but a majority of outputs z give rise to linear probabilistic equations.
In the case of CanFil1 and CanFil2, we did not observe linear equations of large probability
for m < m0 − 1. It is interesting to investigate the situation for larger values of n:
Example 11. Consider CanFil5 with n = 40 and setup 11. For the output z = 000 . . . 0 of
m = 20 bits, we determine 200 random preimages. With d = 1, evaluation of Mz yields
a rank of 30, i.e. 11 (independent) solutions exist. With 2000 random preimages, we
observed a rank of 33, i.e. only 3 solutions of the first system were detected to be merely
probabilistic. An example of an equation is Fz(x) = x0⊕x7⊕x9⊕x13⊕x14⊕x17⊕x18⊕
x25 ⊕ x30 ⊕ x33 = 0. 
The remaining 8 solutions of the above example may be exact, or probabilistic with very
high probability. By sampling, one could find (probabilistic) conditional equations for
much larger values of n. For example, with CanFil5, n = 80, m = 40 and filter inversion,
time complexity to find a linear equation for a weak output is around 232.
4.5.4 Discussion of Attacks
Our experimental results reveal that some filter functions are very vulnerable to algebraic
attacks based on the corresponding augmented function. For CanFil5 with n = 20 and
setup 9, we observed R = 163 exact equations using the parameters m = 10 and d = 1,
which gives a ratio of r = 0.16. Including probabilistic equations, this ratio may be
even larger. Here, preimages of any z can be found efficiently by sampling: using filter
inversion, a single preimage can be found in 2m−n/k = 26 steps, and a single equation in
around 213 steps. Provided that equations are independent and the probability is large,
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data complexity is about CD = (n+1)/r+m− 1 = 140. The linear equations could also
be substituted into the system of degree AI = 2, which results in a data complexity of
about CD = 66. Notice that conventional algebraic attacks would require CD = E = 211
bits (and time complexity E3). As we expect that our observation can be scaled, (i.e.
that r remains constant for larger values of n and m = n/2), data complexity is a linear
function in n. Considering time complexity for variable n, the matrix M and the final
system of equations can be solved in polynomial time, whereas sampling is subexponential
(and polynomial in some cases, where linear sampling is possible).
In [57], CanFil5 has been attacked experimentally with n+ε data, where n = 40, . . . , 70
and ε < 10. Our analysis gives a conclusive justification for their observation. Other
functions such asMajority5 could be attacked in a similar way, whereas CanFil1 and CanFil2
are shown to be much more resistant against this general attack: No linear equations have
been found for m < m0 − 1, and only few quadratic equations.
4.6 Second Application: Trivium
Trivium [32] is a stream cipher with a state of 288 bits, a nonlinear update and a linear
output. It has a simple algebraic structure, which makes it an interesting candidate for
our framework. We consider the S-box Sm(x) = z, where S is the augmented function of
Trivium, x the state of n = 288 bits, and z the output of m bits. We will first analyze the
sampling of Sm, which is very similar to linear sampling of filter generators.
4.6.1 Sampling
The state consists of the 3 registers R1 = (x0, . . . , x92), R2 = (x93, . . . , x176) and R3 =
(x177, . . . , x287). In each clock cycle, a linear combination of 6 bits of the state (2 bits
of each register) is output. Then, the registers are shifted to the right by one position,
with a nonlinear feedback to the first position of each register. In the first 66 clocks,
each keystream bit is a linear function of the input, whereas the subsequent keystream
bit involves a nonlinear expression. Consequently, given any output of m = 66 bits, one
can efficiently determine some preimages by solving a linear system. It is possible to find
preimages of even larger output size. Observe that the nonlinear function is quadratic,
where the two factors of the product have subsequent indices. Consequently, one could
fix some alternating bits of the state, which results in additional linear equations for the
remaining variables. Let c, l, q denote constant, linear, and quadratic dependence on the
initial state. Let all the even bits of the initial state be c, see Tab. 4.5. After update 83,
bits 82 and 83 (counting from 1) of R2 are both l. Variable t2 takes bits 82 and 83 of R2
to compute the nonlinear term. So after update 84, t2 = x177 is q (where nonlinear terms
in t1 and t3 appear somewhat later). After 65 more updates, x242 is quadratic, where x242
is filtered out from R3 in the next update (after 84 updates, other bits are also q and
are filtered out from registers R1 and R2, but on a later point in time). Consequently,
keystream bit number 66 + 84 = 150 (counting from 1) is q, and the first 149 keystream
bits are linear in the remaining variables. The number of remaining variables in the state
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Table 4.5: Evolution of states with partially fixed input.
Initial state After 1 update After 84 updates
R1 = lclcl . . . R1 = llclcl . . . R1 = lllll . . .
R2 = clclc . . . R2 = lclclc . . . R2 = lllll . . .
R3 = clclc . . . R3 = lclclc . . . R3 = qllll . . .
(the degree of freedom) is 144. Consequently, for an output of size m = 144 bits, we can
expect to find one solution for the remaining variables; this was verified experimentally.
The solution (combined with the fixed bits) yields a preimage of z. Notice that we do
not exclude any preimages this way. In addition, m can be somewhat larger with partial
search for the additional bits.
Example 12. Consider the special output z = 000 . . . 0 of m = 160 bits. By sampling and
partial exhaustive search, we find the following nontrivial preimage:
x =
100010111100010111001100010101001101000010010010
000100100100110011111011011101100001001100101000
110000000101011001110000111111011001100001101010
011100000101010011001101111010101011111110100001
000001000001101000100001111001101010100010101111
101000001110100101010011000100111001010010101101 
4.6.2 Potential Attacks
The nonlinear update of Trivium results in equations Sm(x) = z of increasing degree for
increasing values of m. However, for any output z, there are at least 66 linear equations in
the input variables. It is an important and security related question, if there are additional
linear equations for some fixed output z. A linear equation is determined by D = 289
coefficients, thus we have to compute somewhat more than 289 preimages for this output.
By sampling, this can be done in polynomial time. Here is an experiment:
Example 13. Consider a prescribed output z of 144 bits, and compute 400 preimages x
such that Sm(x) = z (where the preimages are computed by a uniform random choice
of 144 fixed bits of x). Given these preimages, set up and solve the matrix M of linear
monomials in x. For 30 uniform random choices of z, we always observed 66 linearly
independent solutions. 
Consequently, Trivium seems to be immune against additional linear equations, that might
help in an attack. Because of the lack of probabilistic solutions, Trivium is also supposed
to be immune against equations of large probability (compare with CanFil1 and CanFil2).
As pointed out in [75], there are some states resulting in a weak output: If R1, R2 and
R3 are initialized by some period-3 states, then the whole state (and hence the output)
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repeats itself every 3 iterations. Each of these states results in z = 000 . . . 0. Here is an
extended experiment (with partial exhaustive search) for this special output:
Example 14. Consider the output z = 000 . . . 0 of 150 bits, and compute 400 random
preimages x such that Sm(x) = z. By solving the matrix M of linear monomials in x, we
still observed 66 linearly independent solutions. 
4.7 Conditional Correlations
Exact equations (or equations with very large probability) are used in algebraic attacks
on stream ciphers, and probabilistic linear equations are used in correlation attacks and
linear attacks (e.g. for the Boolean function in combination generators). In spite of this
close relationship, these two approaches have never been analyzed in a unified framework.
We briefly sketch how to use the previous methods to find conditional correlations.
4.7.1 Nonlinearity
Consider a Boolean function f : Fn → F, where the output f(x) is assumed to be known.
Let u ∈ Fn and define the dot product by u·x := u0x0⊕. . .⊕un−1xn−1. The problem here is
to find the vector u such that the probabilistic linear equation f(x) = u · x has maximum
probability for uniformly random x. This problem can be restated with the notation
of (conventional) nonlinearity, which is the Hamming distance of f to the set of affine
functions. More precisely, theWalsh-Transform of f is defined by fˆ(u) :=
∑
x(−1)f(x)⊕u·x.
The linear correlation coefficient is C := maxu fˆ(u) and conventional nonlinearity becomes
NL := 1
2
(2n−C). This means p := Prx(f(x) = u·x) = 1−NL/2n for some optimal u. For
an S-box S : Fn → Fm, one can investigate the maximum probability of Prx(u·S(x) = v·x)
with u ∈ Fm and v ∈ Fn. Zhang and Chan [125] observed that if S(x) is known, then
we can compose S(x) with any (and not necessarily linear) Boolean function g : Fm → F
and consider the maximum probability of Prx(g(S(x)) = v · x). Since we are choosing
from a larger set of equations now, we can find linear approximations with larger bias,
but finding the relation is more difficult. This concept was improved again in [36] by
considering all implicit equations F (x, z) = 0 with z = S(x) which are non-degenerate
for all z and linear in x. They introduced the notation of generalized nonlinearity, which
can be computed in about 22n steps (assuming m < n). We use a similar notation for
conditional equations with fixed output z, see also [92, 91].
Definition 8. Consider an S-box S : Fn → Fm and the set F of linear Boolean functions
F : Fn → F. Define the conditional probability for a fixed output z and a function
F ∈ F by pz := PrS−1(z)(F (x) = 0), where S−1(z) is the set of preimages of size Uz.
Let Fˆ :=
∑
S−1(z)(−1)F (x) and Cz := maxF∈F |Fˆ |. The conditional nonlinearity of S with
respect to F (and conditioned by z) is defined by NLz := 12(Uz − Cz), and the maximum
conditional probability becomes pz = 1−NLz/Uz.
Note that NLz may be computed for each output z separately, involving the computation
of preimages. According to the definition of AI for an S-box, the nonlinearity NL could
4.7 Conditional Correlations 49
Table 4.6: List of maximal conditional probabilities for CanFil1 with n = 20 and different
setups.
m Setup 6 Setup 7 Setup 8 Setup 9 Setup 10
2 0.625 0.667 0.500 0.563 0.531
3 0.625 0.750 0.625 0.625 0.531
4 0.625 0.750 0.625 0.656 0.625
5 0.625 0.800 0.625 0.664 0.625
6 0.628 0.833 0.657 0.697 0.656
7 0.661 0.835 0.659 0.708 0.658
8 0.677 0.861 0.673 0.734 0.683
9 0.756 0.917 0.733 0.749 0.712
10 0.756 0.935 0.770 0.778 0.762
be (re-)defined by the minimum of NLz for all z. For linear functions, the number of
monomials is D = n and the size of F is 2n. Let us discuss some algorithmic methods to
determine NLz. In a direct approach, each of the 2n linear functions in F is evaluated
for the given set of preimages in order to find the maximum pz. For a balanced S it is
Uz = 2
n−m, hence the complexity to compute NLz is about 22n−m, and the complexity to
compute the (alternative) NL is 22n. We can also use the probabilistic algorithm from
Sect. 4.2.3 with only V ≪ Uz random preimages. For V < D, there are at least D − V
independent equations. On the other hand, V should be as large as possible in order
to increase the probability of an equation (by increasing the number of conditions). In
practice, we will choose V slightly below D. If one (or more) solutions F can be found,
one has to estimate the conditional correlation pz with some additional preimages of z.
All steps can be repeated T times to identify the solution F with maximum empirical pz.
The bottleneck of this method is to find preimages of z.
4.7.2 Experimental Results
In Sect. 4.5, it turned out that some Boolean functions of filter generators have many
(exact) linear conditional equations already for small values of m (e.g. CanFil5), whereas
other functions are more resistant (e.g. CanFil1). Here, we investigate the existence of
probabilistic equations for filter generators for even smaller values of m.
Example 15. Consider a filter generator with n = 20, filter CanFil1 and setup 6. Choose
parameters V = 15, T = 20 and compute the (empirical) maximum of the conditional
probabilities, see Tab. 4.6 (and Tab. 4.7 for CanFil5). For example, for the output z =
000 . . . 0 of m = 10 bits, the equation Fz(x) = x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x12 ⊕ x13 = 0
holds with probability pz = 0.739. 
Consequently, one can find probabilistic equations for small m, even for some functions
which turned out to be strong with respect to exact equations. The correlations weakly
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Table 4.7: List of maximal conditional probabilities for CanFil5 with n = 20 and different
setups.
m Setup 6 Setup 7 Setup 8 Setup 9 Setup 10
2 0.929 0.928 0.833 0.942 0.929
3 0.978 0.800 0.929 0.985 0.935
4 0.978 0.800 0.978 0.997 0.935
5 0.995 0.933 0.979 0.996 0.949
6 0.995 0.933 0.984 0.998 0.982
7 0.996 0.970 0.985 1.000 0.985
8 0.997 0.977 0.995 1.000 0.987
9 0.998 0.994 0.999 1.000 0.988
10 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.994
depend on the setup, and strongly depend on the filter. We observe that the probabilistic
algorithm can find the maximum conditional probability pz (resp. the nonlinearity NL)
in most of the cases.
4.8 Summary
Intrinsic properties of augmented functions of stream ciphers have been investigated with
regard to algebraic attacks and linear attacks. Certain properties of the augmented func-
tion enable efficient algebraic attacks with lower data complexity than established alge-
braic attacks. In order to assess resistance of augmented functions against such improved
algebraic attacks, a prespecified number of preimages of outputs of various size of these
functions have to be found. For a random function, the difficulty of finding preimages
increases exponentially with the output size. However, due to a special structure of the
augmented function of a stream cipher, this can be much simpler than in the random
case. For any such stream cipher, our results show the necessity of checking the aug-
mented function for algebraic relations of low degree for output sizes for which finding
preimages is feasible. In this chapter, this has been successfully carried out for various
filter generators as well as for the eSTREAM candidate Trivium.
Chapter 5
Attacks on the Alternating Step Generator
In the previous chapter it was noticed that sampling may be useful along with other
attacks in a unified framework. The results of this chapter represent a positive attempt
to exploit such a connection for a concrete stream cipher: we present some reduced
complexity attacks on the Alternating Step Generator (ASG). The attacks mostly benefit
from the low sampling resistance of the ASG, and of an abnormal behavior related to the
distribution of the initial states of the stop/go LFSR’s which produce a given segment of
the output sequence.
5.1 Introduction
The Alternating Step Generator (ASG), a well-known stream cipher proposed in [71],
consists of two stop/go clocked binary LFSR’s, LFSRx and LFSRy, and a regularly clocked
binary LFSR, LFSRc of which the clock-control sequence is derived. The original descrip-
tion of ASG [71] is as follows. At each time, the clock-control bit determines which of the
two stop/go LFSR’s is clocked, and the output sequence is obtained as bitwise sum of the
two stop/go clocked LFSR sequences. It is known [79,65,78] that instead of working with
the original definition of ASG we can consider a slightly different description for which the
output is taken from the stop/go LFSR which has been clocked. More precisely, at each
step first LFSRc is clocked; then if the output bit of LFSRc is one, LFSRx is clocked and its
output bit is considered as the output bit of the generator, otherwise LFSRy is clocked and
the output bit of the generator is taken from this LFSR. Since in a cryptanalysis point of
view these two generators are equivalent, we use the later one all over this chapter and
for simplicity we still call it ASG.
Several attacks have been proposed on ASG in the literature. Most of these attacks
are applied in a divide-and-conquer based procedure targeting one or two of the involved
LFSR’s. We will focus on a divide-and-conquer attack which targets one of the two stop/go
LFSR’s.
A correlation attack on individual LFSRx or LFSRy which is based on a specific edit
probability has been introduced in [66]. The amount of required keystream is linear in
terms of the length of the targeted LFSR and the correct initial state of the targeted LFSR
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is found through an exhaustive search over all possible initial states. In [79] some reduced
complexity attacks on ASG and SG (Shrinking Generator, see [38]) were presented and the
effectiveness of the attacks was verified numerically for SG while only few general ideas
were proposed for ASG without any numerical or theoretical analysis. These methods
avoid exhaustive search over all initial states, however, the amount of needed keystream
is exponential in terms of the length of the targeted LFSR. One of our contributions of
this chapter is to give a closed form for the reduced complexity attacks on ASG.
Our major objective of this chapter is to investigate a general method which does not
perform an exhaustive search over all possible initial states of the targeted LFSR. We
will take advantage of the low sampling resistance of ASG. For ASG, sampling is easy if
the output length m is chosen to be about the total length of the two stop/go LFSR’s.
Another weakness of ASG which enables us to mount our attack is that different initial
states of any of the two stop/go LFSR’s have far different probabilities to be accepted
as a candidate which can produce a given segment of length m of the output sequence.
Systematic computer simulations confirm this striking behavior. The highly non-uniform
distribution of different initial states of any of the stop/go LFSR’s is valid for any segment
of length about m, and the effect is more abnormal for some special outputs which we
refer to as weak outputs. Thanks to the low sampling resistance of ASG we first try to
find a subset of the most probable initial states which contains the correct one, then using
the probabilistic edit distance [66] we distinguish the correct initial state. Our general
approach can be faster than exhaustive search even if the amount of keystream is linear
in terms of the length of the targeted LFSR, improving the results in [66]. With regard
to reduced complexity attacks, our approach does assume less restricted output segments
than in [79], a fact that has been confirmed by large-scale experiments. This enables
attacks with significantly lower data complexity even for large instances of ASG (whereas
asymptotical complexity is shown to be comparable over known methods).
5.2 Previous Attacks on ASG
Several attacks have been proposed on the ASG in the literature. This section will provide
an overview of the different attacks. We will denote the length of registers LFSRc, LFSRx
and LFSRy by nc, nx and ny, respectively. If we only use parameter n, we apply the
simplification n := nc = nx = ny.
5.2.1 Divide-and-Conquer Linear Consistency Attack
It is shown in [71] that the initial state of LFSRc can be recovered by targeting its initial
state in a divide-and-conquer based attack based on the fact that the output sequence
of the ASG can be split into the regularly clocked LFSRx and LFSRy sequences, which
are then easily tested for low linear complexity. Hence the complexity of this attack is
O(min2(nx, ny)2nc) assuming that only the feedback polynomial of LFSRc is available.
Under the assumption that the feedback polynomial of all LFSR’s are available, which
is the basic assumption of all other known attacks (including ours in this chapter), the
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complexity of this attack would be O(min(nx, ny)2nc) instead, since a parity check test can
be used in place of linear complexity test. In this case the attack is a linear consistency
attack [124]. We will use the idea of this attack to sample ASG in Sect. 5.4.1.
5.2.2 Edit Distance Correlation Attack
A correlation attack on LFSRx and LFSRy combined, which is based on a specific edit
distance, was proposed in [65]. If the initial states of LFSRx and LFSRy are guessed
correctly, the edit distance is equal to zero. If the guess is incorrect, the probability of
obtaining the zero edit distance was experimentally shown to exponentially decrease in
the length of the output string. Later, a theoretical analysis of this attack was developed
in [78, 63]. The minimum length of the output string to be successful for an attack is
about four times total lengths of LFSRx and LFSRy. As the complexity of computing the
edit distance is quadratic in the length of the output string, the complexity of this attack
is O((nx+ ny)22nx+ny). In addition, it was shown that the initial state of LFSRc can then
be reconstructed with complexity O(20.27nc).
5.2.3 Edit Probability Correlation Attack
A correlation attack on individual LFSRx or LFSRy which is based on a specific edit
probability was developed in [66]. For a similar approach, see [79]. The edit probability is
defined for two binary strings: an input string, produced by the regularly clocked targeted
LFSR from an assumed initial state, and a given segment of the ASG output sequence. The
edit probability is defined as the probability that the given output string is produced from
an assumed input string by the ASG in a probabilistic model, where the LFSR sequences
are assumed to be independent and purely random. It turns out that the edit probability
tends to be larger when the guess about the LFSR initial state is correct. More precisely,
by experimental analysis of the underlying statistical hypothesis testing problem, it was
shown that the minimum length of the output string to be successful for an attack is about
forty lengths of the targeted LFSR. As the complexity of computing the edit probability is
quadratic in the length of the output string, the complexity of reconstructing both LFSR
initial states is O(max2(nx, ny)2max(nx,ny)). This yields a considerable improvement over
the edit distance correlation attack if nx and ny are approximately equal and relatively
large, as is typically suggested (for example, see [98]).
Remark 3. Note that ”edit distance correlation attack” means that the initial states of
LFSRx and LFSRy can be recovered regardless of the unknown initial state of LFSRc,
whereas ”edit probability correlation attack” means that the initial state of LFSRx (LFSRy)
can be recovered regardless of unknown initial states of LFSRy (LFSRx) and LFSRc. How-
ever, the targeted LFSR initial states should be tested exhaustively. The main motivation
for this chapter is to investigate if the initial states of LFSRx (LFSRy) can be reconstructed
faster than exhaustive search regardless of unknown initial states of LFSRy (LFSRx) and
LFSRc.
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5.2.4 Reduced Complexity Attacks
A first step to faster reconstruction of LFSR’s initial states was suggested in [79], in which
some reduced complexity attacks on ASG and SG are presented. In the next section, we
will give a general expression in the parameter nx, the length of target register LFSRx.
A second movement to faster reconstruction of LFSR initial states was suggested in [68],
using an approach based on computing the posterior probabilities of individual bits of the
regularly clocked LFSRx and LFSRy sequences, when conditioned on a given segment of
the output sequence. It is shown that these probabilities can be efficiently computed and
the deviation of posterior probabilities from one half are theoretically analyzed. As these
probabilities represent soft-valued estimates of the corresponding bits of the considered
LFSR sequences when regularly clocked, it is argued that the initial state reconstruction
is thus in principle reduced to fast correlation attacks on regularly clocked LFSR’s such as
the ones based on iterative probabilistic decoding algorithms. Although this valuable work
shows some vulnerability of the ASG towards fast correlation attacks, the practical use
of these probabilities has not yet been deeply investigated. Nonetheless, these posterior
probabilities can certainly be used to mount a distinguisher on ASG. This can be compared
with [62], a similar work on SG for which a distinguisher was later developed in [69].
5.3 Johansson’s Reduced Complexity Attacks
In [79] some reduced complexity attacks on the ASG and SG were presented, and the
effectiveness of the attacks was verified numerically for the SG (while only few general
ideas were proposed for the ASG without any numerical or theoretical analysis). We
give a closed form for the reduced complexity attack on ASG, using the approximation(
n
w
) ≈ 2nh(w/n) where h(p) is the binary entropy function defined as
h(p) := −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p) . (5.1)
In the first scenario, the attacker waits for a segment of m consecutive zeros (or ones)
in the output sequence and assumes that exactly m/2 of them are from LFSRx. This
is true with probability β =
(
m
m/2
)
2−m. The remaining n − m/2 bits of LFSRx are
then found by exhaustive search. Time and data complexities of this attack are CT =
n22n−m/2β−1 = n22n+m/2
(
m
m/2
)−1
and CD = 2
m−1β−1 = 22m−1
(
m
m/2
)−1
(using overlapping
blocks of keystream). Ignoring the polynomial and constant terms and equaling the time
and data complexities, we have n −m/2 = m, which shows m = 2
3
n. Thus the optimal
complexities of this attack are CT = O(n22 23n) and CD = O(2 23n). These arguments apply
to both LFSRx and LFSRy.
Remark 4. The total time of the attack is composed of the time to filter the blocks of data
with desired properties, and of the time to further process the filtered blocks. Although
the unit of examination time of these two phases are not equal, we ignore this difference
to simplify the analysis.
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In another scenario in [79], it is suggested to wait for a segment of length m containing
at most w ones (zeros) and make the assumption that only half of the zeros (ones) come
from the LFSRx. All the ones (zeros) and the remaining zeros (ones) are assumed to come
from the LFSRy. This is true with probability β = 2
−w
(
m−w
(m−w)/2
)
2−(m−w). The time and
data complexities of this attack are then CT = n
22n−(m−w)/2β−1 and CD = 2
m−1
(
m
w
)−1
β−1,
respectively. With w := αm, ignoring the constant and polynomial terms, and equaling
the time and data complexities, we have n− (1−α)m/2+αm = m−h(α)m+αm, which
results inm = n/(3/2−α/2−h(α)). The minimum value of the exponentsm(1−h(α)+α)
is 0.6406n, which is achieved for α ≈ 0.0727 (and hence m = 0.9193n and w = 0.0668n).
Therefore, the optimal complexities are CT = O(n220.64n) and CD = O(20.64n). Note that
this complexity is only for reconstruction of the initial state of LFSRx. The complexity for
recovering the initial state of LFSRy highly depends on the position of ones (zeros) in the
block. In the best case, the block starts with w ones (zeros) and the complexity becomes
CT = n
22n−(m+w)/2. In the worst case, the attacker has to search for the positions of ones
(zeros), and the complexity becomes CT =
(
(m+w)/2
w
)
n22n−(m−w)/2. It is difficult to give
an average complexity, but we expect that it is close to the worst case complexity. With
m = 0.9193n and w = 0.0668n, this gives CT = O(n220.69n) to recover the initial state
of LFSRy. Consequently, as a distinguishing attack, this scenario operates slightly better
than the previous one, but as an initial state recovery it is slightly worse.
5.4 New Reduced Complexity Attack
Before we describe our attack in detail, let us introduce some notations. We use A := (ai)
for a general binary sequence, Amk := (ai)
m
i=k for a segment of it and A
m := (ai)
m
i=1 for
a prefix of length m. The number of 1’s in A is denoted by wt(A). We define the first
derivative of A as (ai ⊕ ai+1) and denote it by A˙. Let C, X, Y and Z denote the regular
output sequences of LFSRc, LFSRx, LFSRy and the output sequence of the ASG itself,
respectively. The initial state of the LFSR’s can be represented by c = Cn, x = Xn and
y = Y n. The output sequence of the ASG of size m is denoted by z = Zm.
5.4.1 Sampling Resistance
Let us consider the augmented function of ASG with S : F3n → Fm. Any initial state
(c, x, y) of ASG which can produce z, a given prefix of size m of the output sequence
of ASG, is called a preimage of z. As in the previous chapter, the sampling resistance
is defined as 2−m where m is the maximum value for which we can efficiently produce
all preimages of m-bit outputs. As will be shown in this subsection, the low sampling
resistance of ASG is an essential ingredient for our attack. Let S−1(z) of size Uz = |S−1(z)|
denote the set of all preimages of z. Based on the divide-and-conquer linear consistency
attack, introduced in Sect. 5.2, we can compute S−1(z) according to Alg. 3. Let us
discuss the complexity of Alg. 3. If Uz ≤ 2n, then the overall complexity is 2n, because
the complexity of Steps 3 to 8 are O(1). On the other hand, if Uz > 2n, then Steps 3
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to 8 introduce additional solutions, and overall complexity is about Uz. The following
statement is given under the assumption of balancedness, i.e. the average number of
preimages of ASG for any output z of m bits is about 23n−m, where m ≤ 3n.
Algorithm 3 Sampling of ASG
Input: Output sequence z of m bits.
Output: Find S−1(z) with all preimages of z.
1: Initially, set S−1(z) = ∅.
2: for all non-zero initial states c do
3: Set X = Y = ∅.
4: Compute Cm, a prefix of length m of the output sequence of LFSRc.
5: Based on Cm, split up z into Xw and Y m−w, where w = wt(Cm).
6: Add all (non-zero) x to X , if LFSRx can generate Xw.
7: Add all (non-zero) y to Y , if LFSRy can generate Y m−w.
8: For all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , add (c, x, y) to the set S−1(z).
9: end for
Statement 1. Time complexity of Alg. 3 is CT = O(max(2n, 23n−m)).
With the previous definition of sampling resistance, this algorithm can be considered as an
efficient sampling algorithm iff Uz ≥ O(2n) or equivalently m ≤ 2n. That is, the sampling
resistance of ASG is about 2−k with k = 2n the total length of the two stop/go LFSR’s.
A related problem is how to find a multiset A with T uniformly random independent
elements of S−1(z). We suggest to modify Alg. 3 as follows: S−1(z) is replaced by A and
T is added as another input parameter. In Step 2, a uniform random (non-zero) initial
state c is chosen, and Steps 3 to 8 are not modified. The new Steps 2 to 8 are then
repeated, until T preimages have been found. This modified algorithm will be referred
to as Alg. 3B. We assume correctness of the algorithm, i.e. the preimages found with
Alg. 3B are uniformly random elements of S−1(z) (for which we will give experimental
evidence). The following statement is presented under the assumption that the average
number of preimages of ASG for any output z, given some fixed initial state of LFSRc, is
about 22n−m, where m ≤ 2n.
Statement 2. Time complexity of Alg. 3B is CT = O(T ) for m ≤ 2n, and CT =
O(min(2n, T2m−2n)) for m > 2n, where 1 ≤ T ≤ O(23n−m).
5.4.2 Conditional Distribution of the Initial States
With the sampling algorithm described in Sect. 5.4.1, we can find T random preimages
of an output sequence z. The natural question which arises is how large should T be so
that our subset contains the correct initial state? The answer is related to the conditional
distribution of different initial states of LFSRx which can produce a given segment of length
m of the output sequence of the ASG. Consider the following two general propositions:
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Proposition 5. Let X0, . . . , XT be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables, defined over the
finite set {s1, . . . , sN} with probability distribution pi := Pr(Xj = si). Then, the probability
P := Pr(X0 ∈ {X1, . . . , XT}) that a realization of X1, . . . , XT contains a realization of X0
is
P = 1−
N∑
i=1
(1− pi)Tpi . (5.2)
Proof. The probability P can be expressed as
Pr(X0 ∈ {X1, . . . , XT}) = 1− Pr(X0 6= Xj, 1 ≤ j ≤ T )
= 1−
N∑
i=1
Pr(X0 6= Xj, 1 ≤ j ≤ T | X0 = si) · Pr(X0 = si)
= 1−
N∑
i=1
Pr(si 6= Xj, 1 ≤ j ≤ T ) · Pr(X0 = si)
= 1−
N∑
i=1
(1− pi)Tpi . 
Proposition 6. Let H := −∑Ni=1 pi log2(pi) be the entropy of random variable Xj. With
about T = 2H , the probability Pr(X0 ∈ {X1, . . . , XT}) is significant.
Proof. From Prop. 5 we have Pr(X0 ∈ {X1, . . . , XT}) = 1−
∑N
i=1(1− pi)Tpi. With the
assumption Tpi ≪ 1, we obtain (1−pi)T ≈ 1−Tpi, which gives the approximation Pr(X0 ∈
{X1, . . . , XT}) ≈ 1−
∑N
i=1(1−Tpi)pi = T
∑N
i=1 p
2
i . Assuming Pr(X0 ∈ {X1, . . . , XT}) ≈ 1,
we have T ≈ 1/∑Ni=1 p2i , or equivalently T ≈ 2G with G := − log2∑Ni=1 p2i . This can
be compared with the entropy function H . Both H and G are approximated with a
multivariate Taylor series of order 2 at the point p0, such that pi = p0 + εi. If T2 denotes
the second order part, this gives
T2(H) =
Np0
ln 2
− 1
ln 2
− log2 p0
T2(G) =
2
ln 2
− 2
Np0 ln 2
− log2N − log2 p20 .
Now let p0 := 1/N , then we have T2(H) = log2N and T2(G) = − log2N + 2 log2N =
log2N . Consequently, the difference becomes T2(H)− T2(G) = 0, hence H = G of order
2 on the points pi = 1/N . 
Remark 5. The quantity G := − log2
∑N
i=1 p
2
i is the Re´nyi entropy of order 2. It is known
that guessing a random value, drawn from a known nonuniform probability distribution,
on average requires the number of steps related to the Re´nyi entropy of order 2, e.g.
see [117] or references therein. Prop. 6 shows that this is still true when the distribution
is not directly known but can be simulated. One can directly use this entropy instead
58 5. Attacks on the Alternating Step Generator
of Shannon entropy which is only an approximation in this regard, however, we prefer to
use the better known Shannon entropy. For the case pi = 1/N we have G = H = log2N ,
hence T = N and P = 1−∑Ni=1(1− 1/N)N(1/N). For N ≫ 1 we have (1− 1/N)N ≈ e−1
which shows P ≈ 1 − e−1 ≈ 0.63. We guess that in general we have P ≥ 1 − e−1. Our
extensive simulations for several distributions verify this conjecture.
To apply these propositions to the situation of ASG, let S−1(z|x) of size Ux be a subset
of S−1(z), defined by {(c, x, y) ∈ S−1(z)} for fixed x. The conditional probability for a
fixed initial state x of LFSRx is then defined by p(z|x) = Ux/Uz. Consequently, we need to
draw about T = 2Hx uniformly random elements of S−1(z) to include the correct initial
state of LFSRx where Hx is the conditional entropy of the initial state of the LFSRx given
z, defined by
Hx(z) = −
∑
x
p(z|x) · log2 p(z|x) . (5.3)
The same argument applies to LFSRy, and the symmetry of ASG motivates the simpli-
fication H := Hx = Hy (if not mentioned otherwise). Another natural question is the
expected number of different elements Q drawn in this sample of size T . This is related to
the Coupon-Collector Problem with non-uniform distribution. However, we can assume
that Tp≪ 1, which results in Q ≈ T .
Remark 6. Any adversary who would know the distribution p(z|x) could try to recover
the unknown initial state of LFSRx by considering the most probable initial state first,
then the second most probable one and so on. Here, to cope with unknown distribution
p(z|x), we simulate it by choosing uniformly random elements of S−1(z) (where element x
is chosen with probability p(z|x)). This procedure is similar to [97] in which an equivalent
description of the underlying cipher was used, for which the initial states were no longer
equiprobable.
Remark 7. As mentioned in Sect. 5.2.4, it has been suggested in [68] to take advantage
of the posterior probabilities of the individual bits of the regularly clocked LFSRx and
LFSRy sequences, when conditioned on a given segment of the output sequence for faster
reconstruction of LFSR initial states. Our attack can be considered as a generalization of
this attack in which we take advantage of the posterior probabilities of the initial states
rather than individual bits, when conditioned on a given segment of the output sequence.
Although unlike [68] we are able to give an estimation for the time and data complexities
of our attack, a theoretical analysis of the conditional entropy of the initial states remains
an open problem, see Sect. 5.5.1.
5.4.3 Description of the Attack
In the basic edit probability correlation attack on the ASG [67, 66], the edit probability
is computed for each of the 2n possible initial states of LFSRx (given a segment of length
N ≈ 40n of the output sequence of the ASG) to find the correct initial state. This is
repeated also for LFSRy, and finally the initial state of LFSRc can be recovered. In our
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improved attack, we take the output sequence z of m bits into account to compute a
smaller multiset A of candidates of initial states, which is of size T and contains the
correct initial state of LFSRx (resp. LFSRy) with some probability P , see Prop. 5. The
multiset A is constructed with Alg. 3B. In Alg. 4, we give a formalization of this attack.
Remark 8. One would think that it is better to compute the edit probability between the
ZN and only the LFSR output sequence of all distinct initial states suggested by multiset
A to avoid processing the same initial state several times. However, this needs memory of
O(|A|) and extra effort to keep the track of the non-distinct initial states. Since |A| ≈ T
the achieved gain is negligible and therefore we alternatively compute the edit probability
at the time where a preimage is found.
Algorithm 4 Attack on ASG
Input: Parameters T , m, N , output ZN .
Output: Recover the initial state of ASG with some error probability pe.
1: Given the segment z = Zm, find T preimages using Alg. 3B.
2: Compute the edit probability between ZN and the output sequence for each suggested
initial state.
3: Choose the most probable candidates for LFSRx resp. LFSRy.
4: Recover LFSRc and verify the validity, see Sect. 5.2.3.
Parameters for the Entropy. The complexity of the attack is related to the conditional
entropy H . However, for large instances of ASG, the conditional probabilities and hence
H are unknown. To be able to evaluate our attack and give an explicit expression for the
data and time complexities, we need to know the relation between conditional entropies H
and all parameters which can possibly affect them. The parameters are LFSR’s feedback
polynomials and the output prefix z, which implicitly include the lengths of LFSR’s and
output segment length as well. In our simulations we noticed that feedback polynomials
have almost no effect and the only important parameters are LFSR lengths n, the size of the
output segment m (as larger values of m reduce uncertainty about the correct preimage),
and the weight w of the output segment z or the weight w of the first derivative of the
output segment z (as will be shown in our simulations). The entropy is significantly
reduced if |wt(z)/m− 0.5| ≫ 0 (i.e. many zeros or ones) or if wt(z˙)/m≪ 0.5 (i.e. many
runs of zeros or ones). This can be explained by the fact that a biased output segment
results in a biased LFSR segment, and we will refer to such outputs as weak outputs. In
Sect. 5.5.1, we will predict the average value of H depending on these parameters using
some regression analysis, hence H = f(n,m,w).
Time Complexity. Let us discuss time complexity of Alg. 4. According to Prop. 6, we
set T = 2H . Complexity of Step 1 is described in Statement 2. Computation of the edit
probability distance of a single preimage takes about O(n2), hence complexity of Step 2
is at most O(n2T ). Finally, the complexity of Step 4 is O(20.27n), which can be neglected
here.
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Statement 3. Time complexity of Alg. 4 is about CT = O(n22H) for m ≤ 2n, and
CT = O(2H+m−2n) for m≫ 2n.
This should be compared to the attack by Golic et al. of complexity CT = O(n22n) using
an output sequence of length about CD = 40n which was described in Sect. 5.2.3, and
Johansson’s attack of complexity CT = O(n22 23n) using an output sequence of length
CD = O(2 23n) as described in Sect. 5.3.
Data Complexity. The parameter w has some influence on the data complexity of our
attack. Once we know that the weight of z is at most w or at least m − w, or that the
weight of the first derivative of z is at most w, a prefix of length about N = 40n suffices
to recover the initial states, see [66]. However, in order to obtain such an output segment
Zt+mt+1 for some t, the required amount of keystream bits is CD = 2
m(3
∑w
i=0
(
m
i
)
)−1. This
can be roughly approximated by CD = O(2m(1−h(w/m))).
Success Probability. The error probability pe of the attack depends on three events: 1)
The probability that our multiset A of size T = 2H contains the correct initial state.
2) The probability that our prediction of the entropy gives at least H . 3) The success
probability of the edit distance correlation attack. The first probability corresponds to
P according to Eq. 5.2. The second probability comes from the fact that we use an
estimation of the average value of H instead of the exact value of H .
5.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we give experimental results on ASG. We estimate the conditional entropy,
give a detailed discussion of the complexity for different scenarios and present an example
of an attack.
5.5.1 Distribution of Initial States
For specific instances of ASG, we investigate the distributions of initial states. Here, ASG
is small enough such that an exact computation of initial states with Alg. 3 is feasible. We
use registers of the same length, but our results do not significantly change if the lengths
are pairwise coprime and about the same, as suggested in [98]. The following example has
illustrative character: First, we compute the distributions for one fixed output sequence.
Second, the block size m is varied for average-weighted output sequences. Third, an
output sequences of low weight is investigated.
Example 16. Consider a setup with n = 20 and some randomly chosen primitive feedback
polynomials. Fix a random output sequence z of m = 40 bits according to
z = 1110110110100101010000100100101011000110 .
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Figure 5.1: H/n versus w/m for all 0 ≤ w ≤ m and 5 ≤ n ≤ 21.
The number of preimages is Uz = 1 046 858 = 2
20.00, and the entropies are Hc = 17.49,
Hx = 17.32, and Hy = 17.34. If this output is padded by the 2 additional bits 01, then
the number of preimages becomes Uz = 264265 = 2
18.01 and the entropies are Hc = 16.26,
Hx = 16.46, and Hy = 16.45. On the other hand, consider the following output sequence
for m = 40 and with weight w = 7,
z = 0001010000100000000110000001000100000000 .
The number of preimages for this low-weight output sequence is Uz = 1 117 725 = 2
20.09,
with entropies Hc = 17.39, Hx = 12.24, and Hy = 12.63. 
Let us discuss this example. The number of preimages is about 260−m, as expected. In
all three registers, the entropy is not maximal for the random output sequence of size
m = 40. This may be explained by the fact that sequences are not fully random, as they
satisfy a linear recurrence. In the stop/go LFSR’s, the entropy is strongly reduced for
outputs of low weight, without any losses in the number of preimages. Notice that Hc
does not depend on the weight of the output, which is optimal for efficient sampling.
In the following we will focus on the case m = 2n. The entropy H of the stop/go
LFSR’s is exactly determined for different values of n and w, where n = 5, . . . , 21 and
w = 0, . . . , m. More precisely, given some n (and randomly chosen primitive feedback
polynomials), we determine the average entropy H using 500 randomly chosen outputs of
weight w. The values of H/n as a function of w/m are shown in Fig. 5.1. The inner dots
in this figure relate to smaller values of n, and the outer dots relate to larger values of n.
A convergence behavior of H/n for increasing n is perceivable from this figure.
It turns out that H/n can be well approximated by a scaled binary entropy function,
namely H/n ≈ γ · h(w/m) with 0 < γ ≤ 1 depending on n. Notice that γ = maxw(H/n),
which can be well approximated by γ ≈ 1 − 1/(0.19n + 3.1). Fig. 5.2 shows some addi-
tional figures of the average entropy, together with our approximations using nonlinear
regression. Fig. 5.3 compares the average value of the entropy as a function of the weight
of the output sequence and as a function of the weight of the derivative of the output
sequence. Consequently, with this regression analysis, the average value of the entropy is
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Figure 5.2: Up: H/(maxw(H)) versus w/m for n = 21, approximated by the entropy
function. Down: maxw(H) versus n, approximated by γ(n).
approximated by:
H(n,m,w) ≈ γ(n) · n · h
(w
m
)
(5.4)
γ(n) ≈ 1− 1
0.19n+ 3.1
. (5.5)
In the case w = wt(z˙) the shape is not symmetric, however it seems that for w/m < 0.5
for a fixed n the figures of H/n versus w/m are well comparable regardless of what w
represents (w = wt(z˙) or w = wt(z)), see Fig. 5.3. For m > 2n, the expected entropy
does not correspond to this functional form anymore. The maximum of H against w/m
decreases linearly with m, but the graph of H/n versus w/m is broader compared to
h(w/m), which means that a reduction of the entropy requires an output of very low
weight. We do not further investigate this scenario.
5.5.2 Complexity of the Attack
Our attack allows different time/data trade-offs. We describe the complexity of our attack
for m = 2n and different values of parameters n and w. According to Statement 3, time
complexity of our attack is CT = O(n22H). Including the approximation for H , we obtain
CT = O(n22γnh(w/m)). Given an random output sequence, the complexity of our attack
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Figure 5.3: H/n versus w/m for n = 17 in two cases: w = wt(z˙) and w = wt(z).
is CT = O(n22γn). In this case the data complexity is minimal and our attack should
be compared to the attack by Golic et al. [66] which shows an improvement by a factor
2(1−γ)n. In the limit γ → 1 (hence for n→∞), our attack reduces to the previous attack.
However for moderate values there is some gain. For example, we expect γ = 0.945 for
n = 80, which gives an improvement of a factor 24.4.
Reduced complexity attacks can be mounted by using weak outputs. This can be
compared to the attack by Johansson [79]. Asymptotical data complexity of our attack
becomes CD = O(2m(1−h(w/m))). Similar to what we do in Sect. 5.3, the optimized com-
plexity is achieved if time and data complexities are almost equal. Considering only the
exponential terms and γ = 1, this happens when h(w/m)n = m(1 − h(w/m)), that is
h(w/m) = 2/3 and hence w ∈ {0.174m, 0.826m}. The asymptotical complexities become
CT = O(n22 23n) and CD = O(2 23n), which is identical to the complexities of the attack by
Johansson, see Sect. 5.3. However, compared to the simple attack in [79], it is clear that
our attack allows for more flexibility in the structure of the output sequence: the weight
can be arbitrary, we can also use outputs of low weight derivative, and we do not need a
hypothesis about the origin of the output bits. With a more subtle (non-asymptotical)
investigation of the complexities, we show that data (and/or time) complexity can be
significantly reduced with our attack. More precisely, we evaluate the exact complexities
of our and Johansson’s attack for reasonable value of n. Regarding Johansson’s attack,
consider the special point m = 2
3
n in the time/data tradeoff curve. For n = 80, this gives
CT = 2
69.4 and CD = 2
55.2. If we choose w = 0.21m in our attack, we obtain about the
same time complexity and require only CD = 2
42.3 data. This is an improvement of a
factor 212.9 (notice that a significant reduction can be expected even for γ = 1).
5.5.3 Example of an Attack
In this section, we present a large-scale example of a partial attack. We fix a random initial
state in all three registers, such that the corresponding output sequence has weight w =
0.174m. Then, H is computed according to Eq. 5.4 and 5.5. Alg. 3B is used to compute
the multiset A of size T = 2H , and we check if the correct initial state of the LFSRx (resp.
LFSRy) is included in A. This is repeated several times, in order to determine the success
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probability P . In addition, time complexity of Alg. 3B is measured experimentally: For
each choice of c, the complexity is increased by the number of preimages found (and by
one if no preimage can be found), see Remark 8. For m = 2n, this should be compared
to CT = O(T ), see Statement 2. Notice that we do not implement the edit probability
correlation attack and rely on the results of [66].
Example 17. Let n = 42 and fix a random initial state such that the corresponding output
sequence z of m = 84 bits has weight w = 14. The expected entropy becomes H = 24.16,
we set T = 2H = 18782717 and apply Alg. 3B. This is repeated 200 times, and the correct
initial state of LFSRx is found in 84 cases which shows a success probability of P = 0.42
for our algorithm. The average time complexity of the sampling algorithm is 225.35. 
5.6 Summary
A reduced complexity attack on the Alternating Step generator (ASG) has been presented,
the success of which has been confirmed experimentally. For comparison, the complexity
of the best previous attack has been determined and described in closed form. Esti-
mates of the overall complexity of our new attack are shown to improve the complexity of
the previous attack. Our attack allows for greater flexibility in known output data con-
straints, and hence for lower data complexity, for being successful. The attack method
demonstrates the usefulness of a quite general attack principle exemplified in the case of
ASG: to exploit low sampling resistance and heavily biased inputs for outputs satisfying
certain constraints.
Chapter 6
Analysis of F-FCSR
We have seen that algebraic attacks (and related concepts) can be a real threat for LFSR-
based stream ciphers, but are much less efficient for stream ciphers with nonlinear driving
devices such as FCSR’s. In this chapter, we investigate the security of the eSTREAM
phase 3 stream cipher candidate F-FCSR. Our analysis shows a link to an equivalent
representation of the FCSR.
6.1 Introduction
As a potential replacement device of LFSR’s, feedback shift registers with carry (FCSR’s)
have been investigated. The eSTREAM phase 3 candidate F-FCSR consists of an FCSR
with multiple linear (thus hardware-efficient) filters applied to the main register of the
FCSR automaton. The security of F-FCSR was investigated in different directions, and it
was recently observed in [116] that an equivalent description exists. It is an open question
if this equivalent description results in a simplified structure to be used in a cryptanalytic
attack (as it was the case for ASG in the previous chapter). The new description reveals
that (1) only one variable of the main state is updated in each iteration, (2) the memory
is very small, but (3) with a transformed filter. We focus our analysis on this alternative
description of F-FCSR.
6.2 Theoretical Background
An FCSR can be represented in Fibonacci or Galois architecture, see [70]. In this section,
we review the definition and some basic theory from [5, 6, 70, 83] on FCSR’s in both
representations.
6.2.1 2-Adic Numbers and Periods
Following the definition in [83], we call a state of a finite state machine (an FCSR, for
instance) periodic if, left to run, the machine will return to that same state after a
finite number of steps. Similarly, we call a sequence U = (u0, u1, . . .) periodic (or strictly
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Figure 6.1: FCSR with Galois architecture.
periodic) with period T if ui+T = ui for all i ≥ 0. We call a sequence U eventually periodic
if there exists a t ≥ 0 such that U ′ = (ut, ut+1, . . .) is periodic. A 2-adic integer is a formal
power series α =
∑∞
i=0 ui2
i with ui ∈ {0, 1}. The collection of all such formal power series
forms the ring of 2-adic numbers. This ring especially contains rational numbers p/q
where p and q are integers and q is odd. Such rational numbers and eventually periodic
binary sequences are linked by the following well-known theorem [83].
Theorem 3. There is a one-to-one correspondence between rational numbers α = p/q
(where q is odd) and eventually periodic binary sequences u which associates to each
such rational number α the bit sequence u = (u0, u1, u2, . . .) of its 2-adic expansion. The
sequence u is strictly periodic if and only if α ≤ 0 and |α| < 1.
6.2.2 Galois FCSR’s
Description. A Galois FCSR (which is similar to a Galois LFSR) consists of n binary reg-
ister cells x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) with some fixed binary feedback positions d = (d0, . . . , dn−1),
and n− 1 binary memory cells a = (a0, . . . , an−2). We also use the integer representation
x =
∑n−1
i=0 2
ixi (correspondingly for d and a). Starting from an initial configuration (x, a),
x0 is output, and the sums σi = xi+1 + aidi + x0di are computed for 0 ≤ i < n (with
xn = 0, an−1 = 0). Then, the state is updated by xi ← σi mod 2 for 0 ≤ i < n, and
ai ← σi div 2 for all 0 ≤ i < n− 1, see Fig. 6.1.
Evolution of the States. We consider here the special case where memory bits of a Galois
FCSR are only present on those positions with feedback (which means that the effective
number of memory bits is l ≤ n, and a can only have some restricted values). In this
case, the Galois FCSR can be described by the connection integer q = 1− 2d. The initial
state is denoted (x, a), with an associated value p = x + 2a (assuming that x is not the
all-zero or all-one state). Note that different states (x, a) may lead to the same p, i.e., the
function to compute p from (x, a) is not injective. The sequence generated by the FCSR
is the 2-adic expansion of p/q, i.e., the output sequence depends only on p and q [70]. In
other words, let pt be the state at time t, with initial state p0 = p. Then the Galois FCSR
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div 2 mod 2
b
∑
d0 d1 . . . dn−1
yn−1 yn−2 . . . y0
Figure 6.2: FCSR with Fibonacci architecture.
produces 2pt+1 = pt mod q, or
pt = 2−tp mod q . (6.1)
The output bit at time t is then zt = pt mod 2. It is 0 ≤ p ≤ |q|, hence the output
sequence is periodic (see Th. 3). According to Eq. 6.1, the period of the output sequence
is the order of 2 modulo q. The maximum value of the period is |q| − 1 and can only be
reached if |q| is a prime [5]. In the case of a maximum-length FCSR, the transition graph
representing the evolution of the states (x, a) consists of a main cycle of length |q| − 1
with small paths converging to it. It is known [8] that any state (x, a) converges to the
main cycle (i.e. it synchronizes) after at most n+4 iterations. Furthermore, a single cycle
of the output consists of two half periods (which are binary complements of each other).
6.2.3 Fibonacci FCSR’s
Description. A Fibonacci FCSR consists of a main register y = (y0, . . . , yn−1) of n bits,
with some fixed binary feedback taps d = (d0, . . . , dn−1) and an additional memory reg-
ister b of l bits. Starting from an initial configuration (y, b), y0 is output, the sum
σ = b +
∑n−1
i=0 yidn−i−1 is computed, and the registers are updated according to y ←
(y1, . . . , yn−1, σ mod 2) and b ← σ div 2, see Fig. 6.2. If the Fibonacci FCSR is in a
periodic state, then the value of the memory b is in the range 0 ≤ b < wt(d), where wt(d)
denotes the Hamming weight of d, see [70].
Evolution of the States. The connection integer is again defined by q = 1 − 2d, and the
state is represented by the integer p. Then, the output sequence of the Fibonacci FCSR is
again the 2-adic expansion of p/q. However, p does not correspond to y + 2b here, but to
p = b2n −
n−1∑
k=0
k∑
j=0
dj−1yk−j2
k (6.2)
where d−1 = −1, see [70]. If memory bits of a Galois FCSR are only present on those
positions with feedback (i.e., for Galois FCSR’s represented by a connection integer q),
then the Galois FCSR can be mapped to a Fibonacci FCSR (and vice versa) with the same
connection integer q = 1−2d such that both produce the same output. Note that a Galois
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FCSR can be implemented more efficiently than a Fibonacci FCSR since the additions may
be carried out in parallel.
6.3 Sequences Produced by a Single Galois Register Cell
In a Galois FCSR, the values xi in the main register are modified in each cycle, and not
only shifted. Assume an initial state (x, a) and a connection integer q = 1 − 2d. Then,
according to Th. 4 in [5], there exists some pi such that the sequence x
t
i of values produced
by a fixed register cell i in a Galois FCSR corresponds to the 2-adic expansion of pi/q.
From [7], we know that pi = Fi(x, a) · q +Mi · p with Fi(x, a) =
∑n−1
j=i (xj + 2aj)2
j−i and
with constants Mi = 2
∑n−1
j=i dj2
j−i. The following proposition is a simple consequence of
this for periodic states:
Proposition 7. Consider a maximum-length Galois FCSR with initial state (x, a) and
output sequence pt mod 2, where p0 = x + 2a. If (x, a) is a periodic state, the sequence
xti of a fixed register cell i corresponds to p
t+si mod 2 with a phase shift si = − log2(Mi)
mod q and Mi = 2
∑n−1
j=i dj2
j−i.
Proof. If (x, a) is periodic, the 2-adic expansions of pi/q have to be strictly periodic
for all i. Th. 3 implies that 0 ≤ pi < |q|, hence pi = pi mod q = Mi · p mod q. In a
maximum-length Galois FCSR, each possible value of pi mod q is passed after a number
of si iterations of p, hence pi = 2
−sip mod q, and we can set Mi = 2
−si mod q. 
Note that the phase shifts si are independent of the initial state p and depend on i (and
q) only. Here is an example:
Example 18. Consider the toy example of [5] with q = −347, hence n = 8 and d = 174.
The output of the FCSR is strictly periodic with period −q − 1 = 346. We find M0 = 1,
M1 = 174, M2 = 86, M3 = 42, M4 = 20, M5 = 10, M6 = 4, M7 = 2. The phase shifts are
s0 = 0, s1 = 1, s2 = 23, s3 = 250, s4 = 67, s5 = 68, s6 = 344, s7 = 345. 
6.4 A Canonical Representative
Note that more than one state (x, a) may be mapped to p ∈ Z|q|+1 . We define an
equivalence relation ∼ on the set of FCSR-states in Galois representation by
(x, a) ∼ (x′, a′)⇔ x+ 2a ≡ x′ + 2a′ mod q .
With the following proposition, we can define a canonical representative for the equiva-
lence classes [p].
Proposition 8. For a state (x, a) with p = x + 2a of a maximum-length Galois FCSR
with connection integer q, the only strictly periodic state in the equivalence class [p] is the
state (x′, a′) with x′i =Mi · p mod q mod 2 and a′ = (p− x′)/2.
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Proof. Let p = x + 2a. We have x′ + 2a′ = x′ + 2p−x
′
2
= x′ + p − x′ = p, hence
(x′, a′) ∼ (x, a). In the case p = 0, we have (x, a) = (0, 0) = (x′, a′), and (xt, at) = (0, 0)
for all t, so (x′, a′) is periodic. Similarly for p = |q|, the only possible state (x, a) is
(2n − 1, d − 2n−1), and this state is periodic [5]. If p 6= 0, the state transition graph
representing the evolution of the states (xt, at) consists of a main cycle of length |q| − 1
and paths converging to it. Hence, for each state (x, a) there exists exactly one equivalent
state (x˜, a˜) that lies on the main cycle. For this state (x˜, a˜), the sequences x˜ti have to be
strictly periodic. Due to Prop. 7, the first bit of the 2-adic expansion of p˜i/q and hence
x′i is equal to p˜i mod 2 with pi = Mi · p mod q. Moreover, a˜ is uniquely determined by
x˜ and p, which implies (x˜, a˜) = (x′, a′). 
This suggests to define the state (x′, a′) as the canonical representative for the equivalence
class [x′ + 2a′]. Here is an example:
Example 19. Let q = −347, hence n = 8 and d = 174. For p = 100, we find the canonical
representative (x′, a′) = (80, 10) which is a strictly periodic state. 
6.5 Analysis of F-FCSR in Fibonacci Representation
We recall the specification of two instances of the F-FCSR family of stream ciphers and
present our analysis in Fibonacci representation.
6.5.1 Filtered FCSR’s
In [6], the stream cipher F-FCSR-H with security level 80 bits was presented. It consists
of a Galois FCSR of size n = 160 and with a memory of size l = 82. There are k = 8
fixed linear filter functions (applied on the intermediate state bits of the Galois FCSR)
to produce 8 keystream bits in each iteration. A similar stream cipher F-FCSR-16 with
security level 128 bits was presented, with n = 256, l = 130 and k = 16. According
to [5, 7], we can expect the FCSR to be in a periodic state after the key/IV setup has
completed. Our observations imply that both versions of F-FCSR can be equivalently
described based on a Fibonacci FCSR instead of a Galois FCSR, but with a transformed
filter. This transformation can be done in different ways, which gives different scenarios
of potential attacks.
6.5.2 Transformation with Nonlinear Filter
If the initialization p of the Galois FCSR of F-FCSR is known, it can be mapped to
an initial state of a Fibonacci FCSR such that both versions produce the same output.
The advantage of the Fibonacci representation (from a cryptanalytic point of view) is
that only one bit of the main state is modified per iteration, and 8 bits are sent to the
keystream. However, this also requires a transformation of the linear filter to obtain the
correct keystream: the linear filter of F-FCSR operates on the intermediate states of the
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Galois FCSR. In order to compute the input of the filter function, we need to compute
the values of certain Galois main register cells in each clock cycle:
Proposition 9. The value xi of the i-th cell in the main register of the Galois FCSR can
be computed from the (strictly) periodic state (y, b) of the corresponding Fibonacci FCSR
by
xi =Mi
(
b2n −
n−1∑
k=0
k∑
j=0
dj−1yk−j2
k
)
mod q mod 2 . (6.3)
Proof. We first use Eq. 6.2 to compute the value of p that corresponds to the Fibonacci
state (y, b) and then apply Prop. 8 to compute pi. 
Every keystream bit is a linear combination of several bits given by Eq. 6.3. This results
in a nonlinear system of equations in the unknowns (y, b).
6.5.3 Transformation with Linear Filter
Given some periodic initialization (x, a) of a maximum-length Galois FCSR, the sequence
of a cell i corresponds to the output with a phase shift si, see Prop. 7. Consequently, the
F-FCSR keystream can be produced by a linear filter applied on the FCSR output, where
the required size of the FCSR output depends on the values of the involved si. The FCSR
output can be produced with a Fibonacci FCSR (initialized by the state corresponding
to p). Alternatively, one could think of an FCSR-combiner with linear filter, where the
number of identical FCSR’s corresponds to the number of filter taps, and where the initial
states are not independent, but related according to Prop. 7.
6.5.4 Potential Attack with Linearization
We describe a trivial attack on a Fibonacci FCSR with n = 160, l = 82 and with k = 8
linear filters. Initially, there are 160 binary variables (ignoring the memory), and each
updated bit is represented by a new variable (ignoring the details of the construction and
assuming independence). Each iteration gives another 8 linear equations in these (initial
and newly introduced) state variables. The main state can be recovered by solving the
system of linear equations, if the number of equations is at least as large as the number of
variables. This requires r iterations, where 8r ≥ 160+ r. Consequently, r = 23 iterations
are sufficient, or 184 bits of keystream. Gaussian elimination of this system requires a
computational complexity of about 1843, which is 223. After recovering the main state, one
can recover the memory state. If the FCSR is in a periodic state (which can be expected
already after the initialization phase), then the effective size of the memory state reduces
to 7 bits. Consequently, the memory can be guessed, or recovered by FCSR-synthesis,
and the whole state can be recovered in about 230 steps and with less than 200 bits of
keystream. A similar attack is possible for any other construction of this type with k > 1.
However, the stream cipher F-FCSR with Fibonacci representation and with linear
filters has initially a number of variables which corresponds to the maximum of involved
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si. In Tab 6.1, we observe that the phase shifts si for the first filter of F-FCSR-H are
distributed over a significant part of the period of the FCSR output sequence. Depending
on the linear filters, the extracted bits to produce one keystream bit may involve the
whole cycle of the FCSR output. On the other hand, the FCSR-combination generator
requires many new variables. Consequently, we expect that the above scenario does not
constitute a practical threat to neither of the two F-FCSR instances.
Table 6.1: List of phase shifts for the first filter of F-FCSR-H.
i si
8 0x084D55C1E9BF6DABABE0BDA75592EE7F4C4DE6BA9
24 0x0F21C59484E27CB4F6D6D72A0F8141F0E2B4734C7
40 0x0C5FA773C15C6E3BE3E651BC3BB22FE735750A436
56 0x0F65F15C09715290BDB70A07C2520E6CB0A081382
80 0x0A778DF1C1F0E55E6B7B6EE796363498223BA75AC
96 0x1171C8C7A5E76A27EAB1E7C54D700A01112A5CE8A
104 0x060AA060A404D38A7307AFA25D3B9ED593CD05F15
112 0x061AD53ACAC8385A916026572D0FE291A53C93D3E
128 0x0FE422A9803989E98E16DB607440C1F40AF8BD82B
136 0x10076D047EA8E3B35E0C9C71B6CDAB88BEE0E6321
6.6 Summary
In this chapter we have given a simplified description of the sequences produced by a
single cell of a Galois FCSR given the register’s initial state is periodic. Additionally
we have shown how to compute for a given state of a maximum length FCSR the unique
equivalent periodic state. Based on these observations and the well-known correspondence
between Fibonacci and Galois representations of FCSR’s, we have proposed several new
attack strategies. Currently, our analysis does not lead to an efficient attack, but may be
useful as a starting point for further cryptanalytic research.
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Chapter 7
Attacks on T-functions
In the previous chapter, we have seen that FCSR’s may be suitable building blocks to
replace linear driving devices in stream ciphers. Another suggestion is to use nonlinear T-
functions. In this chapter, we analyze a class of stream ciphers based on T-functions. We
use statistical and linear methods to mount very efficient distinguishing and key recovery
attacks, and we observe a non-randomness of the initialization function of one eSTREAM
proposal.
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze several proposals of stream ciphers based on T-functions and
exhibit substantial weaknesses in some of these constructions. The flaws are extended to
dedicated attacks. First we analyze the statistical properties of the pure square mapping,
which allows us to find an efficient distinguisher (with an expected 232 data complexity)
on TF-0 as well as on a previously unbroken multi-word mapping described in [87] and
labeled here as TF-0M, both based on the squaring operation. TF-0M operates on a
256-bit state and the output sequence consists of the 32 most significant bits. Then, we
cryptanalyze the TSC-family of stream ciphers [76], which operates on a 128-bit state and
outputs 32 bits of the state using a filtering function. We find a very efficient distinguisher
for TSC-1 with an expected 225 data complexity, which can be used for key recovery; for
TSC-2, we describe a different distinguishing attack with an expected 234 data complexity.
To confirm our theoretical results, the attacks have been implemented and run many times
with success. Our attacks have a negligible error probability and a remarkably small time
complexity. For eSTREAM Phase 2 candidate TSC-4, we identify a non-randomness in
the initial state over the full eight-round initialization phase.
7.2 Cryptanalysis of Square Mappings
Klimov and Shamir have proposed different types of T-functions based on the squaring
operation [85, 87]. After introducing the framework of this section, we focus on the pure
square mapping and derive a hypothesis about their probability distribution. This dis-
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tribution is used in order to distinguish the proposed mappings TF-0 and TF-0M with
significant advantage.
Let us consider a scheme which consists of an update function L and an output func-
tion f . Let us further define the random variables X and X ′ over the set X = {0, 1}n,
with uniformly distributed X and with X ′ = L(X). Equivalently, Z and Z ′ are random
variables over Z = {0, 1}m with uniformly distributed Z and with Z ′ = f(L(X)). Given
the distributions D1, D0 (corresponding to the distributions of Z, Z
′) and some uniform
random or pseudo-random output respectively, we can perform a statistical test in order
to assign the output to a distribution. According to Sect. 2.8, let ∆(D0) be the imbal-
ance of the distribution D0. We are interested in the data complexity N = d/∆(D0) of
the (optimal) distinguisher, corresponding to some designated overall error probability
pe = Φ(−
√
d/2). For small1 word sizes n, the distribution D0 can be determined by an
exhaustive computation of f(L(x)) for all 2n elements x, resulting in a precomputation
time complexity of 2n and a memory complexity (measured with the number of required
memory cells) of 2m. We assume that the test is performed online, hence we do not need
additional memory in order to store the data. The online time complexity is identical to
the data complexity. However, a precomputation of D0 might be infeasible for large values
of n (e.g. n = 64 bit). We perform some detailed analysis of D0 for small word sizes n and
establish an analytical hypothesis for the approximated distribution of Z ′, considering
only the most biased elements. This significantly reduces the oﬄine time and memory
complexity, but might increase the online time and data complexity of the distinguisher,
given some pe. For small word sizes n, the hypothesis can be verified with the accurate
distributions, and for large n, the quality of the hypothesis will be directly examined by
the experimental data complexity of the distinguisher.
7.2.1 Distribution of the Pure Square Mapping
Let us define the pure square mapping (PSM) by L(x) = x2 mod 2n and f(x) = x ≫
(n−m), which are the m most significant bits of word x. Iteration produces some fixed
points such as 0 or 1, hence L can not be considered as an update function for a real
application. However, we will be able to reduce more complex single-cycle mappings
to some modified square mappings and apply the results obtained in this section; in
other words, we will consider the pure square mapping as an ideal case, resulting in
distinguishers with minimal data complexity compared to modified square mappings.
We first mention that Klimov and Shamir [85] found an analytical expression for
probabilities of single bits of the square mapping. Applying the notation X ′ = L(X) for
an uniformly distributed X, they found that Pr([X ′]0 = 0) =
1
2
, Pr([X ′]1 = 0) = 1 and
Pr([X ′]i = 0) =
1
2
(1+ 2−
i
2 ) for i > 1. However, as we will have to deal with an additional
carry bit later on (which would reduce this bias significantly), we are more interested in the
distribution of words. We explain how to derive highly biased probability distributions for
X ′ = L(X) and Z ′ = f(L(X)). As shown in the next proposition, L is not a permutation,
1The term small is used with respect to current computational possibilities, i.e. n . 40 bit for personal
computers nowadays.
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resulting in an unbalanced distribution of X ′ (there are some predictable elements L(x)
with exceptionally large bias).
Proposition 10. Consider the function L : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n with L(x) = x2 mod 2n.
For successive elements x ∈ {0, . . . , 2n− 1}, the images L(x) have a cyclic structure with
cycle length 2n−2. Hence L is neither injective nor surjective.
Proof. As x2 − (2n−1 + x)2 = 0 mod 2n, we have two cycles of length 2n−1, and as
(2n−2 + x)
2− (2n−2 − x)2 = 0 mod 2n, both cycles have two mirrored sequences of length
2n−2. Hence the output of successive numbers x has the shape abc . . . cbaabc . . . cba. 
Due to the specified output function in PSM, the bias is transferred to the distribution
of Z ′. For a truly random scheme, any element of the output occurs with probability
p0 = 2
−m. For the particular scheme PSM with m = n/2, we observed (for small word
sizes n) that there exist 4 outcomes with biased probability 2 · p0, 12 outcomes with
biased probability 1.5 · p0 and so on. This property appears to be independent of n, and
we therefore can establish a hypothesis for the most biased elements (which are explicitly
known). Let Zi be the aggregate containing elements of constant biased probability pi.
The parameter si denotes the cardinality of Zi, and ni denotes the minimal word size for
a stable occurrence of pi. The parameters ni, si and pi are summarized in Tab. 7.1. Then
we have for i = 0, . . . , k (limited by the condition n ≥ nk)
Z0 = {2(n−n0)/2 · j2; j = 0, . . . , s0}
Zi = {2(n−ni)/2 · (1 + 8j); j = 0, . . . , si}
Z∞ = Z −
∑Zi . (7.1)
The values in Tab. 7.1 are determined with empirical methods, however ni and si are
exact at least for word sizes within our computational possibilities. In the case of PSM,
pi is exact for i = 0, 1, but fluctuating for i > 1 so we have to take an average value.
A further approximation is done with the remaining elements in Z∞, which are assigned
to a constant (standardized) probability. The number of aggregates k determines the
accuracy of the approximation. However, k is constrained by the condition n < nk, and
as the values of pi are only accurate for ni up to about 40, we usually choose k = 8 for
n > 40 bit. This corresponds to a memory complexity of 217. Regarding the complexities
of a distinguisher, increasing the number of aggregates k is coupled with more time, more
memory and less data.
Table 7.1: Parameters of the approximated distribution for the first 9 aggregates.
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
pi2
m 2.000 1.500 1.200 1.100 1.050 1.030 1.002 1.005 1.003
ni2
−2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
log2(si) 2 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
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7.2.2 Attacking the Single-Word Mapping TF-0
Let us now consider the running single-word proposal TF-0 with the update function
L(x) = x + (x2 ∨ C) mod 2n where C = 5, 7 mod 8, and with the output function
f(x) = x≫ (n−m) as described in [85,88]. As the low-order bits are known to be weak,
the authors of the scheme proposed m = 1, 8, 16, 32 for the standard word size n = 64 bit.
Klimov and Shamir showed that L is an invertible T-function over an n-bit state x with
a single cycle of length 2n. The number of extracted bits m controls a tradeoff between
security and efficiency of the scheme. We give some relationship to PSM with the next
proposition.
Proposition 11. Consider the scheme TF-0. If one requires C < 2n−m, it is f(L(x)) −
f(x) = f(x2) + α mod 2m for n−m > 2 and for a carry bit α ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. As L(x) = y = x + (x2 ∨ C) mod 2n, we conclude y − x = x2 ∨ C mod 2n for
C < 2n−m. Hence, f(y − x) = f(x2 ∨ C) mod 2m and f(y − x) = f(x2) mod 2m for
C < 2n−m. We finally have f(y)− f(x)−α = f(x2) mod 2m for C < 2n−m and for some
carry bit α ∈ {0, 1}. 
Prop. 11 states that the difference of two consecutive outputs of TF-0 differs only by
an additive carry bit α ∈ {0, 1} from the output of PSM. Therefore, we may accurately
approximate the distribution of the random variable f(L(X))− f(X) by the distribution
of PSM (i.e. we neglect the influence of the carry bit). We choose the standard parameters
C = 5, n = 64 and m = n/2 and use 9 aggregates for the distribution D0. This gives
an imbalance of ∆(D0) = 2
−28, and for pe = 0.05 the estimated data complexity of the
distinguisher is 232. This could be verified with experiments, and is somewhat larger
than the lower limit derived by extrapolation for the accurate probability distribution. If
the scheme is used as a pseudo-random number generator in large computer simulations,
the output may not be considered as random after 232 iterations, although we have a
single-cycle of 264 states. This observation is consistent with the practice nowadays, not
to use more data than
√
P of a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) with period P .
However, we also examined modified output functions with a smaller number of extracted
bits m. Experiments show that (independently of the word size n), decreasing m by one
bit increases the data complexity by a factor of 2. We conclude that, in contradiction to
previous assumptions, not only the lower bits of this T-function are weak, but also the
higher bits. This is an intrinsic property of the scheme, which will have consequences for
other square mappings and may have consequences for more complicated output functions.
We mention that state-recovery attacks on TF-0 have been described in [14,86]. More-
over, Mitra and Sarkar [99] described a time-memory tradeoff for the squaring problem,
which may be applied to consecutive output differences of TF-0. The most efficient algo-
rithms have a complexity of about 216.
7.2.3 Attacking the Multi-Word Mapping TF-0M
Several multi-word update functions proposed in [87] have been attacked with a time-
memory tradeoff by Mitra and Sarkar [99]. We now present a distinguishing attack against
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a multi-word proposal which has not been broken yet, and which we will refer as TF-0M.
The update function L corresponds to Eq. 12 in [87], it is an invertible T-function over a
4n-bit state x = (x0, x1, x2, x3) with a single cycle of length 2
4n:
L :


x0
x1
x2
x3

 7→


x0 + (s
2
0 ∨ C0)
x1 + (s
2
1 ∨ C1) + κ0
x2 + (s
2
2 ∨ C2) + κ1
x3 + (s
2
3 ∨ C3) + κ2

 . (7.2)
It is s0 = x0, s1 = s0 ⊕ x1, s2 = s1 + x2, s3 = s2 ⊕ x3. The constants are satisfying
[Ci]0 = 1 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and [C3]2 = 1. All operations are carried out on n bit
words and κi denotes the carry bit of xi. The output function is f(x) = x3 ≫ (n −m)
with m = n/2. We choose the standard word size n = 64 bit. We observe that the multi-
word update function of Eq. 7.2 consists of 4 approximatively independent and identically
distributed random variables similar to the single-word update function of TF-0. We may
concentrate only on the most significant variable x3. The argument to be squared s3 can
be approximated as uniformly distributed, and therefore produces the same output as x2.
The carry bit modifies the output with a probability of 2−33; this infrequent event will not
have a significant influence to the distinguisher. Therefore, we do not have to modify the
approximate distribution used for the distinguisher. Theoretical data complexity remains
the same, and simulations result in an experimental data complexity of 232 for a 256 bit
state with 224 unknown bits. We have performed 20 experiments, observing no incorrect
decision of our distinguisher. The data complexity is very close to the complexity for
TF-0, confirming our assumption on the influence of κ and s. We emphasize the practical
applicability of this result and the small number of required data, compared to the large
number of unknown bits. As before, we also considered to extract less bits m < n/2.
Again, we found that decreasing m by one bit increases the data complexity by a factor
of 2. Hence reduction of m may still not prevent practical attacks.
7.3 Cryptanalysis of TSC-1
We start this section with a description of the recent proposal of stream cipher TSC-1 [76].
We find a very efficient distinguishing attack on TSC-1, which can be transformed in a
state-recovery attack.
7.3.1 Description of the Scheme
The stream cipher TSC-1 consists of a state vector of 128 bits x = (x0, x1, x2, x3), an
update T-function L and an output function f . Bit-slice i of the state is defined by
[x]i = ([x0]i, [x1]i, [x2]i, [x3]i). The update function consists of an odd 32-bit parameter
α(x) and a single-cycle S-box S, mapping a 4 bit input to a 4 bit output. If [α]i = 0,
then the mapping Se is applied on bit-slice i of the state, otherwise the mapping So is
applied. e (resp. o) is an even (resp. odd) number. This procedure is repeated for all 32
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bit-slices in a single update period. With the satisfaction of these properties, L is a single-
cycle T-function, hence the period of the cipher is 2128. The odd parameter is defined by
α = (p+C)⊕p⊕2s with a constant C, p = x0∧x1∧x2∧x3 and s = x0+x1+x2+x3. Except
for the lower few bits, each output bit of α is equal to 1 almost half of the time. Due to
the properties of an odd parameter, one has [α]0 = 1, meaning that the least significant
bit-slice is always mapped by So. Consequently, the bits from the least significant bit-slice
of the state will be referred as irregular bits. In TSC-1, the powers of the S-box are e = 2
and o = 1, the constant used in the odd parameter is C = 0x12488421, the S-box (in
standard notation) is defined by S = (3,5,9,13,1,6,11,15,4,0,8,14,10,7,2,12) and the output
function is
f(x) = (((x0≪ 9) + x1)≪ 15) + ((x2≪ 7) + x3) .
The output functions have a period of 2128, however, three state variables in the output
equation determine the remaining variable, hence the maximum security of the ciphers is
96 bit. Furthermore, there are some time-memory tradeoffs on TSC with large precom-
putation time complexities.
7.3.2 Description of the Attack
In this section, we present a linearization attack on TSC-1. Probabilistic linear relations
in the update function (i.e. relations between state bits at different time instants) and in
the output function (i.e. relations between state bits and output bits) are combined, in
order to obtain relations between output bits at different time instants. Provided that
the relations are biased, the output of TSC-1 can be distinguished from a random stream.
Let us first discuss a linear approximation of the T-function. We focus on a single bit
[xtj ]i and analyze the statistical effect of ∆ iterations to this bit. Let Y∆ be the indicator
variable of the event [xtj ]i = [x
t+∆
j ]i, implying that a fixed bit is repeated after ∆ iterations.
After ∆ iterations, bit-slice i (including the bit under observation) is mapped δ times by
S, with ∆ ≤ δ ≤ 2∆ (the mapping S is applied 2∆ − δ times, and the mapping S2 is
applied δ − ∆ times). Hence, in order to compute Pr(Y∆ = 1), we have to analyze the
distribution of δ and the bit-flip probabilities of the mappings Sδ. Let us denote b∆(δ) the
probability that after ∆ iterations, the S-box is applied δ times. For regular bit-slices, we
reasonably assume equal probabilities for the application of S and S2 (which is, however,
a simplification for some lower bit-slices), and binomial distribution for b∆,
b∆(δ) =
(
∆
δ −∆
)
·
(
1
2
)∆
. (7.3)
For the irregular bit-slice, it is b∆(δ) = 1 for δ = ∆, and zero otherwise. In order to
describe the effect of the mappings Sδ, let us analyze the S-box. We will denote w an
uniform random number 0 ≤ w ≤ 15, and i an index 0 ≤ i ≤ 31. Let also Xδ be the
indicator variable of the event [w]i = [S
δ(w)]i for any fixed bit position i. The S-box
is designed such that the bit-flip probability for an application of S and S2 is balanced.
However, there is a huge bias of the bit-flip probability for some multiple applications of
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S, namely for Pr(Xδ = 1) with δ = 0 mod 4 (this observation is of course portable to
the mapping S2). We find Pr(X4 = 1) = Pr(X12 = 1) = 1/8, Pr(X8 = 1) = 3/4 and of
course Pr(X16 = 1) = 1. These results are independent of bit-position i, other values of
δ result in balanced probabilities. Finally, the bit-flip probability P (Y∆) of a single bit in
the state for ∆ iterations simply becomes the weighted sum
Pr(Y∆ = 1) =
2∆∑
δ=∆
Pr(Xδ = 1) · b∆(δ) . (7.4)
We find a maximal bias for ∆ = 3 with Pr(Y3 = 1) = 0.3594, and still a large bias for many
other values of ∆. The predicted probabilities are in good agreements with experiments.
In the case of irregular bits, Eq. 7.4 simply becomes Pr(Y∆ = 1) = Pr(X∆ = 1) with a
large bias for ∆ = 0 mod 4. In the fictive case of a perfect single-cycle S-box (which,
however, does not exist) with Pr(Xδ = 1) = 1/2 for δ 6= 16 and Pr(X16 = 1) = 1, Eq. 7.4
becomes Pr(Y∆ = 1) = (b∆(16) + 1)/2 for regular bits. A maximal bias is obtained for
∆ = 11, resulting in Pr(Y11 = 1) = 0.6128.
Let us combine Eq. 7.4 with a simple linear approximation of the output function.
The bias of Y∆ strikes through the output function, such that the loops in the state are
also present in the output. We consider a single bit [zt]i of the output and analyze the
statistical effect of ∆ iterations to this bit. Let Z∆ be the indicator variable of the event
[zt]i = [z
t+∆]i, implying that a fixed bit of the output is repeated after ∆ iterations.
We approximate the output function by [z]i = [x0]i+8 ⊕ [x1]i+17 ⊕ [x2]i+25 ⊕ [x3]i ⊕ c, for
i = 0, . . . , 31 (additions of indices are performed modulo 32) and a carry bit c ∈ {0, 1}. For
bit-positions i = 0, 7, 15, 24, one irregular bit is involved in the linear approximation of [z]i;
consequently, these output bits are called irregular. Neglecting the carry bit and availing
the fact that the output bits are composed of independent state bits, the probability
Pr(Z∆ = 1) is approximated using Matsui’s Piling-up Lemma [94]. For regular output
bits, we obtain
Pr(Z∆ = 1) =
1
2
+ 23 ·
(
Pr(Y∆ = 1)− 1
2
)4
. (7.5)
Notice that ε = Pr(Y∆ = 1) − 12 is the probability bias. In the case of irregular output
bits, one of the four factors ε in Eq. 7.5 is substituted by ε′ = Pr(X∆ = 1) − 12 . Let
us consider the case of ∆ = 3; it is Pr(Z3 = 1) = 0.5031 for regular output bits (and
a balanced probability for irregular output bits). However, as we neglected the carry
bit in this simple model, the above probability is considered as an upper limit. Notice
that the carry is also biased and inclines towards absorbing itself. Experiments show
that indeed, most of the regular output bits are biased for ∆ = 3. We emphasize that
higher bits are affected equivalently to lower bits. Due to the integer addition, the exact
bias depends on the bit-position. We find the maximum bias for bit-position i = 1 with
Pr = 0.5003. A similar result is obtained for ∆ = 8 and i = 0. This biased probability
distribution D0 is accessible to a cryptanalyst with known plaintext and may be used to
distinguish the outcome of the cipher from a uniform random outcome. The imbalance
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of the distribution is ∆(D0) = 2
−21, and for pe = 0.05 the estimated data and online
time complexity of the distinguisher is 225 (4 MB of keystream); oﬄine time complexity
is negligible. We performed a number of experiments (taking all biased bits into account)
and verified the predicted complexity. As described above, a variant of this attack even
works without taking into account any specific property of the single-cycle S-box.
7.3.3 A State-Recovery Attack
The bias of Z∆ can be transformed in a state-recovery attack by guess-and-determine. In
a first step, we guess the least-significant bit-slice [xt]0, which may be iterated separately.
The four corresponding bits are subtracted independently from appropriate output bits
in order to construct a modified index variable. Considering Eq. 7.5, we expect the bias
to significantly increase for a right guess, and we expect a balanced output for a false
guess. After recovering [xt]0, we may continue with consecutive bit-slices. Considering
all available equations, experiments showed that a single bit-slice may be accepted or
rejected (with a reasonable probability of error) using 225 iterations. Repeating this for
all 24 values of a single bit-slice, and for all 25 bit-slices, we obtain an overall complexity
of about 234. A similar result has also been obtained by Peyrin and Muller [101].
7.4 Cryptanalysis of TSC-2
In this section, we describe the proposal TSC-2 and find an efficient distinguishing attack.
7.4.1 Description of the Scheme
The stream cipher TSC-2 [76] is defined as TSC-1, with the following differences: In TSC-2,
one has e = 0 (hence, the identical mapping is used), o = 1 and C = 0x00000001. The
S-box is defined by S = (5,2,11,12,13,4,3,14,15,8,1,6,7,10,9,0) and the output function is
f(x) = (((x0≪ 11) + x1)≪ 14) + (((x0≪ 13) + x2)≪ 22) + ((x0≪ 12) + x3) .
7.4.2 Description of the Attack
The 32 bits of α determine the update of the 128 bits of the state. Hence we may wait
for appropriate values of α in order to initiate some attacks. In TSC-2, an interesting
case is the minimal-weight parameter α = 1, for which only the least significant bit-
slice is modified and two similar successive outputs may be detected. The detector is an
algorithm which takes as input the keystream z and gives out 1 if α = 1, and 0 otherwise.
The detector can make two types of errors: it can either output 1 when α 6= 1 (false
alarm) or 0 when α = 1 (non-detection). The error probabilities are denoted by pα and
pβ, respectively.
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The complete set of states U resulting in α(xt) = 1 is given with the conditions∑3
i=0 x
t
i ∈ {0x00000000, 0x80000000} and [xt]0 ∈ {0x0, 0x3, 0x5, 0x6, 0x9, 0xA, 0xC},
where [xt]i denotes bit-slice i of the state matrix. In the following, let us assume that
such a state occurs at time t = 0. Hence we have α0 = 1, and only the least significant
bit-slice of the state is changed by the mapping L : x0 → x1; consequently, we suppose
that the subsequent outputs z0 and z1 have low distance. Let us analyze the exemplary
integer modular difference z0 − z1 for x ∈ U with [x0]0 = 0x5; we find that [x1]0 = 0x4
and [x0]i = [x
1]i for i 6= 0. The output function produces z0 = z1 + (1≪ 25) + (1≪
3) + (1≪ 12) and hence z0 − z1 = 0x02001008. In fact, we find that z0 − z1 = const
for any x ∈ U , where the constant const depends only on the least-significant bit-slice
[x0]0 in most of the cases, see Tab. 7.2. For less than 1% of the states in U , the integer
modular difference is not constant because an addition in the output function may cause
a carry bit, which propagates from the msb to the lsb due to the cyclic shift.
Table 7.2: List of output differences for α = 1, some of which will be applied in the attack.
[x0]0 [x
1]0 z
0 − z1
0x0 0x5 0xFDBFEFF8
0x3 0xC 0x01C05007
0x5 0x4 0x02001008
0x6 0x3 0xFE3FEFF8
0x9 0x8 0x02001008
0xA 0x1 0xFE002FF9
0xC 0x7 0xFDFFAFF9
Detection of single constants only would result in a huge amount of false alarms. However,
examining Tab. 7.2, we find a path for the iteration of [x0]0 with 0x6 → 0x3 → 0xC
which is closed in U , meaning that α0 = α1 = α2 = 1. Therefore, we may restrict the
detector to detect only a subset of states V ⊂ U , where V is defined by the conditions∑3
i=0 x
t
i ∈ {0x00000000, 0x80000000} and [xt]0 ∈ {0x6, 0x3}. The detector takes three
successive outputs, computes two differences of consecutive outputs and compares them
with the fixed values; if there is a match of both, the detector returns 1, and 0 otherwise.
The probability of x ∈ V is 2−33, and a false detection due to random outputs2 occurs
with probability 2−64. As the differences are constant almost all the time, the error pβ
(which would increase the running time of the detector) is negligible, too. The time and
data complexity is around 233 (no precomputation and negligible memory).
The detector can be transformed in a distinguisher by feeding the detector with a
fixed amount of data N . If the detector always returns 0, then the distinguisher returns 0
(random stream); if the detector returns 1 at least once, then the distinguisher returns 1
(keystream produced by TSC-2). The probability of false positives can be neglected, and
the probability of false negatives is pβ = (1 − 2−33)n. For pβ = 0.05, we obtain a data
complexity of about N = 234. With a successful detection of α(xt) = 1, we obtain the
2In order to increase the set V , we do not make use of the connection of the whole path.
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information
∑3
i=0 x
t
i ∈ {0x00000000, 0x80000000}, as well as the value of bit-slice [xt]0
and the output equation f(xt) = zt. This information may be used for a state-recovery
attack with a complexity smaller than 296. However, TSC-2 appears to be seriously injured
with our efficient distinguishing attack, and we did not study the state-recovery attack in
more detail.
7.5 Non-randomness of TSC-4
The attack on TSC-1 exploits a bit-flip bias for multiple applications of the state update
function L. In [102], a similar attack was applied for eSTREAM Phase 2 candidate TSC-3.
For the tweaked version TSC-4, this bias still exists for regular updates, but the strong
filter function f prevents from an attack. In this section, we disregard the details of the
filter function and investigate the statistical properties of multiple warm-up updates of
TSC-4: While the regular updates have some guaranteed properties, the warm-up updates
use additional ad hoc operations that are designed to accelerate diffusion. Notice that our
analysis is embedded in a more general context: we actually consider the initialization
function F of TSC-4 and try to detect some non-random behavior in a set of outputs (i.e.
in the TSC-4 initial states) that are produced by a set of well-chosen inputs (i.e. in the
IV’s).
7.5.1 Description of the Scheme
The stream cipher TSC-4 is specified in [100]. It consists of two states x and y of 4× 32
bits each, denoted x = (x0, x1, x2, x3)
T and y = (y0, y1, y2, y3)
T . We first describe the
regular update function L, which updates the two states x and y independently by single-
cycle T-functions. In the case of state x, a 32-bit parameter αx is computed as a function
of x. It is defined by αx = p ⊕ (p + cx) ⊕ s with p = x0 ∧ x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 and s =
(x0 + x1 + x2 + x3)≪ 1 and constant cx = 0x51291089. If [αx]i = 1, then the fixed S-box
S = (9,2,11,15,3,0,14,4,10,13,12,5,6,8,7,1) is applied to bit-slice i of x, and if [αx]i = 0,
then the S-box S6 is applied to bit-slice i of x (for all i = 0, . . . , 31). The state y is
similarly updated where parameter αy has constant cy = 0x12910895. Notice that the
least significant bit-slice is always mapped by S. The output function f produces a
keystream byte z by combining some bytes of both states (using integer addition, XOR,
shift and rotation), see [100] for more details.
Let us consider the initialization function of TSC-4. To start, the internal state of
256 bits is loaded with the secret key K = (k0, . . . , k9) and the initialization vector
V = (v0, . . . , v9) each of 10× 8 bits (a single 32-bit word is denoted as a concatenation of
four 8-bit words).
x =


x0
x1
x2
x3

 =


k3 k2 k1 k0
k7 k6 k5 k4
v3 v2 v1 v0
v7 v6 v5 v4

 , y =


y0
y1
y2
y3

 =


v1 v0 v9 v8
v5 v4 v3 v2
k1 k0 k9 k8
k5 k4 k3 k2


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Table 7.3: Average imbalance ∆(D0) in the statistical model for r = 6, . . . , 12 rounds,
and for different bit-slices.
r lsb in x lsb in y non-lsb in x non-lsb in y
6 2−3.1 2−3.9 2−9.7 2−11.8
8 2−6.0 2−8.2 2−13.8 2−17.1
10 2−8.9 2−13.0 2−18.2 2−22.6
12 2−11.4 2−15.9 2−23.4 2−28.1
A single round of the initialization function (denoted as a warm-up update) consists of a
regular update and some additional operations: A byte z = f(x) is produced, x1 and y0
are rotated to the left by eight positions, and then byte z is XORed to the 8 least significant
bits of x1 and y0. The specifications of TSC-4 propose r = 8 rounds.
7.5.2 Statistical Model of Initialization
We investigate the statistical properties of the initialization process. In our statistical
model, we assume that the parameter α (with exception of the lsb) and the feedback z
are uniformly randomly distributed. For a single bit-slice i (not the least significant one)
in the state x, our assumptions imply for each round:
1. Bit-slice i is mapped uniformly randomly by S or by S6.
2. After application of the S-box, bit 1 of bit-slice i is chosen uniformly randomly.
With a fixed input w ∈ {0, . . . , 15}, these two steps are repeated for r rounds, so we can
analyze the distribution of the output v ∈ {0, . . . , 15}. Within this model, the distribution
can be computed exactly in 22r steps. The other cases (i.e. the least-significant bit-slice
and the state y) are treated similarly. The imbalance is measured by ∆(D0), where D0 is
the distribution with probabilities Pr(v) for an output v (given some fixed parameters).
In Tab. 7.3, the imbalance is shown for different parameters. To simplify the presentation
we compute imbalance for all inputs w and show the average values only. As expected,
the average imbalance is decreasing with the number of rounds r. In the case of the least-
significant bit-slice in the state x, it is reduced by a factor of about 2.6 with each additional
round. Interestingly, the position of the random bit (see Step 2) has a notable influence
on the distribution and diffusion is better for state y. And, as expected, diffusion is better
for bit-slices which are not on the least-significant position (intuitively a combination of
S and S6 results in larger diffusion than using S only).
7.5.3 Experimental Results
Now we attempt to detect the bias of the previous subsection in the genuine initialization
function F (K, V ) of TSC-4. We need N different inputs (K, V ) where the value of a fixed
bit-slice i is the same for all inputs. Each bit-slice consists of two key bits and two IV
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Table 7.4: Average χ2 statistic in the experiment for r = 8 rounds and a varying number
of samples.
All Keys
N average χ2 value % values > 80
210 40 3
212 119 67
214 421 100
bits. Consequently, bit-slice i is the same for all inputs, if the key is fixed (and unknown),
and if the IV bits of bit-slice i are fixed (though the other IV bits can be varied). The
N outputs can then be used to evaluate the distribution of bit-slice i. Provided that the
assumptions on the model of the previous section are valid, bit-slice i = 0 of the state x
is expected to have maximum bias. Here is an example for r = 8 rounds.
Example 20. Take N different inputs (K, V ) where V = (v0, . . . , v9). The key is fixed,
IV bytes v0, v1 . . . , v7 are zero, and v8, v9 increments from 0 to N − 1. Compute N =
210 outputs after r = 8 rounds of F (K, V ) and evaluate the imbalance ∆(D0) of the
distribution of the least-significant bit-slice in the initial state x. In 100 experiments using
random keys, we find an imbalance of ∆(D0) = 2
−5.2. The results for the corresponding
χ2 statistics are listed Tab. 7.4. 
The measured bias is in good agreement with the model of Section 7.5.2, which predicts an
average imbalance of ∆(D0) = 2
−6.0 in this setup3. Of course, the initial state cannot be
accessed by an attacker, so the χ2 test has perhaps a certificational character. However,
the setup of Ex. 20 does not require any key bit to be known, and the number of samples
N is very small. Consequently, this non-randomness may be a basis for future attacks that
includes analysis of the filter function f . The non-randomness is not limited to the least
significant bit-slice. A notable example is i = 8 (and with other parameters as in Ex. 20).
This is a consequence of the specific setup in Ex. 20 where bit-slices i = 8, 9 . . . of x after
the first round are the same for all N states and so the effective number of rounds is only
r−1 (in addition, the biased bit 1 of bit-slice 0 is rotated into bit-slice 8). The experiment
with i = 8 was carried out for a varying number of rounds, see Fig. 7.1. The imbalance
∆(D0) in terms of r can be approximated by an exponential decay and in one round it is
reduced by a factor of about 2.5. By extrapolation, we expect that about r = 35 rounds
would be necessary to obtain an imbalance of ∆(D0) = 2
−40. In an extended experiment
one could also measure the effectiveness of the combined initialization function F and
update function Lt. For example, with r = 8, t = 50, we observed an average value of
∆(D0) = 2
−14 when using the same setup as previously. However we did not observe a
bias in the keystream.
3Notice that two input bits of bit-slice i = 0 are always zero in the setup of Ex. 20. This has a small
influence on the modeled bias in Tab. 7.3.
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Figure 7.1: The average imbalance ∆(D0) for r = 6, . . . , 14 rounds.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we examined some specific proposals of stream ciphers based on T-
functions. Two proposals by Klimov and Shamir are based on the squaring operation,
namely a single word T-function as well as a previously unbroken multi-word T-function
with a 256-bit state, both revealing some part of the state. It turned out that the integer
differences of consecutive outputs have significant statistical deviation even in the high-
order bits. Based on that deviation, we described efficient distinguishing attacks with
a 232 data complexity. We conclude that the squaring operation has some undesirable
properties when used in the design of T-functions and possibly in other cryptographic
primitives. The two proposals by Hong et al. have a 128-bit state, which are controlled
by a 32-bit parameter and tiny S-boxes. The output function uses some integer additions
and rotations. For one of the proposals, we found small loops in the state and in the
output produced by the S-box, resulting in a distinguishing attack of complexity 225. For
the other proposal, we wait for an appropriate value of the parameter, which produces
some detectable structure in the output. This results in a distinguisher of complexity 234.
We conclude that the small size of the parameter (and potentially also the tiny S-boxes)
may be critical, and that the integer additions and rotations in the output functions have
a very limited randomizing effect. In the case of TSC-4, we considered the way the key
and the initialization information is used. The initial cipher state is derived using eight
applications of a warm-up function. Non-randomness over all eight iterations can be de-
tected in the initial state with about 1000 inputs. Each additional round increases the
data requirements by a factor of about 2.5 and this non-randomness requires the attacker
to choose IV bits only.
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Chapter 8
Attacks on Salsa20 and Related Primitives
The stream cipher Salsa20 is currently one of the most promising software oriented eS-
TREAM candidates. It is a unique design with a trivial update function and a complex,
round-based output function, similar to block ciphers or hash functions. The only oper-
ations used are integer addition, exclusive-or and rotation, hence it is a suitable aim for
differential attacks. In this chapter, we investigate Salsa20 and related primitives such as
ChaCha and the compression function Rumba.
8.1 Introduction
Salsa20 [17] is a stream cipher introduced by Bernstein in 2005 as a candidate in the eS-
TREAM competition, and has been selected for the third phase. Bernstein also submitted
to public evaluation the 8 and 12 round variants Salsa20/8 and Salsa20/12 [18], though
these are not formal eSTREAM candidates. More recently, he suggested a modification
of the core function aiming at bringing faster diffusion without slowing down encryption,
calling the variant ChaCha [21]. The compression function Rumba [20] was later presented
in the context of a study of generalized birthday attacks [122] applied to incremental
hashing [13], as the component of a hypothetical iterated hashing scheme. Rumba maps a
1536-bit value to a 512-bit (intermediate) digest, and Bernstein only conjectures collision
resistance for this function, letting a further convenient operating mode provide extra
security properties as pseudo-randomness.
First, we present a framework for finding high-probability differential trails for reduced-
round Salsa20 (throughout we assume that the IV’s can be chosen). This results in a
key recovery attack on Salsa20/6, and a related-key attack on Salsa20/7. Inspired from
correlation attacks, and from the notion of neutral bit, as introduced by Biham and
Chen [22], we present then a novel method for probabilistic detection of the output-
difference. More precisely, we first use an empirical measure of the correlation between
certain key bits of the state and the bias observed after working a few rounds backward,
in order to split key bits into two subsets: the extremely relevant key bits to be subjected
to an exhaustive search and filtered by observations of a biased output-difference value,
and the less significant key bits ultimately determined by exhaustive search. We present
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the first key-recovery attack for Salsa20/8, and improve a previous attack on seven rounds
by a factor 238. The method can also be applied to break 7 rounds of ChaCha. In a second
part, we show collision and preimage attacks for derived versions of Rumba, and present a
differential analysis of the original version using methods of linearization and neutral bits:
our main result is a collision-search algorithm for 3-round Rumba running in about 279
steps (compared to 2256 with a birthday attack). We also give examples of near-collision
over three and four rounds.
8.2 Description of Salsa20
The stream cipher Salsa20 [17] works with 32-bit words and takes as input a key K =
(k0, k1, . . . , k7) of n = 256 bits, a nonce V = (v0, v1) of 64 bits and a counter T = (t0, t1)
of 64 bits to produce a 512-bit block of the keystream. The counter is initialized by zero,
and incremented after each application of the encryption function. At each application,
Salsa20 acts on the following 4× 4 matrix of 32-bit words:
x =


x0 x1 x2 x3
x4 x5 x6 x7
x8 x9 x10 x11
x12 x13 x14 x15

 =


c0 k0 k1 k2
k3 c1 v0 v1
t0 t1 c2 k4
k5 k6 k7 c3

 . (8.1)
The constants are c0 = 0x61707865, c1 = 0x3320646E, c2 = 0x79622D32 and c3 =
0x6B206574. There is also a mode for a 128-bit key K ′, where the 256 key bits in the
matrix are filled with K = K ′‖K ′. If not mentioned otherwise, we focus on the 256-bit
version. Let xr denote the state after r rounds of Salsa20 (where the superscript 0 is
omitted). Then, the keystream block z is produced using the following rule
z = x+ x20 , (8.2)
using wordwise addition modulo 232. The round function is based on the following non-
linear operation, which transforms a vector (x0, x1, x2, x3) to (y0, y1, y2, y3) by sequentially
computing
y1 = x1 ⊕ ((x3 + x0)≪ 7)
y2 = x2 ⊕ ((x0 + y1)≪ 9)
y3 = x3 ⊕ ((y1 + y2)≪ 13)
y0 = x0 ⊕ ((y2 + y3)≪ 18) .
(8.3)
This operation is called the quarterround function, see Fig. 8.1. In odd numbers of
rounds (which are called columnrounds in the original specification of Salsa20), the nonlin-
ear operation is applied to the columns (x0, x4, x8, x12), (x5, x9, x13, x1), (x10, x14, x2, x6),
(x15, x3, x7, x11). In in even numbers of rounds (which are also called the rowrounds), the
nonlinear operation is applied to the rows (x0, x1, x2, x3), (x5, x6, x7, x4), (x10, x11, x8, x9),
(x15, x12, x13, x14). At each application 512 bits of keystream are generated by using the
entirety of the final state as the keystream. We write Salsa20/R for R-round variants, i.e.
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Figure 8.1: The quarterround function of Salsa20.
with z = x+ xR. Note that the r-round inverse function is defined differently whether it
inverts after an odd or and even number of rounds.
8.3 Key-Recovery Attack on Salsa20/6
In this section we will demonstrate a non-random behavior which is detectable over six
rounds of Salsa20. To start, we illustrate our approach by building on the earlier work
of Crowley [47] and we describe a framework that allows a more sophisticated analysis to
take place. This is achieved in two steps. First, we identify interesting differential effects
in a simplified version of Salsa20. Second, we identify key and IV choices (where the
IV denotes then nonce V and counter T here) that allow us to ensure that the behavior
of the genuine Salsa20 is reasonably well-approximated by the simplified version. This
technique allows us to make a systematic research of possible input differences ID’s and
consequently to find ID’s with optimal properties. As mentioned, our observations are
differential in nature. We will work with two copies of the state where x is filled with
the input (K, V, T ) and a second state x′ is initialized according to x′ = x ⊕ ∆ where
∆ = (∆0, . . . ,∆15) is the ID. Note that the specifications of Salsa20 require that any ID
must be zero in the diagonal words ∆0, ∆5, ∆10, and ∆15. After r rounds of Salsa20 the
output difference OD is given1 by ∆r = xr ⊕ (x′)r.
8.3.1 A Linearized Version of Salsa20
In previous work, Crowley [47] identified a truncated differential over three rounds of
Salsa20. Consider setting ∆i = 0 for i 6= 9 and ∆9 = 0x80000000. Then the following
truncated differential for the first three rounds holds with a theoretical probability 2−12.
In practice a variety of effects conspire to give an average probability of 2−9.
1Note that due to the feedforward in Salsa20 that uses addition modulo 232 this is not necessarily the
same as the difference in the corresponding keystream.
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

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0x80000000 0 0
0 0 0 0


col
row
col−→


? ? ? 0x02002802
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?


Given the behavior exhibited in x33⊕(x′3)3 it is tempting to look for some impact in the next
round. Yet, it is not clear how to proceed in a methodical manner. To establish an ap-
propriate framework for analysis, we introduce an alternative algorithm LinSalsa20. This
is identical to Salsa20 except that all integer additions have been replaced by exclusive-
or. The corresponding round functions are denoted LinColumnround and LinRowround.
Assume that two initial states x and x′ = x ⊕ ∆ are iterated by LinSalsa20. Then since
LinSalsa20 is completely linear in GF(2), the difference ∆r = xr ⊕ (x′)r coincides exactly
with computing r iterations of ∆ with LinSalsa20. This computation does not require
knowledge of the key and we refer to a differential path generated by LinSalsa20 as a
linear differential. It is straightforward to see that there are many (admissible) input
differences for which the output of LinSalsa20 is trivially non-random.
Proposition 12. Consider an input ∆i ∈ {0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000} for all words i =
0, . . ., 15. Then, for any number of updates with LinSalsa20, one has ∆ri ∈ {0xFFFFFFFF,
0x00000000}.
However we need to be more careful. While LinSalsa20 allows some straightforward anal-
ysis, the further the behavior of LinSalsa20 is from the true Salsa20, the less useful it will
be. Since a differential of large Hamming weight is likely to induce carries and hence non-
linear behavior to the genuine Salsa20, we will need a linear differential of low Hamming
weight. Such a differential is intended to offer a reasonably good approximation to the
same differential in genuine Salsa20. We will consider a linear differential to be of low
weight if any computation involving active words in the difference only uses words of low
Hamming weight (≪ 16). Let us consider Crowley’s differential within this linear model.
Example 21. Consider an input difference with ∆9 = 0x80000000 as the one non-zero
word. The weight of differences for the first four rounds is as follows.

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0

 col−→


0 2 0 0
0 3 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0

 row−→


4 2 2 2
7 10 3 6
1 3 4 1
0 1 1 2

 col−→


9 19 6 5
3 13 5 5
4 11 11 7
1 16 2 10


row−→


13 13 14 10
13 13 13 19
16 18 19 11
11 17 20 15


The top line of this differential is as far as Crowley goes, but when using LinSalsa20
it appears we can go one round further. Indeed, one can identify a low-weight linear
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differential for word x412, among others. Note that x12 is a right-to-diagonal word (with
wrap) and is updated first in round four; the 16 in x313 has no effect on x
4
12. 
8.3.2 Non-randomness in Four Rounds of Salsa20
Consider the linear differential of Ex. 21 and set ID to be identical to that of [47]. By
using LinSalsa20 we suspect a statistical imbalance in ∆412 = x
4
12 ⊕ (x′12)4. Given a set of
N different pairs of (K, V, T ) for a fixed key K, where each pair takes the same fixed ID,
the distribution of the output difference for the N pairs can be analyzed. However, we
might consider a subset of the bits or even a single bit, and by examining each bit in ∆412
one finds that bit 26 is heavily unbalanced2. This differential is denoted ([∆412]26 | [∆9]31),
and the bias ε of the OD is defined by
Pr
V,T
([∆412]26 = 1 | [∆9]31) =
1
2
+ ε , (8.4)
where the probability holds over all nonces and counters (note that our statistical model
considers the counter to be random). Furthermore, considering key as a random variable,
we denote the median value of of ε by ε⋆. Hence, for half of the keys this differential will
have a bias of at least ε⋆. The imbalance can be detected using a optimal distinguisher
or a χ2 test, see Sect. 2.8.
The behavior of the differential heavily depends on the input. The presence or ab-
sence of carries, on which Salsa20 relies, depends on the actual values of the operands.
Thus some inputs will dampen, and others amplify, the evolution of a differential. The
imbalance in bit 26 is greater the closer Salsa20 is to LinSalsa20. Therefore to find optimal
inputs we will need to consider which conditions allow the non-linear differential trail to be
closely approximated by the linear differential. The only non-linear operation in Salsa20 is
integer addition in the quarterround function, denoted xa+xb. Given a corresponding ID
(∆a,∆b), the nonlinear OD corresponds to the XOR of xa+ xb and (xa⊕∆a) + (xb⊕∆b).
Thus, the nonlinear OD is identical to the linear OD, if
(xa + xb)⊕ ((xa ⊕∆a) + (xb ⊕∆b)) = ∆a ⊕∆b . (8.5)
Each non-zero bit in ∆a and ∆b may cause integer addition to create or annihilate a
sequence of carry bits. Hence we focus on low-weight trails to keep more control of
such events. Note that a difference in the most significant bit is always linear. We will
(indirectly) consider Eq. 8.5 to place conditions on the inputs so that a differential in
Salsa20 follows a linear differential in LinSalsa20 for some steps before diverging. We refer
to this as partially linearizing the differential. Such conditions might be on the nonce, on
the counter (assuming that the nonce and the counter are user-controlled inputs), or on
the key (thereby establishing classes of weak keys). A close inspection of the first round
of the differential of Ex. 21 reveals that the first two additions, differentially speaking, act
as XOR while the third does not. However, depending on how t1 is incremented, we can
2In fact there are many unbalanced bits in the state of Salsa20 after four rounds.
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Table 8.1: Non-randomness in four rounds of Salsa20.
All keys and nonces Weak key class
N av. χ2 value % values > 40 av. χ2 value % values > 40
212 33 20 51 34
214 123 41 192 46
216 315 46 656 68
establish conditions on the key to ensure that it does. Thus there are keys for which the
imbalance in bit 26 is boosted. The key conditions for the weak key class are on k0 and
k6. First set the following bits of k0 to the values shown:
bit number: 0 1 20 21 22 23
value: 0 1 0 0 1 1
Next set bit 7 of k6 equal to bit 7 of A where c1 = 0x3320646E and A = (((k0 + c1)≪
7) + c1)≪ 9. Note that all these conditions are randomly satisfied with a probability of
2−7. A more sophisticated set of conditions can be derived to linearize the entirety of the
first round. However for clarity we restrict ourselves to the simpler case.
Example 22. Take N inputs (K, V, T ) with randomly fixed key K and random (V, T ). For
each input, we use values of t1 to generate an associate input with ID ∆9 = 0x80000000
(and zero otherwise). Compute the OD after four rounds of Salsa20 and evaluate the bias
of bit 26 of ∆412. In 100 experiments using random keys and nonces, we find an average
bias of ε = 0.04. In the case of the weak key class, we find ε = 0.05. The results for the
corresponding χ2 statistics are listed in Tab. 8.1. 
8.3.3 Non-randomness in Six Rounds of Salsa20
The results presented in Section 8.3.2 give statistical weaknesses, as measured by the bias
of a single bit, over four rounds of Salsa20. The statistical anomaly can be detected two
rounds later. We intercept the required keystream z and we guess the necessary key words
to partially unwind the last two rounds of state update and recover word x412. The five key
words to guess are k3, k4, k5, k6, k7. Thus, for a single guess of the relevant words of key,
the backwards computation is carried out over two rounds for N pairs of output, where
each output was generated using the chosen input difference. The χ2 statistic of the target
bit of the target word is evaluated, and a χ2 test is applied. Our analysis tells us that a
correct key guess will yield a significant χ2 score. We assume that an incorrect key guess
results in essentially random candidate values for the bit we test. Thus, a significantly
large χ2 value suggests that the key guess may be correct. The remaining key words can
be searched exhaustively and the entire key guess verified against the keystream. If the
χ2 value for a key guess is not significant we move on to a new guess. Clearly, the scale
of the imbalance in the target bit is important to the success of this method. The closer
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Table 8.2: Demonstration of a key recovery attack on five rounds of Salsa20.
All keys and nonce Weak key class
N % success rate % success rate
212 20 28
214 29 41
216 44 54
Salsa20 behaves to LinSalsa20 then the greater the imbalance in the target bit, and the
greater the χ2 score we expect to observe. This helps an attacker in two ways:
1. If certain keys and IV’s give a high χ2 score, then a greater proportion of the keys
from an identified set should be susceptible to attack.
2. Higher χ2 scores permit less keystream or greater precision in an attack.
To begin to get a picture of how things might behave in practice, we have implemented a
restricted version of this style of attack. In principle we could use the four round differen-
tial of Ex. 22 to attack six rounds of Salsa20. To keep the experiments tractable, however,
we use the same differential to attack a restricted five-round version as a demonstration
(i.e. we unwind one round only).
Example 23. We recover nine bits (bits 4 to 12) of k3 under the assumption that k5 has
been correctly guessed. Over 100 random keys and N pairs, we give the success rate
when assuming the correct key lies among the candidate values giving the three highest
χ2 values. We repeat the experiment for the weak key class identified in Ex. 22. For
the weak key class we observe that the same proportion of keys can be recovered when
using one quarter of the text, see Tab. 8.2. We recall that the weak keys only improve
the differential propagation and that our attack is also working for other keys. 
8.3.4 Complexity Estimation
As demonstrated in Ex. 23, at least in principle, our observations can be used in the way
we intend. In this section, the complexity of an optimal distinguisher is evaluated in more
detail. The subkey of our attack has a size of m bits, so we have a set of 2m sequences
of N random variables with 2m − 1 of them verifying the hypothesis H1 (with uniform
distribution D1), and a single one verifying the hypothesis H0 (having distribution D0
characterized by ε). The decision rule to acceptHi can lead to two types of errors, pα = 2
−c
for false alarms and pβ for non-detection. A complexity of 2
mN/(1−pβ) is needed to find a
number of 2mpα subkey candidates. Each subkey candidate is then checked for correctness
together with the remaining l = n−m key bits, requiring a complexity of 2l2mpα = 2n−c
with n = 256. In practice, we choose an overall error probability pe = Φ(−
√
d/2) (note
that both pα and pβ are bounded by 2pe) and set N = d/∆(D0) with the imbalance
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∆(D0) = 4ε
2 according to Sect. 2.8. The probability pβ can be ignored, and pα ≈ pe
should be chosen such that it minimizes CT = 2
mN + 2256−c. Note that the potential
improvement from key ranking techniques is not considered here, see e.g. [81]. The data
complexity of our attack is CD = N , if the counter can be chosen arbitrarily. In the
case of Salsa20/6 we have m = 160 and ε = 0.04, and the work effort for a key-recovery
attack is estimated to be around 2176 operations using N = 216 pairs of keystream blocks
sampled appropriately from the same keystream. However, since the entirety of the target
word can be recovered for any single key guess, using a single bit to test a key will miss
much of the information available. We will exploit this in Sect. 8.5 to attack more rounds
of Salsa20.
8.4 Related-Key Attack on Salsa20/7
The linear model can also be used to find longer differentials. A well-chosen multi-bit
input may cause smaller diffusion than a single-bit input; non-zero bits can be placed in
positions where they are annihilated in the update process. To illustrate, we focus again
on a single column where the weight of the input (starting with the diagonal element) is
(0, 2, 1, 1). With a fixed relative position of the non-zero bits in this input, one can obtain
an output after the first linear quarterround of the form (0, 1, 0, 0). The absolute position
of the non-zero bits and the choice of column are free parameters and naturally lead to
an identified sub-class of inputs. These all have the same properties in LinSalsa20.
Example 24. Consider an input difference with non-zero words ∆2 = 0x00000100, ∆6 =
0x00001000, and ∆14 = 0x80080000.

0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 2 0

 col−→


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0

 row−→


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 3 4

 col−→


4 1 3 4
1 2 4 8
1 0 7 10
3 1 3 14


row−→


13 1 6 7
11 14 5 7
7 4 14 5
14 21 18 17

 col−→


13 16 17 17
6 16 19 23
14 13 18 15
18 16 15 15


One can identify a truncated low-weight linear differential for x59 which is an out-of-
diagonal word. Note that some words in the final array may have a lower Hamming
weight, but their generation required computations using average-weighted words and so
they are unlikely to be relevant to genuine Salsa20. 
The non-zero bits of this differential are located in column two. Word x14 is updated
first by y14 = x14 ⊕ (x10 + x6)≪ 7. A second state x′i = xi ⊕∆i is updated in the same
way and, according to Eq. 8.5, the difference of this first update will follow the linear
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Table 8.3: Non-randomness in five rounds of Salsa20.
All Keys and Nonces Weak Nonce Class
N av. χ2 value % values > 40 av. χ2 value % values > 40
220 5 4 27 26
222 16 11 105 73
224 78 17 383 89
differential if the following equation holds:
(x10 + x6)⊕ ((x10 ⊕∆10) + (x6 ⊕∆6)) = ∆10 ⊕∆6 . (8.6)
Notice that ∆10 is zero and that ∆6 has a single non-zero bit in position 12. Further,
x10 = c2 and x6 = v0. Bits 12 . . . 9 of c2 are defined as (. . . 0110 . . .)2. Consequently, if
bits 11 . . . 9 of v0 are chosen as (. . . 000 . . .)2, then no carry is produced from the right,
and Eq. 8.5 is satisfied. Subsequently x2 is updated and so provided the previous update
followed the linear differential, the only non-zero bit in the difference will be in bit 31 and
the linear trial will be followed. Updating x6 is similar while updating x11 only involves
zero differences. Thus we have identified conditions on three bits of v0, part of the nonce,
so that the first round of genuine Salsa20 with the ID of Ex. 24 follows the linear trail.
In fact, the ID of Ex. 24 turns out to be optimal, i.e. it seems to have minimum weight
after two rounds of Salsa20; bitwise rotations of ID reduce the number of msb’s while
shifting the difference to another column shifts the input-condition to a key word instead
of v0. Without input conditions on v0, the first round would follow the linear trail with a
probability of about Pr = 0.175.
Example 25. Take N inputs (K, V, T ) with randomly fixed key K and random (V, T ).
For each input, we use values of k1, v0, k7 to generate an associate input with ID ∆2 =
0x00000100, ∆6 = 0x00001000, ∆14 = 0x80080000 (and zero otherwise). Compute the
OD after five rounds of Salsa20 and evaluate the bias of bit 1 of ∆59. In 100 experiments
using random keys and nonces, we find an average bias of ε = 0.001. In the case of the
weak nonce class, we find ε = 0.002. In Tab. 8.3 the results are listed for the corresponding
χ2 statistics. 
We can intercept the required keystream of Salsa20/7 and guess the necessary key words
to partially unwind the last two rounds of state update to recover ∆59. The six key words
to guess are k0, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6. According to Sect. 8.3.4, Salsa20/7 might be broken
in around 2218 operations using 226 pairs of keystream blocks taken from two sets of
keystream. However, for the five round imbalance we used non-zero differences in part of
the key k1 and k7, so the attack is only valid under a related-key scenario. The practical
validity of such an attack is debatable [16], so we merely observe that over seven of the
20 rounds in Salsa20, statistical imbalances can be detected.
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8.5 Key-Recovery Attack on Salsa20/8
In the previous sections, we focused on sophisticated differentials for Salsa20 and used
deterministic backwards computation to distinguish the right subkey. In this section, we
introduce differential attacks based on a new technique called probabilistic neutral bits
(PNB’s). In order to apply it to Salsa20, we first identify suitable choices of truncated
single-bit differentials, then describe a general framework for probabilistic backwards com-
putation, and introduce the notion of PNB’s, along with a method to find them. After
this, we outline the overall attack, and state our results for Salsa20/7, Salsa20/8. Even-
tually, we discuss our attack scenarios and possibilities of improvements.
8.5.1 Probabilistic Backwards Computation
In the following, assume that the differential ([∆rp]q | [∆0i ]j) of bias εd is fixed, and the
corresponding outputs z and z′ are observed for nonce V , counter T and key K. Having
K, V and T , one can invert the operations in z = x + xR and z′ = x′ + (x′)R in order
to access to the r-round forward differential (with r < R) from the backward direction
thanks to the relations xr = (z − x)r−R and (x′)r = (z′ − x′)r−R. More specifically, define
f(K, V, T, z, z′) as the function which returns the q-th lsb of the word number p of the
matrix (z − x)r−R ⊕ (z′ − x′)r−R, hence f(K, V, T, z, z′) = [∆rp]q. Given enough output
block pairs with the presumed difference in the input, one can verify the correctness of
a guessed candidate K ′ for the key K by evaluating the bias of the function f . More
precisely, we have Pr(f(K ′, V, T, z, z′) = 1) = 1
2
+ εd conditioned on K
′ = K, whereas
for (almost all) K ′ 6= K we expect f be unbiased i.e. Pr(f(K ′, V, T, z, z′) = 1) = 1
2
. The
classical way of finding the correct key requires exhaustive search over all possible 2256
guesses K ′. However, we can search only over a subkey of m = 256 − l bits, provided
that an approximation g of f which effectively depends on m key bits is available. More
formally, let K¯ correspond to the subkey of m bits of the key K and let f be correlated
to g with bias εa i.e.:
Pr
V,T
(f(K, V, T, z, z′) = g(K¯, V, T, z, z′)) =
1
2
+ εa . (8.7)
Note that deterministic backwards computation (i.e. K¯ = K with f = g) according to
Sect. 8.3 and Sect. 8.4 is a special case with εa = 1. Denote the bias of g by ε, i.e.
Pr(g(K¯, V, T, z, z′) = 1) = 1
2
+ ε. Under some reasonable independency assumptions, the
equality ε = 2εdεa holds. Again, we denote ε
⋆ the median bias over all keys (we verified in
experiments that ε⋆ can be well estimated by the median of 2εdεa). Here, one can verify
the correctness of a guessed candidate K¯ ′ for the subkey K¯ by evaluating the bias of the
function g based on the fact that we have Pr(g(K¯ ′, V, T, z, z′) = 1) = 1
2
+ ε for K¯ ′ = K¯,
whereas Pr(g(K¯ ′, V, T, z, z′) = 1) = 1
2
for K¯ ′ 6= K¯. This way we are facing an exhaustive
search over 2m subkey candidates opposed to the original 2256 key candidates which can
potentially lead to a faster attack. We stress that the price which we pay is a higher data
complexity.
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8.5.2 Probabilistic Neutral Bits
Our new view of the problem, described in Sect. 8.5.1, demands efficient ways for finding
suitable approximations g(K¯,W ) of a given function f(K,W ) where W is a known pa-
rameter; in our case, it is W = (V, T, z, z′). In a probabilistic model one can consider W
as a uniformly distributed random variable. Finding such approximations in general is an
interesting open problem. In this section we introduce a generalized concept of neutral
bits [22] called probabilistic neutral bits (PNB’s). This will help us to find suitable ap-
proximations in the case that the Boolean function f does not properly mix its input bits.
Generally speaking, PNB’s allows us to divide the key bits into two groups: significant
key bits (of size m) and non-significant key bits (which are the l PNB’s). In order to
identify these two sets we focus on the amount of influence which each bit of the key has
on the output of f . Here is a formal definition of a suitable measure:
Definition 9. The neutrality measure of the key bit ki with respect to the function f(K,W )
is defined as γi, where Pr =
1
2
+γi is the probability (over all K andW ) that complementing
the key bit ki does not change the output of f(K,W ).
We use the following Alg. 5 to compute the neutrality measure of a single key bit of
Salsa20.
Algorithm 5 Computation of the neutrality measure
Input: Number of rounds R and r, key bit index i.
Output: Determine the neutrality measure γi.
1: Choose the number of samples T and let ctr = 0.
2: for i from 1 to T do
3: Pick a random state x (with fixed constants) and apply the ID to get x′.
4: Compute z = x+ xR and z′ = x′ + (x′)R.
5: Compute (z − x)r−R and (z′ − x′)r−R and observe the OD.
6: Flip the i-th key bit in x and x′.
7: Compute (z − x)r−R and (z′ − x′)r−R and observe the OD.
8: Increment ctr if the OD’s are equal.
9: end for
10: Output γi = ctr/T − 1/2.
Singular cases of the neutrality measure are:
• γi = 1/2: f(K,W ) does not depend on i-th key bit (i.e. it is a neutral bit).
• γi = 0: f(K,W ) is stat. independent of the i-th key bit (i.e. it is a significant bit).
• γi = −1/2: f(K,W ) linearly depends on the i-th key bit.
In practice, we set a threshold γ and put all key bits with γi ≤ γ in the set of significant
key bits. The less significant key bits we get, the faster the attack will be, provided
that the bias εa defined in Eq. 8.7 remains non-negligible. Having found significant and
non-significant key bits, we simply let K¯ be the significant key bits and define g(K¯,W )
as f(K,W ) with non-significant key bits being set to a fixed value (e.g. all zero). Note
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that, contrary to the mutual interaction between neutral bits in [22], here we have directly
combined several PNB’s without altering their probabilistic quality. This can be justified
as the bias εa smoothly decreases while we increase the threshold γ.
Remark 9. Tsunoo et al. [118] used nonlinear approximations of integer addition to iden-
tify the dependency of key bits, whereas the independent key bits—with respect to non-
linear approximation of some order—are fixed. This can be seen as a special case of our
method.
Remark 10. It is reasonable to assume that a false subkey, which is close to the correct
subkey, may introduce a non-negligible bias. In general, this results in an increased value
of pα. If many significant key bits have neutrality measure close to zero, then the increase
is expected to be small, but the precise practical impact of this observation is unknown
to us.
8.5.3 Overview of the Attack
We sketch the full attack described in the previous subsections. It is split up in a precom-
putation step (independent of the key) and in the effective attack, see Alg. 6 and Alg. 7.
The cost of precomputation is negligible compared to the effective attack, and complexity
of the effective attack is the same as in Sect. 8.3.4.
Algorithm 6 Precomputation of the attack
1: Choose an r-round differential with ID in the nonce or counter.
2: Choose a threshold γ.
3: Construct the function f defined in Sect. 8.5.1.
4: Empirically estimate the neutrality measure γi of each key bit for f .
5: Put all key bits with γi ≤ γ in the significant key bits set of size m = 256− l.
6: Construct the function g using f by assigning a fixed value to the PNB’s, see Sect. 8.5.1
and Sect. 8.5.2.
7: Estimate the median bias ε⋆ by empirically measuring the bias of g using many ran-
domly chosen keys, see Sect. 8.5.1.
8: Estimate the data and time complexity of the attack, see Sect. 8.3.4.
Algorithm 7 Effective attack
Input: N pairs of keystream blocks produced with relevant ID, a function g.
Output: Recover the secret key.
1: for each choice of the subkey of m bits do
2: Compute the bias of g using the N keystream block pairs.
3: If the optimal distinguisher legitimates the subkey candidate as a (possibly) correct
one, perform an additional exhaustive search over the l PNB’s in order to check the
correctness of this filtered subkey and to find the PNB’s.
4: end for
5: Output the recovered key.
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8.5.4 Experimental Results
We used automatized search to identify optimal differentials for the reduced-round ver-
sions Salsa20/7 and Salsa20/8. This search is based on the following observation: The
number l of PNB’s for some fixed threshold γ mostly depends on the OD, but not on
the ID. Consequently, for each of the 512 single-bit OD’s, we can assign the ID with
maximum bias εd, and estimate time complexity of the attack. Below we only present the
differentials leading to the best attacks. The threshold γ is also an important parameter:
Given a fixed differential, time complexity of the attack is minimal for some optimal value
of γ. However, this optimum may be reached for quite small γ, such that l is large and
|ε⋆a| small. We use at most 224 random nonces and counters for each of the 210 random
keys, so we can only measure a bias of about |ε⋆a| > const · 2−12 (where const ≈ 5 for a
reasonable estimation error). In our experiments, the optimum is not reached with these
computational possibilities (see e.g. Tab. 8.4), and we note that the described complexities
may be improved by choosing a smaller γ.
Attack on 256-bit Salsa20/7. We use the differential ([∆41]14 | [∆07]31) with |ε⋆d| = 0.0655.
The OD is observed after working three rounds backward from a 7-round keystream block.
To illustrate the role of the threshold γ, we present in Tab. 8.4 complexity estimates along
with the number l of PNB’s, the values of |ε⋆d| and |ε⋆|, and the optimal values of c for
several threshold values. For γ = 0.25, the attack runs in time 2152 and data 227. The
previous best attack in [118] required about 2190 trials and 212 data.
Table 8.4: Different parameters for our attack on 256-bit Salsa20/7.
γ l |ε⋆a| |ε⋆| c CT CD
0.50 39 0.500 0.0655 30 2230 213
0.45 97 0.328 0.0430 86 2175 216
0.40 103 0.241 0.0317 91 2170 217
0.35 113 0.101 0.0133 99 2162 219
0.30 124 0.025 0.0032 106 2156 224
0.25 131 0.009 0.0011 109 2152 227
Attack on 256-bit Salsa20/8. We use the differential ([∆41]14 | [∆07]31) with |ε⋆d| = 0.0655.
The OD is observed after working four rounds backward from an 8-round keystream
block. For the threshold γ = 0.06 we find l = 36, |ε⋆a| = 0.0006, and |ε⋆| = 0.00008. For
c = 8, this results in time 2251 and data 230. The list of PNB’s is {26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,
71, 72, 120, 121, 122, 148, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177,
210, 211, 212, 224, 225, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247}. Note that our attack reaches the
same success probability and supports an identical degree of parallelism as brute force.
The previous attack in [118] claims 2255 trials with data 210 for success probability 44%,
but exhaustive search succeeds with probability 50% within the same number of trials,
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with much less data and no additional computations. Therefore their attack does not
constitute a break of Salsa20/8.
Attack on 128-bit Salsa20/7. Our attack can be adapted to the 128-bit version of Salsa20/7.
With the differential ([∆41]14 | [∆07]31) and γ = 0.2, we find l = 38, |ε⋆a| = 0.023, and
|ε⋆| = 0.0030. For c = 20, this breaks Salsa20/7 within 2111 time and 221 data. Our attack
fails to break 128-bit Salsa20/8 because of the insufficient number of PNB’s.
Discussion. In our attacks on reduced-round 256-bit Salsa20, we exploit 4-round differ-
entials, then we attack the cipher by going three of four rounds backwards. We made
intensive experiments in order to observe a bias after going five rounds backwards from
the guess of a subkey, in order to attack Salsa20/9, but without success. Four is probably
the maximal number of rounds one can invert from a partial key guess while still observing
a non-negligible bias after inversion, and such that the overall cost improves from exhaus-
tive key search. Can one hope to break further rounds by statistical cryptanalysis? We
believe that it would require novel techniques and ideas, rather than the relatively simple
XOR difference of 1-bit input and 1-bit output. For instance one might combine several
biased OD’s to reduce data requirements, but this requires almost equal subset of guessed
bits; according to our experiments, this seems hard to achieve. Exploiting multibit differ-
entials such as the single-bit ID in [∆7]26 and OD in [∆41]0 ⊕ [∆42]9 with εd = −0.30 does
not improve efficiency either. Note that an alternative approach to attack Salsa20/7 is to
consider a 3-round biased differential, and observe it after going four rounds backwards.
This is however much more expensive than exploiting directly 4-round differentials. For
the variant with a 128-bit key, we can break up to seven Salsa20 rounds.
8.6 Key-Recovery Attack on ChaCha7
We present the stream cipher ChaCha and use the same method as for Salsa20/8 to attack
up to 7 rounds.
8.6.1 Description of the Scheme
The stream cipher ChaCha [21] is similar to Salsa20 with the following three modifications:
1. The input words are placed differently in the initial matrix:
x =


x0 x1 x2 x3
x4 x5 x6 x7
x8 x9 x10 x11
x12 x13 x14 x15 .

 =


c0 c1 c2 c3
k0 k1 k2 k3
k4 k5 k6 k7
t0 t1 v0 v1

 . (8.8)
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2. The nonlinear operation of Round transforms a vector (x0, x1, x2, x3) to (y0, y1, y2, y3)
by sequentially computing
b0 = x0 + x1, b3 = (x3 ⊕ b0) ≪ 16
b2 = x2 + b3, b1 = (x1 ⊕ b2) ≪ 12
y0 = b0 + b1, y3 = (b3 ⊕ y0) ≪ 8
y2 = b2 + y3, y1 = (b1 ⊕ y2) ≪ 7 .
(8.9)
3. The round function is defined differently: in odd numbers of rounds, the nonlinear
operation is applied to the columns (x0, x4, x8, x12), (x1, x5, x9, x13), (x2, x6, x10, x14),
(x3, x7, x11, x15), and in in even numbers of rounds, the nonlinear operation is applied
to the diagonals (x0, x5, x10, x15), (x1, x6, x11, x12), (x2, x7, x8, x13), (x3, x4, x9, x14).
As for Salsa20, the round function of ChaCha is trivially invertible. R-round variants
are denoted ChaChaR. The core function of ChaCha suggests that “the big advantage of
ChaCha over Salsa20 is the diffusion, which at least at first glance looks considerably
faster” [19].
8.6.2 Experimental Results
ChaCha is expected to have faster diffusion than Salsa20. Our experiments argue in favor
of this conjecture, since we found many biased differentials over 3 rounds, but none over
4 rounds. Such differentials of weight one in both ID and OD can easily be found by
automatized search.
Attack on 256-bit ChaCha6. We use the differential ([∆311]0 | [∆013]13) with |ε⋆d| = 0.013.
The OD is observed after working three rounds backward from an 6-round keystream
block. For the threshold γ = 0.3 we find l = 147, |ε⋆a| = 0.009, and |ε⋆| = 0.00024. For
c = 121, this results in time 2140 and data 231.
Attack on 256-bit ChaCha7. We use again the differential ([∆311]0 | [∆013]13) with |ε⋆d| =
0.013. TheOD is observed after working four rounds backward from an 7-round keystream
block. For the threshold γ = 0.25 we find l = 35, |ε⋆a| = 0.012, and |ε⋆| = 0.00030. For
c = 10, this results in time 2248 and data 227. The list of PNB’s is {3, 6, 15, 16, 31, 35,
67, 68, 71, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 104, 127, 136, 191, 223, 224, 225,
248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255}.
Attack on 128-bit ChaCha6. Our attack can be adapted to the 128-bit version of ChaCha6.
With the differential ([∆311]0 | [∆013]13) and γ = 0.25, we find l = 51, |ε⋆a| = 0.007, and
|ε⋆| = 0.00018. For c = 25, this breaks ChaCha6 within 2107 time and 230 data. Our attack
fails to break 128-bit ChaCha7.
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Discussion. In our attacks on reduced-round ChaCha, we exploit 3-round differentials,
then we attack the cipher by going three of four rounds backwards. For five rounds, we
did not observe a bias anymore. Unlike Salsa20, our exhaustive search showed no bias in 4-
round ChaCha, be it with one, two, or three target output bits. This argues in favor of the
faster diffusion of ChaCha. But surprisingly, when comparing the attacks on Salsa20/8 and
ChaCha7, results suggest that after four rounds backwards, key bits are more correlated
with the target difference in ChaCha than in Salsa20. Nevertheless, ChaCha looks more
trustful on the overall, since we could break up to seven ChaCha rounds against eight for
Salsa20. For the variant with a 128-bit key, we can break up to six ChaCha rounds.
8.7 Analysis of Rumba
In this section, we describe our results for the recently proposed compression function
Rumba. Our goal is to efficiently find colliding pairs for reduced rounds of Rumba, i.e.
input pairs (M,M ′) such that RumbaR(M) ⊕ RumbaR(M ′) = 0. Note that, compared
to our attacks on Salsa20 (where a single biased bit could be exploited in an attack), a
collision attack targets all 512 bits (or most of the 512 bits in the scenario of near-collision
attacks).
8.7.1 Description of the Scheme
Rumba is a compression function built on Salsa20, mapping a 1536-bit message to a 512-
bit value. The input M is parsed as four 384-bit chunks m0,. . . ,m3, and the output value
is
Rumba(m) = F0(m0)⊕ F1(m1)⊕ F2(m2)⊕ F3(m3)
= (x0 + x
20
0 )⊕ (x1 + x201 )⊕ (x2 + x202 )⊕ (x3 + x203 ) ,
where each Fi is an instance of the function Salsa20 with distinct diagonal constants, and
the remaining 384 bits of xi contain the message. A single word j of xi is denoted xi,j .
Note that the Fi functions include the feedforward operation of Salsa20. RumbaR stands
for R-round variant. The constants for Rumba are in Tab. 8.5.
Table 8.5: Constants for Rumba.
F0 F1 F2 F3
c0 0x73726966 0x6f636573 0x72696874 0x72756f66
c1 0x6d755274 0x7552646e 0x6d755264 0x75526874
c2 0x30326162 0x3261626d 0x30326162 0x3261626d
c3 0x636f6c62 0x6f6c6230 0x636f6c62 0x6f6c6230
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8.7.2 Collisions and Preimages in Modified Versions
We show here the weakness of two modified versions of Rumba, respectively an iterated
version with 2048-bit input compression function, and the compression function without
the final feedforward.
On the Role of Diagonal Constants. The compression function Rumba is fed with 1536 bits,
copied in a 2048-bit state whose remaining 512 bits correspond to the diagonal constants.
It is tempting to see these values as the IV of an iterated hash function, and use diagonal
values for the chaining variable. However, Bernstein implicitly warned against such a
construction, when claiming that “Rumba20 will take about twice as many cycles per
eliminated byte as Salsa20 takes per encrypted byte” [20]. Indeed, the 1536-bit input should
contain both the 512-bit chaining value and the 1024-bit message, and thus for a 1024-bit
input the Salsa20 function is called four times (256 bits processed per call), whereas in
Salsa20 it’s called once for a 512-bit input. We confirm here that diagonal values should
not be replaced with the chaining variables, by presenting a method for finding collisions
within about 2128/6 trials, against 2256 with a birthday attack: pick an arbitrary 1536-bit
message block M0, then compute Rumba(M0) = h0‖h1‖h2‖h3, and repeat this until two
distinct 128-bit chunks hi and hj are equal, say h0 and h1, corresponding to the diagonal
constants of F0 and F1 in the next round; consequently, these functions will be identical
in the next round. A collision can then be obtained by choosing two distinct message
blocks M1 = m10‖m11‖m12‖m13 and (M ′)1 = m11‖m10‖m12‖m13, or M1 = m10‖m10‖m12‖m13 and
(M ′)1 = (m′0)
1‖(m′0)1‖m12‖m13. How fast is this method? By the birthday paradox, the
amount of trials for finding a suitable M0 is about 2128/6 (here 6 is the number of distinct
sets {i, j} ⊂ {0, . . . , 3}), while the construction of M1 and (M ′)1 is straightforward.
Regarding the price-performance ratio, we do not have to store or sort a table, so the
price is 2128/6 (and this for any potential filter function), while performance is much
larger than one, because there are many collisions (one can choose 3 messages and 1
difference of 348 bits arbitrarily). This contrasts with the cost of 2256 for a serial attack
on a 512-bit digest hash function.
On the Importance of Feedforward. In Davies-Meyer-based hash functions as well as in
MD5 or SHA-1, the final feedforward is an obvious requirement for one-wayness. In
Rumba, the feedforward is applied in each Fi, before a XOR of the four branches, and
omitting this operation does not trivially lead to an inversion of the function, because
of the incremental construction. However, as we will demonstrate, preimage resistance is
not guaranteed with this setting. Let Fi(mi) = x
20
i for i = 0, . . . , 3 and assume that we
are given a 512-bit value h, and our goal is to find M such that Rumba(M) = h. This can
be achieved by choosing random blocks m0, m1, m2, and set
y = F0(m0)⊕ F1(m1)⊕ F2(m2)⊕ h . (8.10)
We can find then the 512-bit state x03 such that y = x
20
3 . If x
0
3 has the correct diagonal
values (the 128-bit constant of F3), we can extract m3 from x
3
0 with respect to Rumba’s
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definition. This randomized algorithm succeeds with probability 2−128, since there are
128 constant bits in an initial state. Therefore, a preimage of an arbitrary digest can be
found within about 2128 trials, against 2512/3 with the generalized birthday method.
8.7.3 Scenarios of Differential Attacks
To obtain a collision for RumbaR, it is sufficient to find two messages m and m′ such that
F0(m0)⊕ F0(m′0) = F2(m2)⊕ F2(m′2) , (8.11)
with m0 ⊕ m′0 = m2 ⊕ m′2, m1 = m′1 and m3 = m′3. The freedom in choosing m1
and m3 trivially allows to derive many other collisions (multi-collision). We use the
following differential notation: Let the initial states xi and x
′
i have the input difference
∆i = xi ⊕ x′i. After r rounds, the observed difference is denoted ∆ri = xri ⊕ (x′i)r, and the
output-difference OD (without feedforward) becomes ∆Ri = xRi ⊕ (x′i)R. If feedforward is
included in the OD, we use the notation∇Ri = (xi+xRi )⊕(x′i+(x′i)R). With this notation,
Eq. 8.11 becomes ∇R0 = ∇R2 , and if the feedforward operation is ignored, then Eq. 8.11
simplifies to ∆R0 = ∆
R
2 . To find messages that satisfy these equations, we use an R-round
differential path of high-probability, with intermediate target difference δr after r rounds,
0 ≤ r ≤ R. Notice that the differential is applicable for both F0 and F2 (thus we do
not have to subscript the target difference). The probability that a random message pair
(with input-difference δ) conforms to δr is denoted pr. To satisfy the equation ∆
R
0 = ∆
R
2
it suffices to find message pairs such that the observed differentials equal the target one,
that is, ∆R0 = δ
R and ∆R2 = δ
R. The naive approach is to try about 1/pr random messages
each. This complexity can however be lowered down by
• Finding constraints on the message pair so that it conforms to the difference δ1 after
one round with certainty (this will be achieved by linearization).
• From a pair conforming to δr, deriving other pairs also conforming to δr (this will
be achieved by the neutral bits technique).
Finally, to satisfy the equation ∇R0 = ∇R2 , it suffices to find message pairs such that
∇R0 = δR ⊕ δ and ∇R2 = δR ⊕ δ (i.e. the additions are not producing carry bits). Given
a random message pair that conforms to δR, this holds with probability about 2−v−w
where v and w are the respective weights of the ID δ and of the target OD δR (excluding
the linear msb’s). The three next subsections are respectively dedicated to finding an
optimal differential, describing the linearization procedure, and describing the neutral
bits technique.
Remark 11. One can observe that the constants of F0 and F2 are almost similar, as well
as the constants of F1 and F3. To improve the generalized birthday attack suggested
in [20], a strategy is to find a pair (m0, m2) such that F0(m0) ⊕ F2(m2) is biased in any
c bits after R rounds (where c ≈ 114, cf. [20]), along with a second pair (m1, m3) with
F1(m1)⊕F3(m3) biased in the same c bits. The sum F0(m0)⊕F2(m2) can be seen as the
feedforward OD of two states having an ID which is nonzero in some diagonal words.
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However, differences in the diagonal words result in a large diffusion, and this approach
seems to be much less efficient than differential attacks for only one function Fi.
8.7.4 Finding High-Probability Differentials
We search for a linear differential, i.e. a differential holding with certainty in the linearized
function Fi of Rumba (where addition is replaced by XOR, see Sect. 8.3.1). The differential
is independent of the diagonal constants, and it is expected to have high probability in the
genuine Rumba if the linear differential has low weight. An exhaustive search for suitable
ID’s is not traceable for linear Rumba, so we choose another method. As in Sect. 8.4, we
focus on a single column in Xi and consider the weight of the input (starting with the
diagonal element, which must be zero). With a fixed relative position of the non-zero bits
in this input, one can obtain an output of low weight after the first linear quarterround.
Here is a list of the mappings (showing the weight only) which have at most weight 2 in
each word of the input and output:
g1 : (0, 0, 0, 0) → (0, 0, 0, 0) g8 : (0, 1, 2, 0) → (1, 1, 1, 0)
g2 : (0, 0, 1, 0) → (2, 0, 1, 1) g9 : (0, 1, 2, 2) → (1, 1, 1, 2)
g3 : (0, 0, 1, 1) → (2, 1, 0, 2) g10 : (0, 2, 1, 1) → (0, 1, 0, 0)
g4 : (0, 1, 0, 1) → (1, 0, 0, 1) g11 : (0, 2, 1, 2) → (0, 0, 1, 1)
g5 : (0, 1, 1, 0) → (1, 1, 0, 1) g12 : (0, 2, 2, 1) → (0, 1, 1, 1)
g6 : (0, 1, 1, 1) → (1, 0, 1, 0) g13 : (0, 2, 2, 1) → (2, 1, 1, 1)
g7 : (0, 0, 2, 1) → (2, 1, 1, 1) g14 : (0, 2, 2, 2) → (2, 0, 2, 0)
These relations can be used algorithmically to construct a suitable ID with all 4 columns.
Consider the following example, where the state after the first round is again a combination
of useful rows: (g1, g10, g1, g11)→ (g1, g2, g4, g1). After 2 rounds, the difference has weight
6 (with weight 3 in the diagonal words). There is a class of ID’s with the same structure:
(g1, g10, g1, g11), (g1, g11, g1, g10), (g10, g1, g11, g1), (g11, g1, g10, g1). The degree of freedom is
large enough to construct these 2-round linear differentials: the positions of the nonzero
bits in a single mapping gi are symmetric with respect to rotation of words (and the
required gi have an additional degree of freedom). Any other linear differential constructed
with gi has larger weight after 2 rounds. Eventually, here is the input difference we will
consider for our attacks on Rumba (with optimal rotation, such that many msb’s are
involved):
∆i,2 = 0x00000002 ∆i,8 = 0x80000000
∆i,4 = 0x00080040 ∆i,12 = 0x80001000
∆i,6 = 0x00000020 ∆i,14 = 0x01001000
and ∆i,j = 0 for the other indices j. The weight of differences for the first four linearized
rounds is as follows (the subscript of the arrows denotes the probability pr that a random
message pair conforms to this differential):
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

0 0 1 0
2 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
2 0 2 0

 col−→2−4


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0

 row−→2−7


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 2 0
0 0 1 1

 col−→2−41


2 2 3 1
0 3 4 2
1 1 7 3
1 1 1 6


row−→
2−194


8 3 2 4
5 10 3 4
9 11 13 7
6 9 10 9


With this fixed ID, we can determine the probability that the OD obtained by genuine
Rumba corresponds to the OD of linear Rumba. Note that integer addition is the only
nonlinear operation. Each nonzero bit in the ID of an integer addition behaves linearly
(i.e. it does not create or annihilate a sequence of carry bits) with probability 1/2, while
a difference in the msb is always linear. In the first round, there are only four bits with
associated probability 1/2, hence p1 = 2
−4 (see also the subsection on linearization). The
other cumulative probabilities are p2 = 2
−7, p3 = 2
−41, p4 = 2
−194. For 3 rounds, we have
weights v = 7 and w = 37, thus the overall complexity to find a collision after 3 rounds is
about 241+37+7 = 285. For 4 rounds, v = 7 and w = 112, leading to a complexity 2313. The
probability that feedforward behaves linearly can be increased by choosing low-weight
inputs.
8.7.5 Linearization
The first round of our differential has a theoretical probability of p1 = 2
−4 for a random
message. This is roughly confirmed by our experiments, where exact probabilities depend
on the diagonal constants (for example, we experimentally observed p1 = 2
−6.6 for F0, and
p1 = 2
−6.3 for F2, the other two probabilities are even closer to 2
−4). We show here how
to set constraints on the message so that the first round differential holds with certainty.
Let us begin with the first column of F0, where c0,0 = x0,0 = 0x73726966. In the
first addition x0,0 + x0,12, we have to address ∆0,12, which has a nonzero (and non-msb)
bit on position 12 (counting from 0). The bits of the constant are [x0,0]12−10 = (010)2,
hence the choice [x0,12]11,10 = (00)2 is sufficient for linearization. This corresponds to
x0,12 ← x0,12 ∧ 0xFFFF3FFF. The subsequent 3 additions of the first column are always
linear as only msb’s are involved. Then, we linearize the third column of F0, where
c0,2 = x0,10 = 0x30326162. In the first addition x0,10+x0,6, we have to address ∆0,6, which
has a nonzero bit on position 5. The relevant bits of the constant are [x0,10]5−1 = (10001)2,
hence the choice [x0,6]4−1 = (1111)2 is sufficient for linearization. This corresponds to
x0,6 ← x0,6∨0x0000001E. In the second addition y0,14+x0,10, the updated difference ∆10,14
has a single bit on position 24. The relevant bits of the constant are [x0,10]24,23 = (00)2,
hence the choice [y0,14]23 = (0)2 is sufficient. Notice that conditions on the updated words
must be transformed to the initial state words. As y0,14 = x0,14⊕(x0,10+x0,6)≪ 8, we find
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the condition [x0,14]23 = [x0,10+x0,6]16. If we let both sides be zero, we have [x0,14]23 = (0)2
or x0,14 ← x0,14 ∧ 0xFF7FFFFF, and [x0,10 + x0,6]16 = (0)2. As [x0,10]16,15 = (00)2, we can
choose [x0,6]16,15 = (00)2 or x0,6 ← x0,6∧0xFFFE7FFF. Finally, the third addition y0,2+y0,14
must be linearized with respect to the single bit in ∆10,14 on position 24. A sufficient
condition for linearization is [y0,2]24,23 = (00)2 and [y0,14]23 = (0)2. The second condition
is already satisfied, so we can focus on the first condition. The update is defined by
y0,2 = x0,2⊕(y0,14+x0,10)≪ 9, so we set [x0,2]24,23 = (00)2 or x0,2 ← x0,2∧0xFE7FFFFF, and
require [y0,14 + x0,0]15,14 = (00)2. As [x0,10]15−13 = (011)2, we can set [y0,14]15−13 = (101)2.
This is satisfied by choosing [x0,14]15−13 = (000)2 or x0,14 ← x0,14 ∧ 0xFFFF1FFF, and by
choosing [x0,10 + x0,6]8−6 = (101)2. As [x0,10]8−5 = (1011)2, we set [x0,6]8−5 = (1111)2
or x0,6 ← x0,6 ∨ 0x000001E0. Altogether, we fixed 18 (distinct) bits of the input, other
linearizations are possible.
The first round of F2 can be linearized with exactly the same conditions. This way, we
save an average factor of 24 (additive complexities are ignored). This linearization with
sufficient conditions does not work well for more than one round because of an avalanche
effect of fixed bits. We lose many degrees of freedom, and contradictions are likely to
occur.
8.7.6 Neutral Bits
Thanks to linearization, we can find a message pair conforming to δ2 within about
1/(2−7+4) = 23 trials. Our goal now is to to efficiently derive from such a pair many
other pairs that are conforming to δ2, so that a search for three rounds can start after the
second round, by using the notion of neutral bits again (cf. Sect. 8.5.2).
Neutral bits can be identified easily for a fixed pair of messages, but if several neu-
tral bits are complemented in parallel, then the resulting message pair may not conform
anymore. A heuristic approach was introduced in [22], using a maximal 2-neutral set.
A 2-neutral set of bits is a subset of neutral bits, such that the message pair obtained
by complementing any two bits of the subset in parallel also conform to the differential.
The size of this set is denoted n. In general, finding a 2-neutral set is an NP-complete
problem (the problem is equivalent to the Maximum Clique Problem from graph theory),
but good heuristic algorithms for dense graphs exist, e.g. see [31]. In the case of Rumba,
we compute the value n for different message pairs that conform to δ2 and choose the pair
with maximum n. We observe that about 1/2 of the 2n message pairs (derived by flipping
some of the n bits of the 2-neutral set) conform to the differential3. This probability
p is significantly increased, if we complement at most ℓ ≪ n bits of the 2-neutral set,
which results in a message space (not contradicting with the linearization) of size about
p · (n
ℓ
)
. At this point, a full collision for 3 rounds has a reduced theoretical complexity of
285−7/p = 278/p (of course, p should not be smaller than 2−3). Since we will have p > 1
2
for a suitable choice of ℓ, the complexity gets reduced from 285 to less than 279.
3In the case of SHA-0, about 1/8 of the 2n message pairs (derived from the original message pair by
complementing bits from the 2-neutral set) conform to the differential for the next round.
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8.7.7 Experimental Results
We choose a random message of low weight, apply the linearization for the first round
and repeat this about 23 times until the message pairs conforms to δ2. We compute then
the 2-neutral set of this message pair. This protocol is repeated a few times to identify a
message pair with large 2-neutral set.
• For F0, we find the pair of states (x0, x′0) of low weight, which has 251 neutral bits
and a 2-neutral set of size 147. If we flip a random subset of the 2-neutral bits, then
the resulting message pair conforms to δ2 with probability Pr = 0.52.
x0 =


0x73726966 0x00000400 0x00000080 0x00200001
0x00002000 0x6d755274 0x000001fe 0x02000008
0x00000040 0x00000042 0x30326162 0x10002800
0x00000080 0x00000000 0x01200000 0x636f6c62


• For F2, we find the pair of states (x2, x′2) of low weight, which has 252 neutral bits
and a 2-neutral set of size 146. If we flip a random subset of the 2-neutral bits, then
the resulting message pair conforms to δ2 with probability Pr = 0.41.
x2 =


0x72696874 0x00000000 0x00040040 0x00000400
0x00008004 0x6d755264 0x000001fe 0x06021184
0x00000000 0x00800040 0x30326162 0x00000000
0x00000300 0x00000400 0x04000000 0x636f6c62


Given these pairs for 2 rounds, we perform a search in the 2-neutral set by flipping at
most 10 bits (which gives a message space of about 250), to find pairs that conform to δ3.
This step has a theoretical complexity of about 234 for each pair, which could be verified
in practice. For example, in the case of (x0, x
′
0), we can flip the bits {59, 141, 150, 154,
269, 280, 294, 425} in order to get a pair of states (x¯0, x¯′0) that conforms to δ3. In the
case of (x2, x
′
2), the bits {58, 63, 141, 271, 304, 317, 435, 417, 458, 460} are flipped in
order to get a pair of states (x¯2, x¯
′
2) that conforms to δ
3.
x¯0 =


0x73726966 0x08000400 0x00000080 0x00200001
0x04400000 0x6d755274 0x000001fe 0x02000008
0x01002040 0x00000002 0x30326162 0x10002800
0x00000080 0x00000200 0x01200000 0x636f6c62


x¯2 =


0x72696874 0x84000000 0x00040040 0x00000400
0x0000a004 0x6d755264 0x000001fe 0x06021184
0x00008000 0x20810040 0x30326162 0x00000000
0x00000300 0x00080402 0x04001400 0x636f6c62


At this point, we have collisions for 3 rounds of Rumba without feedforward, hence ∆30 ⊕
∆32 = 0. If we include feedforward for the above pairs of states, then ∇30 ⊕ ∇32 has
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weight 16, which corresponds to a near-collision. Notice that a near-collision of low
weight indicates non-randomness of the reduced-round compression function (we assume
a Gaussian distribution centered at 256). This near-collision of low weight was found by
using a birthday method: we produce a list of pairs for F0 that conform to δ
3 (using
neutral bits as above), together with the corresponding value of ∇30. The same is done for
F2. If each list has size N , then we can produce N
2 pairs of ∇30 ⊕∇32 in order to identify
near-collisions of low weight.
However, there are no neutral bits for the pairs (x¯0, x¯
′
0) and (x¯2, x¯
′
2) with respect to
δ3. This means that we can not completely separate the task of finding full collisions with
feedforward, from finding collisions without feedforward (and we can not use neutral bits
to iteratively find pairs that conform to δ4). To find a full collision after three rounds,
we could perform a search in the 2-neutral set of (x0, x
′
0) and (x2, x
′
2), by flipping at
most 20 bits. In this case, the resulting pairs conform to δ2 with probability at least
Pr = 0.68, and the message space has a size of about 280. The overall complexity becomes
278/0.68 ≈ 279 (compared to 285 without linearization and neutral bits). Then, we try
to find near-collisions of low weight for 4 rounds, using the birthday method described
above. Within less than one minute of computation, we found pairs (x¯0, x¯
′
0) and (x¯2, x¯
′
2)
such that ∇40 ⊕∇42 has weight 129. Consequently, the non-randomness of the differential
is propagating up to 4 rounds.
x¯0 =


0x73726966 0x00020400 0x00000080 0x00200001
0x00002400 0x6d755274 0x000001fe 0x02000008
0x00000040 0x00220042 0x30326162 0x10002800
0x00000080 0x00001004 0x01200000 0x636f6c62


x¯2 =


0x72696874 0x00001000 0x80040040 0x00000400
0x00008804 0x6d755264 0x000001fe 0x06021184
0x00000000 0x80800040 0x30326162 0x00000000
0x00000300 0x00000450 0x04000000 0x636f6c62


8.8 Summary
Salsa20 is widely viewed as a very promising proposal. Nothing in this chapter affects the
security of the full version of the cipher. A new method for attacking Salsa20 and ChaCha
(and maybe other ciphers) inspired by correlation attacks and by the notion of neutral
bits has been presented. This allows to give the first attack faster than exhaustive search
on the stream cipher Salsa20/8 with a 256-bit key. Thus Salsa20 still appears to be a
conservative design, and Salsa20/12 could turn out to be a well-balanced proposal. For
the compression function Rumba, which is built on Salsa20, the methods of linearization
and neutral bits are applied to a high probability differential to find collisions on Rumba
reduced to 3 rounds with expected 279 trials, and to efficiently find low weight near
collisions on 3-round and 4-round Rumba.
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Chapter 9
Chosen IV Statistical Analysis
In the previous chapter, we have introduced the concept of probabilistic neutral bits
(PNB’s) in the key for the chosen IV scenario. Based on a recent framework for chosen
IV statistical distinguishing analysis of stream ciphers, PNB’s can be exploited to provide
new and general methods for key recovery attacks. As an application, a key recovery
attack on simplified versions of two eSTREAM candidates is given.
9.1 Introduction
The initialization function of a stream cipher should have good mixing properties, and it
should be efficient (especially in hardware-oriented stream ciphers). If the initialization
function uses a round-based approach, one can find a tradeoff between security and effi-
ciency with a well-chosen number of rounds. In [55, 105, 112,58], a framework for chosen
IV statistical analysis of stream ciphers is suggested to investigate the structure of the
initialization function. If mixing is not perfect, then the initialization function has an
algebraic normal form which can be distinguished from a random one (e.g. if some high
degree monomials are not produced). In this chapter, we optimize these methods with
heuristic approaches (such as probabilistic neutral bits), and we present a framework to
mount key recovery attacks. In [55], they say ”It is an open question how to utilize these
weaknesses of state bits to attack the cipher.”. The aim of this chapter is to contribute
to this problem. As in [55, 105] one selects a subset of IV bits as variables. Assuming all
other IV values as well as the key fixed, one can write a keystream symbol as a Boolean
function. By running through all possible values of these bits and generating a keystream
output each time, one can compute the truth table of this Boolean function. Each coef-
ficient in the algebraic normal form of this Boolean function is parametrized by the bits
of the secret key. We now ask whether in the parametrized expression of a coefficient,
every key bit does occur, or more generally, how much influence each key bit does have
on the value of the coefficient. If a coefficient depends on less than all key bits, this
fact can be exploited to filter those keys which do not satisfy the imposed value for the
coefficient. In [120], it is shown that in the eSTREAM Phase 3 candidate Trivium with
IV initialization reduced to 576 iterations, linear relations on the key bits can be derived
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for well chosen sets of variable IV bits. Our framework is more general, as it works with
the concept of (probabilistic) neutral key bits, i.e. key bits which have no influence on
the value of a coefficient with some (high) probability. This way, we can get information
on the key for many more iterations in the IV initialization of Trivium, and similarly for
the eSTREAM Phase 3 candidate Grain-128. On the other hand, extensive experimental
evidence indicates clear limits to our approach: With our methods, it is unlikely to get
information on the key faster than exhaustive key search for Trivium or Grain-128 with
full IV initialization.
9.2 Problem Formalization
Suppose that we are given a fixed Boolean function F (K, V ) : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}.
An oracle chooses a random and unknown K = (k0, . . . , kn−1) and returns us the value
of z = F (K, V ) for every query V = (v0, . . . , vt−1) of our choice. The function F could
stand e.g. for the Boolean function which maps the key K and IV V of a stream cipher to
the (let say) first output bit. Our goal as an adversary is to determine the unknown key
K (or to distinguish F from a random function) in the chosen IV attack model only by
dealing with the function F . If F mixes its inputs in a proper way, then one needs to try
all possible 2n keys by sending O(n) queries to the oracle in order to find the correct key
(since each query gives one bit information about the key for a balanced F ). Here, we are
going to investigate methods which can potentially lead to faster reconstruction of the key
in the case where the function F does not properly mix its inputs. This could occur for
example when the initialization phase of a stream cipher is performed through an iterated
procedure for which the number of iterations has not been suitably chosen. On the other
hand these methods may help to give the designers more insight to choose the required
number of iterations. The existence of faster methods for finding the unknown key K
highly depends on the structure of F . It may be even impossible to uniquely determine
the key K. Let F (K, V ) =
⊕
κ cκ(V )K
κ where Kκ = kκ00 · · · kκn−1n−1 for the multi-index
κ = (κ0, . . . , κn−1). Then the following lemma makes this statement more clear.
Lemma 3. No adversary can distinguish between the two keys K1 and K2 for which
Kκ1 = K
κ
2 for all κ ∈ {0, 1}n such that cκ(V ) 6= 0.
Indeed, it is only possible to determine the values of {Kκ|∀κ, cκ(V ) 6= 0} which is not
necessarily equivalent to determination of K. As a consequence of Lemma 3, the function
F divides {0, 1}n into equivalence classes K1, K2, . . . ,KJ (with J ≤ 2n). See Ex. 28 as an
application on a reduced version of Trivium.
9.3 Scenarios of Attacks
The algebraic description of the function F (K, V ) is too complex in general to be amenable
to direct analysis. Therefore, from the function F (K, V ) and with the partition V =
(U,W ) we derive simpler Boolean functions C(K,W ) with the help of the oracle. In
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our main example, C(K,W ) is a coefficient of the algebraic normal form of the function
deduced from F by varying over the bits in U only (see Sect. 9.4 for more details). If this
function C(K,W ) does not have a well-distributed algebraic structure, it can be exploited
in cryptanalytic attacks. Let us investigate different scenarios:
1. If C(K,W ) is imbalanced for (not necessarily uniformly) randomW and many fixed
K, then the function F (or equivalently the underlying stream cipher) with unknown
K can be distinguished from a random one, see [55, 105, 112,58].
2. If C(K,W ) is evaluated for some fixed W , then C(K,W ) is an expression in the key
bits only. In [120], it was shown that in Trivium case for reduced iterations, linear
relations on the key bits can be derived for a well chosen IV part.
3. If C(K,W ) has many key bits, which have (almost) no influence on the values of
C(K,W ), a suitable approximation may be identified and exploited for key recovery
attacks. This is the target scenario of this chapter and will be discussed in detail.
In scenario 2, the underlying idea is to find a relation C(K,W ), evaluated for some W ,
which depends only on a subset of m (< n) key bits. The functional form of this relation
can be determined with 2m evaluations of C(K,W ). By trying all 2m possibilities for the
involved m key bits, one can filter those keys which do not satisfy the imposed relation.
The complexity of this precomputation is 2m times needed to compute C(K,W ), see
Sect. 9.4. More precisely, if p = Pr(C(K,W ) = 0) for the fixed W , the key space is
filtered by a factor of H(p) = p2+(1−p)2. For example, in the case of a linear function it
is p = H(p) = 1/2. In addition, if several imposed relations on the key bits are available,
it is easier to combine them to filter wrong keys if they have a simple structure, see
e.g. [120]. In scenario 3, our main idea is to find a function A(M,W ) which depends on
a key part M of m bits, and which is correlated to C(K,W ) with correlation coefficient
ε, that is Pr(C(K,W ) = A(M,W )) = 1/2 + ε. Then, by asking the oracle N queries we
get some information (depending on the new equivalence classes produced by A) about
m bits of the secret K in time N2m by carefully analyzing the underlying hypothesis
testing problem. We will proceed by explaining how to derive such functions C from the
coefficients of the ANF of F in Sect. 9.4, and how to find such functions A using the
concept of probabilistic neutral bits in Sect. 9.5.
9.4 Derived Functions from Polynomial Description
The function F can be written in the form F (K, V ) =
⊕
ν,κ cν,κV
νKκ with binary
coefficients cν,κ. We can make a partition of the IV according to V = (U,W ) and
ν = (α, β) with u bit segments U and α, and w = t − u bit segments W and β.
This gives the expression F (K, V ) =
⊕
α,β,κ c(α,β),κU
αW βKκ =
⊕
α cα(K,W )U
α where
cα(K,W ) =
⊕
β,κ c(α,β),κW
βKκ. For every α ∈ {0, 1}u, the function cα(K,W ) can serve
as a function C derived from F . Here is a toy example to illustrate the notation:
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Example 26. Let n = t = 3 and F (K, V ) = k1v1 ⊕ k2v0v2 ⊕ v2. Let U := (v0, v2) of u = 2
bits and W := (v1) of w = 1 bit. Then C0(K,W ) = k1v1, C1(K,W ) = 0, C2(K,W ) = 1,
C3(K,W ) = k2.
Note that an adversary with the help of the oracle can evaluate cα(K,W ) for the unknown
key K at any input W ∈ {0, 1}w for every α ∈ {0, 1}u by sending at most 2u queries to
the oracle, i.e. the partitioning of V helps us to define a computable function cα(K,W )
if u is small enough (even though the explicit form of cα(K,W ) remains unknown). To
obtain the values cα(K,W ) for all α ∈ {0, 1}u, an adversary asks for the output values of
all 2u inputs V = (U,W ) with the fixed part W . This gives the truth table of a Boolean
function in u variables for which the coefficients of its algebraic normal form (i.e. the
values of cα(K,W )) can be found in time u2
u and memory 2u using the Walsh-Hadamard
transform. Alternatively, a single coefficient cα(K,W ) for a specific α ∈ {0, 1}u can be
computed by XORing the output of F for all 2|α| inputs V = (U,W ) for which each bit of
U is at most as large as the corresponding bit of α. This bypasses the need of 2u memory.
One can expect that a subset of IV bits receives less mixing during the initialization
process than other bits. These IV bits are called weak, and they would be an appropriate
choice of U in order to amplify the non-randomness of C. However, it is an open question
how to identify weak IV bits by systematic methods.
9.5 Functions Approximation
We are interested in the approximations of a function C(K,W ) : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}w → {0, 1}
which depend only on a subset of key bits. To this end we make an appropriate partition
of the key K according toK = (L,M) withM (called subkey) ofm bits and L of l = n−m
bits, and construct the function A(M,W ). Such a partitioning can be identified using the
concept of probabilistic neutral bits (PNB’s), see Sect. 8.5.2 (where the notion of PNB’s
was used to derive a suitable function A in the case ofW = V and C = F ). We recall that
the neutrality measure of the key bit ki is defined as γi where 1/2 + γi is the probability
(over all K and W ) that complementing the key bit ki does not change the output of
C. A key bit with large |γi| is called weak key bit (and it is called a significant key bit
otherwise). In practice, we will set a threshold γ, such that all key bits with |γi| < γ
are included in the subkey M . The approximation A(M,W ) could then be defined by
C(K,W ) either with a fixed or a randomly chosen value for non-significant key bits L.
Here is another toy example to illustrate the method:
Example 27. Let n = t = 3, u = 2 and C(K,W ) = k0k1k2v0v1⊕k0v1⊕k1v0. For uniformly
random K and W , we find γ0 = 1/8, γ1 = 1/8, γ2 = 7/8. Consequently, it is reasonable
to use M := (k0, k1) as the subkey. With fixed k2 = 0, we obtain the approximation
A(M,W ) = k0v1 ⊕ k1v0 which depends on m = 2 key bits only.
Note that, if L consists only of neutral key bits, then the approximation A is exact,
because C(K,W ) does not depend on these key bits.
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In the precomputation phase of the attack, we need a suitable partitioning of the IV and
the key (i.e. a function C and an approximation A). The weak IV bits are often found
by a random search, while the weak key bits can be easily found with the neutrality
measure for some threshold γ. Given C and A, we can find a small subset of candidates
for the subkey M with a probabilistic guess-and-determine attack. In order to filter the
set of all 2m possible subkeys into a smaller set, we need to distinguish a correct guess of
the subkey M ′ from an incorrect one. Our ability in distinguishing subkeys is related to
the correlation coefficient between A(M ′,W ) and C(K,W ) with K = (L,M ′) under the
following two hypotheses. H0 : the guessed part M
′ is correct, and H1 : the guessed part
M ′ is incorrect. More precisely, the values of ε0 and ε1 defined in the following play a
crucial role:
Pr
W
(A(M ′,W ) = C(K,W )|K = (L,M ′)) = 1
2
+ ε0 (9.1)
Pr
M ′,W
(A(M ′,W ) = C(K,W )|K = (L,M)) = 1
2
+ ε1 . (9.2)
In general, both ε0 and ε1 are random variables, depending on the key. If the distribu-
tions of ε0 and ε1 are separated, we can achieve a small non-detection probability pβ and
false alarm probability pα = 2
−c by using enough samples. In the special case where ε0
and ε1 are constants (corresponding to the binary distributions D0 and D1), the opti-
mum distinguisher is Neyman-Pearson, see Sect. 2.8. The attack will be successful with
probability 1 − pβ and the complexity is as follows: For each guess M ′ of the subkey,
the bias ε of A(M ′,W ) ⊕ C(K,W ) must be computed, which requires computation of
the coefficients A(M ′,W ) by the adversary, and computation of the coefficient C(K,W )
through the oracle, for the same N values of W , having a cost of N2u at most. This must
be repeated for all 2m possible guesses M ′. The set of candidates for the subkey M has a
size of about pα2
m = 2m−c. The whole key can then be verified by an exhaustive search
over the key part L with a cost of 2m−c2l = 2n−c evaluations of F . The total complexity
becomes CT = N2
u2m + 2m−c2n−m = N2u+m + 2n−c. The required number of samples is
N = d/∆(D0, D1) (assuming that C(K,W ) are independent) to obtain an overall error
pe = Φ(−
√
d/2) ≈ pα. Using more than one function C or considering several chosen IV
bits U may be useful to reduce complexity; however, we do not deal with this case here.
Remark 12. In practice the distributions of ε0 and ε1 for different subkeys may not be fully
separated, and hence a very small pβ and pα may not be possible to achieve. However,
we propose the following non-optimal distinguisher. We choose a threshold ε′0 such that
Pr(ε0 > ε
′
0) has a significant value, e.g. 1/2. We also identify a threshold ε
′
1, if possible,
such that Pr(ε1 < ε
′
1) = 1. Then, we estimate the sample size by replacing ε0 and ε1 by
ε′0 and ε
′
1, respectively, to obtain pα ≤ 2−c and desired pβ ≈ 1/2. If ε′0 and ε′1 are close,
then the estimated number of samples becomes very large. In this case, it is better to
chose the number of samples intuitively, and then estimate the related pα.
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Remark 13. It is reasonable to assume that a false subkeyM ′, which is close to the correct
subkey, may lead to a larger value of ε. Here, the measure for being ”close” could be the
neutrality measure γi and the Hamming weight: if only a few key bits on positions with
large γi are false, one would expect that ε is large. However, we only observed an irregular
(i.e. not continuous) deviation for very close subkeys. The effect on pα is negligible because
subkeys with difference of low weight are rare.
9.7 Application to Trivium
The eSTREAM Phase 3 candidate Trivium [32] has an internal state of 288 bits. To
initialize the cipher, the n = 80 key bits and t = 80 IV bits are written into the registers.
The cipher state is then updated R = 18 × 64 = 1152 times without producing output
in order to provide a good mixture of the key and IV bits in the initial state. We
consider the Boolean function F (K, V ) which computes the first keystream bit after r
rounds of initialization. In [55], Trivium was analyzed with chosen IV statistical tests and
non-randomness was detected for r = 10 × 64, 10.5× 64, 11 × 64, 11.5 × 64 rounds with
u = 13, 18, 24, 33 IV bits, respectively. In [120], the key recovery attack on Trivium was
investigated with respect to scenario 2 (see Sect. 9.3) for r = 9 × 64. In this section we
provide more examples for key recovery attack with respect to scenario 3 for r = 10× 64
and r = 10 × 10.5. In the following two examples, weak IV bits have been found by a
random search. We first concentrate on equivalence classes of the key:
Example 28. For r = 10× 64 rounds, a variable IV part U with the u = 10 bit positions
{34, 36, 39, 45, 63, 65, 69, 73, 76, 78}, and the coefficient with index α = 1023, we could
experimentally verify that the derived function cα(K,W ) only depends on m = 10 key
bits M with bit positions {15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 35, 64, 65, 66}. By assigning all 210
different possible values to these 10 key bits and putting those M which gives the same
function cα(K,W ) (by trying enough samples of W ), we could determine the equivalence
classes for M with respect to cα. Our experiment shows the existence of 65 equivalence
classes: one with 512 members for which k15k16 ⊕ k17 ⊕ k19 = 0 and 64 other classes with
8 members for which k15k16⊕ k17⊕ k19 = 1 and the vector (k18, k22, k35, k64, k65, k66) has a
fixed value. This shows that cα provides
1
2
× 1 + 1
2
× 7 = 4 bits of information about the
key in average. 
Example 29. For r = 10× 64 rounds, a variable IV part U with the u = 11 bit positions
{1, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 22, 24, 27, 29}, and the coefficient with index α = 2047, the derived
function cα(K,W ) depends on all 80 key bits. A more careful look at the neutrality
measure of the key bits reveals that max(γi) ≈ 0.18 and only 7 key bits have a neutrality
measure larger than γ = 0.09, which is not enough to get a useful approximation A(M,W )
for an attack. However, we observed that cα(K,W ) is independent of the key for W = 0,
and more generally the number of significant bits depends on |W |. 
It is difficult to find a good choice of variable IV’s for larger values of r, using a random
search. The next example shows how we can go a bit further with some insight.
9.8 Application to Grain 117
Example 30. Now we consider r = 10.5×64 = 10×64+32 = 672 rounds. The construction
of the initialization function of Trivium suggests that shifting the bit positions of U in
Ex. 29 may be a good choice. Hence we choose U with the u = 11 bit positions {33, 37,
39, 41, 44, 46, 48, 54, 56, 59, 61}, and α = 2047. In this case, cα(K,W ) for W = 0 is
independent of 32 key bits, and p = Pr(cα(K, 0) = 1) ≈ 0.42. This is already a reduced
attack which is 1/H(p) ≈ 1.95 times faster than exhaustive search. 
The following example shows how we can connect a bridge between scenarios 2 and 3 and
come up with an improved attack.
Example 31. Consider the same setup as in Ex. 30. If we restrict ourself to W ’s with
|W | = 5 and compute the value of γi conditioned over these W , then maxi(γi) ≈ 0.34.
Assigning all key bits with |γi| < γ = 0.13 as significant, we obtain a key partM with the
m = 29 bit positions {1, 3, 10, 14, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 39, 41, 46,
49, 50, 51, 52, 57, 59, 61, 63, 68, 74}. Our analysis of the function A(M,W ) shows that
for about 44% of the keys we have ε0 > ε
′
0 = 0.1 when the subkey is correctly guessed.
If the subkey is not correctly guessed, we observe ε1 < ε
′
1 = 0.08. Then, the correct
subkey of 29 bits can be detected using at most N ≈ 215 samples, with time complexity
N2u+m ≈ 255. Note that the condition N < (69
5
)
is satisfied here. 
9.8 Application to Grain
The eSTREAM Phase 3 candidate Grain-128 [73] consists of an LFSR, an NFSR and an
output function h(x). It has n = 128 key bits, t = 96 IV bits and the full initialization
function has R = 256 rounds. We consider again the Boolean function F (K, V ) which
computes the first keystream bit of Grain-128 after r rounds of initialization. In [55],
Grain-128 was analyzed with chosen IV statistical tests. With N = 25 samples and u = 22
variable IV bits, they observed a non-randomness of the first keystream bit after r = 192
rounds. They also observed a non-randomness in the initial state bits after the full
number of rounds. In [105], a non-randomness up to 313 rounds was reported (without
justification). In this section we provide key recovery attack for up to r = 180 rounds with
slightly reduced complexity compared with exhaustive search. In the following example,
weak IV bits for scenario 2 have been found again by a random search.
Example 32. Consider u = 7 variable IV bits U with bit positions {2, 6, 8, 55, 58, 78,
90}. For the coefficient with index α = 127 (corresponding to the monomial of maximum
degree), a significant imbalance for up to r = 180 rounds can be detected: the monomial of
degree 7 appears only with a probability of p < 0.2 for 80% of the keys. Note that in [55],
the attack with u = 7 could only be applied to r = 160 rounds, while our improvement
comes from the inclusion of weak IV bits. 
In the following examples, our goal is to show that there exists some reduced key recovery
attack for up to r = 180 rounds on Grain-128. We use the same weak IV’s as in the
previous example.
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Example 33. Consider again the u = 7 IV bits U with bit positions {2, 6, 8, 55, 58, 78,
90}. For r = 150 rounds we choose the coefficient with index α = 117 and include key
bits with neutrality measure less than γ = 0.49 in the list of significant key bits. This
gives a subkey M of m = 99 bits. Our simulations show that ε0 > ε
′
0 = 0.48 for about
95% of the keys, hence pβ = 0.05. On the other hand, for 128 wrong guesses of the subkey
with N = 200 samples, we never observed that ε1 > 0.48, hence pα < 2
−7. This gives an
attack with time complexity N2m+u+2npα ≈ 2121 which is an improvement of a factor of
(at least) 1/pα = 2
7 compared to exhaustive search. 
Example 34. With the same choice for U as in Ex. 32 and 33, we take α = 127 for r = 180
rounds. We identified m = 110 significant key bits for M . Our simulations show that
ε0 > ε
′
0 = 0.4 in about 30% of the runs when the subkey is correctly guessed. For 128
wrong guesses of the subkey with N = 128 samples, we never observed that ε1 > 0.4.
Here we have an attack with time complexity N2m+u + 2npα ≈ 2124, i.e. an improvement
of a factor of 24. 
9.9 Summary
A recent framework for chosen IV statistical distinguishers for stream ciphers has been
exploited to provide new methods for key recovery attacks. This is based on a polynomial
description of output bits as a function of the key and the IV. A deviation of the algebraic
normal form (ANF) from random indicates that not every bit of the key or the IV has full
influence on the value of certain coefficients in the ANF. It has been demonstrated how this
can be exploited to derive information on the key faster than exhaustive key search through
approximation of the polynomial description and using the concept of probabilistic neutral
key bits. Two applications of our methods through extensive experiments have been
given: A reduced complexity key recovery for Trivium with IV initialization reduced to
672 of its 1152 iterations, and a reduced complexity key recovery for Grain-128 with IV
initialization reduced to 180 of its 256 iterations. This answers positively the question
whether statistical distinguishers based on polynomial descriptions of the IV initialization
of a stream cipher can be successfully exploited for key recovery. On the other hand, our
methods are not capable to provide reduced complexity key recovery of the eSTREAM
Phase 3 candidates Trivium and Grain-128 with full initialization.
Chapter 10
Conclusions
The design and analysis of stream ciphers is a fascinating field of activity. It is scientifi-
cally interesting to investigate how much the number of mathematical operations can be
reduced to construct a cipher that is still secure. For example, are a few integer additions
and bitwise operations sufficient to provide a high level of security? Any insight of this
type can also be useful in the design of efficient cryptographic hash functions. On the
other hand, there is a practical need for stream ciphers, which will likely be increasing
in the coming future due to lightweight applications such as RFID. In this thesis, we ad-
dressed cryptanalysis of lightweight stream ciphers. We presented the whole range from
full attacks, identification of some partial weaknesses, or verification of security, and we
derived or improved cryptanalytic methods for different building blocks (with a focus on
algebraic attacks). In particular, we conclude that T-functions have not delivered a good
performance in practice, while shift registers with carry are still promising. The security
of the reputable hardware-oriented designs Trivium and Grain-128 could be verified with
respect to our methods, but the security margin seems larger for software-oriented stream
ciphers: only 8 out of 20 rounds of Salsa20 can be broken yet. It will be interesting to see
how the winners of eSTREAM will prove in practice.
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Appendix A
Attack on MAG
MAG is a synchronous stream cipher submitted to the eSTREAM project. We present a
very simple distinguishing attack (with some predicting feature) on MAG, requiring only
129 successive bytes of known keystream, computation and memory are negligible. The
attack has been verified.
A.1 Brief Description
In the standard version of the stream cipher MAG [121], the internal state consists of 127
registers xi of 32 bit size, as well as a carry register C of 32 bit size. The secret key
is used to initialize all registers x0, . . . , x126 and C (where the details of the key setup
are not important for the attack). In order to produce the keystream, MAG is applied
iteratively; a single iteration consists of an update and an output period. The description
of the update does not seem to be consistent in the paper and in the provided code; we
will refer to the code (however, the attack is of very general nature and may also work for
other versions). In update period i, the carry C and register xi are modified. In a first
step of the algorithm, two neighboring registers are compared in order to determine the
operation for the carry update, and in a second step, the carry is used to update register
xi; more precisely,
C ′ =
{
C ⊕ xi+1 if xi+2 > xi+3
C ⊕ x¯i+1 otherwise (A.1)
x′i = xi ⊕ C ′. (A.2)
Here, x¯ denotes the complement of x; updated variables are primed. Notice that a register
xi is updated only once in 127 iterations, whereas the carry C is updated in each step
of iteration. We point out that comparison of registers is the only operation on words,
whereas XOR and complementation are operations on bits. It remains to describe the
(cryptographic) output of MAG: in output period i, the string xi mod 256 is sent to
the keystream zi (notice that addition of indices in xi is performed modulo 128, whereas
indices in zi are continuous).
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A.2 Distinguishing Attack
The first 127 bytes of keystream zi reveal the 8 least significant bits (lsb’s) of all registers
xi, and the additional keystream byte z127 reveals the 8 lsb’s of the updated register x
′
0.
Given these 128 successive bytes of keystream byte z0, . . . , z127, it is possible to compute
two strings, one of them corresponding to the next keystream byte z128: first, Eq. A.2
defines how to reveal the corresponding carry, namely C ′ = x0⊕x′0. According to Eq. A.1,
the carry is updated by C ′′ = C ′⊕x1 or by C ′′ = C ′⊕ x¯1 (with equal probability). Finally,
the register x1 is updated by x
′
1 = C
′′ ⊕ x1. These relations can be reduced modulo 256
(in order to make use of the known keystream bytes) and combined; using the fact that
they also hold for other indices, we conclude
zi+128 =
{
zi ⊕ zi+1 ⊕ zi+2 ⊕ zi+127 with Pr = 1/2
zi ⊕ zi+1 ⊕ z¯i+2 ⊕ zi+127 with Pr = 1/2 (A.3)
Prediction of zi+128 may be used to distinguish the keystream of the cipher from a truly
random sequence: given the actual keystream byte zi+128, the attacker may verify if it
corresponds to one of the two results of Eq. A.3. If not, the keystream is not produced by
MAG. If yes, the keystream is produced by MAG with a probability of error corresponding
to pα = 1/128. In order to reduce the error pα (false alarms), more keystream may be
used to verify Eq. A.3. Furthermore, the distinguisher may be used to recover some part
of the state; each byte of keystream reveals one bit of information, namely the path of
the branching. However, we did not study the state-recovery attack in more detail.
We conclude that the design of MAG has substantial weaknesses; revealing some part
of the internal state, and sparse use of operations on words may be delicate choices of
design for a secure stream cipher.
A.3 Example of an Attack
The attack was verified, using the code provided in [121]. In Tab. A.1, we give an example
of keystream produced by the standard implementation of MAG, initialized with the zero
seed. According to the previous section, we verify the non-randomness of the last red-
colored byte z128 (where the index counts from 0): Eq. A.3 yields that either z128 =
0x05 ⊕ 0xF0 ⊕ 0x53 ⊕ 0x16 = 0xB0 or z128 = 0x05 ⊕ 0xF0 ⊕ 0x53 ⊕ 0xE9 = 0x4F;
obviously, the first result is the appropriate one.
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Table A.1: Some example keystream produced by standard implementation of MAG for
the zero seed.
0x05 53 16 29 77 23 33 5C 05 FC F8 57 26 1A 98 6B
0xAD 33 E2 2F 02 1B 3D 2E 82 44 82 E9 BF 8E C3 88
0x0F FE 88 21 2E 5D 6E EA 6B 62 1C 62 4D 7B 51 27
0x75 CE 34 53 CA 2A 32 B9 56 23 43 2C 19 5C 14 AE
0xC5 42 BA A8 59 11 8F 41 F0 48 2B 81 4D 52 C7 EA
0xB0 F5 BA 76 62 9B 93 7D 93 24 9C C2 7B 70 EE 3D
0x44 02 B8 E3 CF DF 36 7D EE F3 00 79 20 23 7A 60
0xB3 8B AD 3E 1B F4 BB 57 AF 99 53 AF 5C C7 88 F0
0xB0 23 6B 16 8E 3D 57 0D 0C A0 29 BD 19 F0 51 5B
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